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ABSTRACT

Seaport Vulnerability to Criminal Networks: A Mixed Method Approach to Measuring
Criminological Vulnerability in the Top 30 U.S. Container Ports
by
Leonid Lantsman

Advisor: Michael Maxfield
Seaports form a unique space for criminological examination. As the locus points for the
majority of international and domestic trade criminal network access to a port can provide
outsized benefits. While ports are physical spaces they are underlined by complex systems
incorporating public and private agencies, companies and small entities. Underlying the
administrative and logistical activity at the port is a jurisdictional web of public and private
security regulatory agencies. The complexity of the environment creates vulnerabilities that
criminal networks can use to gain access to ports. This dissertation developed a Seaport
Vulnerability Framework (SVF), developed from the rational choice and situational crime
prevention literature with a multi-disciplinary focus that allows security stakeholders to identify
whether a port is at risk of utilization by criminal networks. The SVF is used to measure and
analyze criminological vulnerability in the top 30 U.S. container seaports and in-depth in a case
study at the Port of New York and New Jersey. Finally, I examine the implications of the SVF
for port and maritime security policy and port security assessments in the U.S. and worldwide.
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Chapter Outline
This dissertation is divided into nine chapters.
-

Chapter 1 describes the structure of the maritime transportation system, the shipping
process for a container transit, and the limitations of the current approach to port security.

-

Chapter 2 explores the theoretical perspectives that inform the Seaport Vulnerability
Framework (SVF). These include how seaports are prime locations of CRAVED
products and services; how seaports can act as crime places, including crime generators
and crime attractors; how the concepts of defensible space can be adapted to seaports;
and supply chain security research and best practices. The chapter describes how the
multiple theories are combined to form an integrated theoretical approach to developing
the SVF.

-

Chapter 3 introduces and details the SVF, developed from a two-year pilot study at the
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, and informed by the literature on seaport
administration and criminal networks and publicly available cases of criminal network
seaport use.

-

Chapter 4 presents the primary research question and research propositions.

-

Chapter 5 describes the methodological approach of this project, data sources, and
methodology used in developing the Seaport Vulnerability Framework to examine
comparative vulnerability in the top 30 U.S. container seaports and in the case study of
the Port of New York and New Jersey (PNYNJ). This chapter lays out how the
vulnerabilities are operationalized, describes the data sources used to measure them, and
the primary data limitations.

1

-

Chapter 6 analyzes the top 30 U.S. container ports using the Seaport Vulnerability
Framework.

-

Chapter 7 is a case study of the PNYNJ, examining the port through the Seaport
Vulnerability Framework using a mixed methods approach through interviews, public
sources, and primary source documentation to develop a criminological vulnerability
model of the port.

-

Chapter 8 examines the policy implications and recommendations of the Seaport
Vulnerability Framework for U.S. maritime and port policy and seaport vulnerability
assessments.

-

Chapter 9 addresses the study limitations, focusing on data sources and measurement
issues, and details future directions for research.
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Chapter 1- Introduction
1.1 Problem statement
Seaports provide a unique space for criminological examination. As the spatial loci for
the majority of international and domestic trade, access to a port can yield significant financial
benefits for a criminal network (Interagency Commission on Crime at U.S. Seaports 2000;
Organization of American States 2013). While ports are physical spaces, they are also spaces
defined by complex systems marked by intersecting stakeholder roles, including administrative
agencies, private companies, and regulatory entities. Underlying the administrative and
logistical activity that is a seaport’s primary function are the jurisdictional responsibilities of
numerous public and private security regulatory agencies. The complexity created by a seaport’s
simultaneous existence as a physical space and as a theoretical space, characterized by contesting
legal, administrative, and market claims, results in gaps or vulnerabilities that criminal networks
can exploit to gain access to ports.
Criminal networks use the maritime transportation system to move narcotics, stolen
vehicles, people, and illicit goods around the world to access new markets, supply existing ones,
and generate greater proceeds for their activities. The amount of harm generated by illicit
criminal activity and dark markets can be measured in the billions of dollars, as illicit goods,
such as small arms and narcotics, proliferate throughout the world (Buchanan and Chavarria
2015). Understanding the vulnerabilities created at the points transited by these illicit goods,
such as seaports, and understanding how criminal networks access those points addresses a
significant gap in the efforts to curb such illicit flows. Today, seaport security in the U.S. and
abroad is determined by port and cargo security assessments performed by federal agencies such
as the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection that do not currently
3

incorporate a criminological approach, instead focusing on efforts to prevent infrastructure and
human losses due to terrorist attacks. Using a criminological lens to identify and understand
seaports provides policymakers with an additional assessment methodology to assist in securing
seaports against criminal networks.
This dissertation employs a mixed method approach to identify and examine
vulnerabilities at seaports through a seaport vulnerability analysis of the top 30 container ports in
the U.S. and a case study of the Port of New York and New Jersey (PNYNJ).
1.2 Definitions
To remain consistent with previous research on crime at U.S. seaports, I use the
definitions in the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security at U.S. Seaports (2000).
Seaports refer to “harbors for seagoing vessels with facilities to lade and unlade cargo
and/or passengers and with easy access to the sea (from the 24 nautical mile contiguous zone to
the terminal).” “Ports” also refers to the port authorities that operate the cargo handling
facilities. In this dissertation, the term ports is used to refer to the places where marine cargo
handling operations occur and which may have other services located in the area such as
warehousing or trucking. Both ports and seaports are used interchangeably in this document.
Criminal networks: Instead of the term “organized crime,” I use the term “criminal
networks.” Organized crime implies levels of organization not found in most criminal groups
(Van Duyne 2005). In addition, the term “criminal networks” acknowledges that much of the
criminal activity that occurs at seaports is a result of criminal actors exploiting market forces that
enable them to engage in illicit forms of arbitrage (UNODC 2012). The term “criminal
networks” captures the notion that groups engaging in criminal activities either at companies
operating a seaport, or using the services at a port, are likely not to be organized in a hierarchical
4

manner. However, in some seaports, such as the PNYNJ, “organized crime” is the most
commonly used term and I use that term when examining activity at the PNYNJ.
1.3 Maritime transportation system
The international transportation supply chain has been described as a system of systems
(DHS 2005; Mansouri et al 2009; MARAD 2009). The facets of the maritime transportation
system (MTS), rather than operating as a closed system, are interconnected with feedback loops
occurring at every point. Seaports are themselves a system within the MTS where vessels,
intermodal connections, waterways, users, and ports form the key components of the system.
This foundational perspective of the MTS underscores the fact that security initiatives in any
sub-system are compromised by vulnerabilities in others. Therefore, while shipping in the U.S.
is governed by numerous security protocols (U.S. General Accounting Office 2010) and
waterways are governed by numerous public regulatory initiatives, security at seaports is subject
to a variety of inputs and pressures from the systems within the MTS.
Policymakers have attempted to address regulatory or security gaps through a variety of
international and domestic security programs with a focus on the primary vector of maritime
transport, the shipping container (Goulielmos and Anastasakos 2005; Martinosi, Ortiz, and Willis
2006: 219; Kruk and Donner 2008). The transit of a container, when viewed within the context
of the system of systems, displays how vulnerabilities exist at all points along the supply chain
(Barnes and Oloruntoba 2005; Pate et al. 2008; Grillot et al. 2009).
1.4 Shipping container transit
Container shipping represents the primary method of movement for the vast majority of
cargo worldwide and remains the primary method of cargo import and export to and from the
U.S. (MARAD 2009; USDOT 2011; UNCTAD 2012). In 2010, one in every 11 containers was
5

either bound for or originated in the U.S., equating to roughly nine percent of total global trade
(USDOT 2011). Typically, a container shipped from an overseas destination to the U.S. is
packed on order with goods from a single factory. Goods may also be sent to consolidated
freight stations where a container is filled with cargo from multiple consignees. The container is
then moved by road or rail to an embarkation seaport. The container may be inspected by both
the origin country’s customs service and, in some seaports, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) through U.S. agents stationed at overseas ports through the Container Security Initiative
(U.S. CBP 2009)1. The container is loaded onto an ocean-going vessel, itself subject to a
security framework, the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code (International
Code for the Security of Ships and Port Facilities 2004). Depending on the routes available from
the embarkation seaport, some containers may be shipped to a transshipment seaport, such as
Gioia Tauro, Sicily or Jebel Ali, United Arab Emirates, where they are loaded onto another
vessel for transfer to its final destination seaport (Vis and DeKoster 2003).
After reaching a U.S. destination port, the container is offloaded at a shipping terminal,
either port authority-owned or privately owned and operating on port authority-leased land. The
various facilities at the port that handle maritime cargo are governed by the Maritime Transport
Safety Act of 2002 (MTSA 2002), which states in Sec. 70102 that “the Secretary shall conduct a
detailed vulnerability assessment of the facilities and vessels that may be involved in a
transportation security incident.” This is the base legislation that enables the U.S. Coast Guard
to identify critical facilities and conduct assessments of vulnerability based on the conditions set
by the MTSA for what constitutes a critical transportation security incident, defined as “a
security incident resulting in a significant loss of life, environmental damage, transportation

1

See Appendix A for further information on overseas inspections.
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system disruption, or economic disruption in a particular area” (MTSA 2002; Sec. 70101). The
U.S. Coast Guard conducts these vulnerability assessments using the Maritime Security Risk
Analysis Matrix, or MSRAM, and has done so for over 30,000 individual facilities (Keating,
Howard, and Arimoto 2014). Therefore the container moves through a U.S. port which has a
core underlying assessment framework focused on disruptive incidents. After the container
arrives at a U.S. port, not only are the facilities it passes through subject to vulnerability analysis,
the container and its contents are as well (Congressional Budget Office 2016). Some containers
will at the point of entry be identified for inspection by CBP through the cargo security risk
analysis system called the Automated Targeting System (ATS) that incorporates data from
multiple systems to develop a risk summary for inbound and outboard cargo (Importer Security
Filing and Additional Carrier Requirements). If the cargo is identified for further inspection it
may be taken to a Centralized Examination Station, which may be located on or off the terminal
site (19 CFR 118.2). Containers not singled out for inspection move to a holding area on the
terminal until a drayage (or short haul) truck picks up the container or it is taken to a rail yard for
transportation to an inland distribution point. If picked up by a drayage truck, the container is
taken to its final destination (Bensman and Bromberg 2009) or to a warehouse for onward
distribution, generally no greater than 75 miles from the port.
1.5 Port security initiatives
The transit scenario described above illustrates the interconnected sub-systems involved
in shipping. At both the embarkation and debarkation points, the seaport plays an integral role as
a space where security can be concentrated to prevent the transit of illicit cargo. Since 2001,
with the aim of addressing security at seaports, particularly the use of containers by terrorist
groups, policymakers have implemented numerous seaport and shipping security initiatives with
7

varying degrees of success (Goulielmos and Anastasakos 2005; Martinosi, Ortiz, and Willis
2006; Kruk and Donner 2008). While this dissertation addresses vulnerabilities beyond
container security, the container security regime serves as the foundation of U.S. and
international seaport security.
The regime is primarily implemented by U.S. Customs and Border Protection, which
before September 2001, inspected between two and four percent of the containers that entered
American ports (Marine Link 2004; McClure 2007). After the September 2001 terrorist attacks,
and following simulations detailing an attack on a U.S. port (Los Angeles/Long Beach) using a
container (Meade and Molander 2006), the public and Congress pressured U.S. regulatory
agencies to implement more stringent screening regulations (U.S. General Accounting Office
2008; U.S. General Accounting Office 2008a).2 Currently, several maritime security initiatives
are enforced at U.S. seaports and form the core security framework addressing illicit use of the
supply chain.3 The primary focus of these initiatives is to push inspection of containers away
from U.S. seaports and back to overseas embarkation points (U.S. Customs and Border
Protection 2009; U.S. General Accounting Office 2012).
The other aspect of the port security regime is the role of the U.S. Coast Guard which
oversees port security regulations under the federal mandate of the Maritime Transportation
Safety Act of 2002 (MTSA 2002) and the SAFE Ports Act of 2006 which provided the U.S.
Coast Guard with an increased responsibility to ensure port security in the 36 primary Coast
Guard sectors. This includes assessing port vulnerability with a primary focus on risk that

2

In fiscal year 2009, 4.9% of containers were scanned through passive non-intrusive inspection systems (GAO
2009).
3
For a detailed examination of the security framework currently in force at U.S. seaports, see Appendix A.
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heavily weighs loss of life in attacks on facilities (GAO 2011; Keating, Howard, and Arimoto
2011).
1.6 Limitations of current approach
The regulations that comprise the container and port security framework in the U.S.
primarily focus on preventing terrorist use of maritime transportation and addressing threats to
maritime infrastructure through a screening of containers and identifying vulnerable targets at
U.S. seaports (Carluer et al. 2008; European Commission 2010). The core underlying condition
for assessment in the MTSA is that the assessed facility is primarily assessed as to the effect on
damage or loss of life as a result of an incident (MTSA 2002; Sec. 70102). This pushes
regulatory attention away from the daily use of ports by criminal networks focused on illicit
trade, which do not seek to disrupt the flow of maritime cargo or cause loss of life (Naim 2005).
Concurrent with the underlying focus away from criminal networks in the existing port
security vulnerability assessment framework, the intensive focus on container screening is often
based on a scenario in which terrorists transport and penetrate U.S. borders with nuclear
materials (Carafano 2006; GAO 2009; CBO 2016). This has underpinned the congressional
demand for 100% screening in ports outside of the U.S. (SCAN Act), but the disproportionate
focus on the nuclear terrorism scenario diverts financial and regulatory investments away from
threats which may be of greater and more realistic concern such as preventing criminal network
intrusion in port labor or ancillary services providers (Carafano 2006). Furthermore, the U.S.
focus on screening initiatives has increased concern in Europe for the financial and trade
implications due to the significant financial burden – 100% screening would cost the European
Union roughly €430 million for screening and detection equipment and infrastructure investment
(European Commission 2010; Papa 2013).
9

The increased focus on intensive container screening based on a perceived threat of
nuclear terrorism belies the myriad of illicit activities criminal networks have used ports for in
the past: transporting small arms bound for conflict zones or fragile states leading to increased
arms capabilities for armed factions in civil war areas (Amnesty International 2006); transporting
narcotics and stolen vehicles that provide a source of hard currency used to fuel other activities
(Farah 2010; Clarke and Brown 2003; Lantsman 2013); and counterfeit or stolen goods (UNICRI
2007). The continued use of seaports by criminal networks to transport illicit cargo has been
addressed at a macro-level, examining illicit flows as an economic issue (Naim 2005; UNODC
2011; Luna 2012). However, except for certain types of criminal activity, such as illegal,
unreported and unregulated fishing (Petrossian, Marteache, and Viollaz 2014), a criminological
approach has yet to be used to identify the specific contextual and situational factors that make
the maritime transportation system in general and, certain seaports in particular, more attractive
to criminal networks.
This dissertation lays out the underlying criminological framework for an integrated
theoretical approach that builds a Seaport Vulnerability Framework enabling port security
stakeholders to begin to understand how and why criminal networks use certain seaports to
transport illicit cargo.
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Chapter 2- Theoretical framework
The core of this dissertation, the Seaport Vulnerability Framework (SVF), is framed
through a set of criminological theories including crime pattern, defensible space, and
CRAVED4, informed by research into the formation and structure of criminal networks and in
the area of supply chain security. Seaports are large complex physical and administrative entities
and to make sense of vulnerability, multiple criminological theories are used to identify
vulnerabilities in three primary categories: (1) physical; (2) administrative; and (3) logistical.
This chapter examines the broad theoretical perspectives that inform the SVF.
The primary assumption underlying the theories that inform the SVF is that certain
seaports function as crime places. All other theoretical insights from research on supply chain
security and criminal networks fit within the supposition that ports function as crime places,
much like certain neighborhoods or micro-locations (Weisburd, Groff, and Yang 2012).
However, it is important to note that the standard interpretation of a crime place, as one where
repeat victimization occurs and which accounts for a greater portion of crime than in similar
places, is not entirely relevant within the context of seaports (Eck and Weisburd 1995). Rather,
seaports as crime places can be defined as those ports which are more likely to be utilized by
criminal networks, whether they are the site of greater victimization or attract greater amounts of
illicit traffic.
2.1 Seaports as crime places
Crime pattern theory, informed by assumptions about routine activities and rational
choice, posits that for a crime to occur three factors must be present: (1) a suitable target; (2) a
motivated offender; and (3) the absence of persons in a position to intervene, directly or

4

Products or services that are Concealable Removable Available Valuable Enjoyable Disposable.
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indirectly, with a criminal event (Cohen and Felson 1979; Clarke and Eck 2005). It provides a
theoretical foundation for a layered understanding of how certain seaports and geographical or
economic areas within ports may be more likely to be used by criminal networks (Brantingham
and Brantingham 2009). Furthermore, in the maritime and port security literature, the multistakeholder environment and nodal character of seaports create numerous vulnerabilities that
criminal networks can use or exploit (Brooks and Pelot 2008).
Research on place has generally attempted to address crime vis-à-vis the distinctions
between the place in question and the surrounding environment (Eck and Weisburd 1995). The
focus has been on micro-locations with criminogenic properties (Roncek and Maier 1990).
However, the consensus among researchers in the environmental crime paradigm is that crime
clusters at many levels of analysis (Sherman 1989; Brantingham and Brantingham 1999;
Weisburd et al. 2004). The key finding, one supported by longitudinal studies, is that a small
percentage of the units of analysis are responsible for a majority or plurality of criminal
activities, generally following some permutation of the 80:20 rule or the Pareto Principle
(Sherman et al. 1989; Roncek 2000; Weisburd et al. 2004, Weisburd, Groff, and Yang 2012).5
However, it is important to disaggregate crime at different levels of spatial analysis, especially
when it is within larger units (Weisburd, Bernasco, and Bruisma 2009; Weisburd, Groff, and
Yang 2012).
More recently, Weisburd, Groff, and Yang (2012) examined crime at micro-locations in
Seattle to create a theory of the criminology of place, which has implications for this dissertation.
The five suppositions of the authors provide a basic framework and guiding principles for the

5

That is, some variation on the stipulation that 80% of crime(s) is caused by 20% of offenders. This has also been
applied to specific areas or locations, in that some version of 80:20 rule applies to locations where a small
percentage of locations are the site of most crime(s) (Weisburd, Groff, and Yang 2012).
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understanding of not only the physical conditions that increase vulnerability but also support the
importance of disaggregating vulnerability at seaports into discrete categories.
First, the authors propose that crime is tightly concentrated in hot spots, building on
research going back decades but which is strongly informed by their longitudinal approach.
Second, hot spots are stable over time, again informed by the longitudinal method. Third, crime
places should be examined at the lowest and most suitable unit of analysis because aggregating
units into higher orders masks significant variability within the unit. This is the approach taken
by this dissertation which aims to understand the vulnerability of seaports by disaggregating the
concept of “vulnerability” into categories of vulnerability and then individual vulnerabilities, not
all of which examine the same unit. Fourth, not only does crime vary within units and the microunit, in which the authors focused on the block vice the neighborhood, but also within each unit
and micro-unit’s various social and cultural contexts. While this is a difficult concept to unpack
without field research, the case study of the Port of New York and New Jersey in Chapter 7
discusses this concept through the examination of the kinds of labor and economic entities with
employees who are more likely to participate in criminal ventures. Finally, crime at places is
predictable, and therefore, it is possible to create effective crime prevention strategies.
With the seaport as the place of analysis, crime pattern theory offers two ways to
understand seaport vulnerability: (1) ports as crime generators; and (2) ports as crime attractors
(Brantingham and Brantingham 1999: 2009). Crime generators are places that become hot spots
of criminal activity because they have legitimate activities or facilities that criminals seek out.
Crime attractors are particular places, areas, neighborhoods, or districts that have a larger than
proportional amount of criminal opportunities.
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2.2 Seaports as crime generators
While the theory of crime place provides the underlying support for focusing on
identifying ports more likely to be targeted by criminal networks, criminological theory provides
further support for ports as different types of crime places. For example, many seaports contain
an abundance of CRAVED goods, which present attractive targets for cargo thieves (Interagency
Commission on Crime at U.S. Seaports 2002; Gooch 2011; Burges 2012; FreightWatch 2013).
In China, for example, cargo was most reported stolen from ports or facilities at ports as opposed
to other types of cargo storage facilities (FreightWatch 2013). The presence of a large amount of
desirable goods may, in and of themselves, create the conditions for specific types of criminal
activity much like the presence of targets in a neighborhood or within a spatial environment
generates crime (Weisburd, Groff, and Yang 2012). These crime generator ports may also occur
where there are particular intersections of transport, offering particular access or utility to
criminal networks, for specific types of products or services (Brantingham and Brantingham
1993).
2.3 Seaports as crime attractors
At a macro level, some seaports may develop reputations for criminal network activity
and drive out legitimate companies and, in the process, attract more illicit criminal networks. At
a meso-level of analysis, certain economic sectors in a seaport, such as freight forwarders,
drayage, longshoremen, and facility maintenance, may increase its attractiveness to criminal
networks. Exploitation of already vulnerable sectors can make a seaport a crime attractor, as
criminal networks are drawn to ports through positive reinforcement. The concept of “port
shopping” identified by Shane (2010) in the context of auto theft networks is particularly
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relevant here. For instance, export-orientated theft networks are more likely to consider using
known porous ports over others (Lantsman 2013).
At a micro-level of analysis, specific companies within sectors may be crime attractors as
well. As an example, multiple physical and administrative vulnerabilities may combine to make
a specific terminal operator or janitorial services provider a crime attractor, resulting in increased
criminal network use. When a single, already-compromised entity (such as a shipping line,
terminal operator, or even freight forwarder) commands a large market share of a particular
sector at a port, this may be sufficient to drive legitimate entities away and attract more criminal
networks by reputation. This concept, therefore, informs the vulnerability focused on identifying
the size of a particular sector, since a compromised entity in a sector with few entities can have
an outsized impact on the vulnerability of the port.
The administrative and economic factors that can lead ports or sectors to be crime
generators or attractors need to be considered within environmental and spatial characteristics as
well, which can be further examined through the perspective of defensible space.
2.4 Defensible space at seaports
The concept of defensible space (Newman 1972; 1976; 1983) has been applied to
describe the architectural and environmental factors that lead certain types of facilities and areas
to experience higher levels of victimization.
Most seaports are large, physically enclosed or fenced in spaces with specific
organizational and administrative cultures, set in the physical environment. Defensible space
explains how the seaport’s physical environment can lead to greater or lesser use by criminal
networks. Just victimization differs within a neighborhood – i.e. burglary rates or individual
sexual assaults – specific companies or vulnerabilities may be targeted based on the individual
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spatial and environmental characteristics of different seaports as well. For example, drug
smuggling networks may repeatedly utilize specific companies or agencies to facilitate transfers
(Zaitch 2002); this would likely have a repeated environmental dimension as well, depending on
the company’s primary operational area. For an example of actual victimization, consider the
repeated theft of luxury vehicles from the Port of NY/NJ (Lantsman 2013). Offenders were
successful in the cases highlighted because the physical environment lacked situational crime
prevention techniques (Clarke and Eck 2003; Zahm 2004), such as good lighting and place
managers.
Later research in the defensible space field highlighted the concept of offensible space
(Atlas 1991; Felson 2006; Edward and Levi 2008), where criminals may utilize the principles of
crime prevention through environmental design to create safe spaces for their own activities
Felson (2006: 91) describes a theoretical type offensible space where offenders gain control over
an area and law-abiding citizens or companies are discouraged from intervention. In the port
environment this concept explains how in certain ports around the world law enforcement
agencies have difficulty gaining entry both the administrative structures operating at the port, and
in which leads to a lack of de facto physical access. Edward and Levi (2008) conclude that fear
of retaliation, weak agency oversight, and links between legitimate interests and criminal
networks all can create spaces where networks operate with impunity. Through the complicity
of legitimate entities, in other words, physical or administrative spaces may be appropriated by
criminal groups. In the field of study which examines the intersection of legitimate and
illegitimate business, Tilley and Hopkin’s (2008) survey of small business owners in three high
crime areas within British cities, found that small businesses were often approached to cooperate
with criminal networks. Similarly, a crime attractor seaport may support businesses that are
repeatedly approached to cooperate with criminal networks. Cooperation in these cases may
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depend, in part, on whether these criminal networks have been able to develop an offensible
space at the port.
At the Port of NY/NJ, a protracted history of criminal network associations led to
offensible spaces where criminal networks could operate without fear of enforcement (Block
1982; President’s Commission on Organized Crime 1986; WCNYH 2010; WCNYH 2011;
WCNYH 2012; WCNYH 2013). Criminal network exploitation of a seaport’s administrative
vulnerabilities can give rise to a culture of secrecy and fear among employees who are less likely
to report activity to higher authorities, contributing to the social dimension of offensible space.
Finally, the concept of indefensible space can also illuminate the challenges of physical
and administrative security at seaports (Cozens et al. 2002). At the macro level, Paoli (2002)
studied the disorganized spaces where criminal networks operate in the heroin trade and found that
criminal networks are capable of taking root where there is lax enforcement and may take over
entire physical areas. At seaports, this macro concept may be understood conceptually as the
physical or administrative space where there is lax defense by place managers or target guardians.
In this situation, circumstances may call for the creation of agencies to manage those places, such
as the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor at the Port of NY/NJ.
2.5 Seaports as “Risky Facilities”
Building on research on crime places, the risky facilities framework developed by Eck,
Clarke, and Guerette (2007) provides an additional framework for identifying facilities’
characteristics that cause some to be more crime-prone than others. The authors focus on
facilities or places that share similar characteristics (e.g., taverns, schools, railway stations,
parking lots). Comparison of other variables among environmentally similar places may provide
insight into why some places have greater concentrations of crime. They define facilities as
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large buildings or areas of land with common use characteristics, which encompass even smaller
facilities such as convenience stores, betting shops, or even Social Security offices. The central
premise of risky facilities is that a small proportion of facilities will account for the majority of
criminal activity within a bounded geographic area. The theoretical literature examined by Eck,
Clarke, and Guerette (2007) offers five reasons for differing crime levels among facilities, which
assist in understanding seaport vulnerability to criminal networks.
First, they examine the proposition that some facilities are riskier than others due to
random variation. They note, however, that when studies incorporate temporal variation in
measurement, random variation does not stand up to scrutiny (Clarke and Martin 1975).
Second, differential reporting processes could account for significant differences in a
facility’s riskiness. This is particularly relevant to facilities where physical operations are
embedded within opaque administrative, regulatory, or even sub-cultural characteristics; seaports
area prime example here. Seaports’ differential reporting processes, or even reporting that is not
coordinated across or within agencies, can and does create perceptions of vulnerability or
riskiness. This can lead one port to having a higher perception of risk, even while nearby ports
with the same underlying characteristics and risk profiles avoid developing a similar reputation.
Closer examination of the jurisdictional structure underlying a facility (e.g., is the facility subject
to any specific enforcement procedures, regulations, or laws), the administrative structure (how
many entities operate at the facility, what are the hiring practices of those entities), and whether
any specific sub-cultures exist among employees or individuals who frequent the facility (do the
specific characteristics of facility employees engender specific behaviors or activities that others
do not participate in, outside of the differences in work) can assist in creating the risk profile of
seaport. These specific characteristics do lead seaports to behave differently from other
categories of risky facilities.
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Third, the authors focus on the number and quality of targets at the facility itself.
Discounting the fact that the number of targets present at a facility is a function of the size of the
facility, they note that the quality of the targets present at the facility may be an indication of
riskiness as well. The Seaport Vulnerability Framework incorporates this insight to account for
both the quantity of traffic at the port, the value of cargo (or CRAVED cargo) present at the port,
and the spatial concentration of CRAVED cargo to build the port’s vulnerability profile.
Fourth, the number of offenders and the proximity to offenders may lead to greater
riskiness. Since seaports are conduit points for significant levels of cargo from areas often
outside the local vicinity of the port, understanding the seaport’s cargo profile may provide a
better indication of the types of networks that seek to use the port for illicit trafficking. At some
seaports, the majority of cargo is consumed within the surrounding regions. For example, the
surrounding communities of the Port of NY/NJ consume the vast majority of cargo that passes
through the port (Rodrigue and Guan 2008).
Lastly, the different administrative characteristics of places or “place management”
provides a final plausible explanation for differential crime activity. At the micro-level, this can
be understood along simple differences, such as closing times at bars and how drinks are
dispensed, among other factors. At a conceptual level, these comprise the different
administrative rules or procedures that may act as crime enablers (Clarke and Eck 2003).
Seaports in the U.S. are subject to a unified overlying set of macro-national level security
procedures through the U.S. Coast Guard and through the application of standard security
procedures outlined in the 2002 MTSA and the 2006 Safe Port Act. It is at the meso-level,
however, that seaports differ. At that level, seaport differences emerge among local law
enforcement structures and whether they employ specialized situational crime prevention

19

techniques. This provides a port-specific examination of differential place management
characteristics.
Recently, researchers have used this risky facilities framework to examine the differential
characteristics of seaports identified as recipient ports for illegal, unreported, and unregulated
(IUU) fishing (Petrossian, Marteache, and Viollaz 2014). The authors grouped ports based on
whether they received vessels identified as IUU-participatory and then focused on categories of
data built from the risky facility literature to identify the characteristics of ports with more than
four visits by IUU-infringing identified vessels. They discovered that the harbor size and the
number of overall vessel calls provided the ability to predict where IUU vessels deposited their illgotten catch. In addition, vessels were more likely to visit ports with weak security procedures.
However, the study does not differentiate ports within countries and overlooks underlying
characteristics of the seaports themselves that may lead groups to choose to deposit IUU catches
at certain ports in the first place: whether, for example there are criminal network activities
occurring at the port or the flag state composition of the vessels calling at the port. Administrative
structures of seaports (and of component entities operating at ports), the composition and
supervision of labor at seaports, and seaports’ relation to nearby ports (vis-à-vis fishing traffic) are
additional place management characteristics which may bolster the explanatory power for the IUU
model developed in their research.
An analogy can be drawn between ports and bus/subway stations, where both are located
on arterial pathways. As noted in the research, crime concentrates along arterial roads for the fact
that there are greater numbers of targets that move along these pathways (Weisburd, Groff, and
Yang 2012) and previous research has demonstrated that crime often concentrates at the locus or
terminus passenger points (Pearlstein and Wachs 1982; Loukaitou-Sideris 1999; Block and Block
2000; Loukaitou-Sideris et al. 2002; Newton 2009; Ceccato et al. 2013). If the maritime supply
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chain functions as the arterial road and ports are the bus/train stations along that artery, then certain
ports are more likely to have greater levels of crime and attract more criminal entities.
This insight provides a useful analogy for several types of seaport vulnerabilities. For
example, research has found that theft at transit stops is concentrated during times of greater traffic
and crowding (Levine et. al. 1986; Clarke et al. 1996; Burrell 2007), similar to findings about
criminal exploitation of ports which focus on ports with higher volume and container throughput
(Zaitch 2002; Lantsman 2013). Furthermore research on transit crime supports the contention that
offenders will not travel far to commit crime (Smith and Clarke 2000), analogous to focusing on
the identifying the presence of illicit import/export markets within port regions.
However, research has also shown that the presence of a transit stop, much like a seaport,
will not necessarily attract crime (LaVigne 1996; Bernasco and Block 2011) and that there are a
number of spatial and contextual characteristics which lead one transit stop to have greater levels
of crime than others (Robinson and Giordano 2011). This dissertation builds on previous research
to focus on understanding those spatial and contextual characteristics at seaports which make them
more prone to criminal network use, through the Seaport Vulnerability Framework introduced in
the following chapter.
2.6. CRAVED products and services
Seaports are important locations of concealable, removable, available, valuable,
enjoyable, or disposable (CRAVED) products and services (Clarke 1999), though certain aspects
of CRAVED are made less enticing to criminal groups through physical and administrative
security procedures (Interagency Commission on Crime at U.S. Seaports 2002; Gooch 2011;
Burges 2012; FreightWatch 2013). Clarke and Newman (2002) note that the risk of crime
depends on the nature of the product or service that is targeted. This framework primarily
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applies to armed theft or burglary and explains, in part, the types of cargo that is targeted for
theft at seaports or in port areas. Recent work has expanded the CRAVED framework to focus
on identifying the choice structuring properties of transnational trafficking operations (Natarajan
2012) or to focus on specific types of products such as illegally harvested wildlife (Moreto and
Lemieux 2015). Choice structuring properties focus attention on the decision making processes
of transnational trafficking networks, or those groups most likely to use seaports. Parallel to this
insight, this study focuses on identifying the properties among seaports that make certain
seaports more attractive for a criminal network. At seaports, for example, concealability and
removability are the most salient factors of analysis, as containers have made goods less easy to
conceal but easier to remove should the right access be available. Pires and Clarke (2012) adapt
the “a” in CRAVED to “accessibility.” This adaptation is relevant to seaports as well where the
accessibility of economic and administrative services informs their supposed value to a
trafficking network (Vander Beken and Van Daele 2008) or whether there are goods which are
CRAVED such as frozen shrimp (Zambito 2006) 6.
In a port without CRAVED cargo, the impetus for criminal networks to target those
sectors involved in the transit of CRAVED cargo is absent, and the port has a lower level of
vulnerability. These kinds of ports are those which primarily are the transit points for bulk
cargo, where cargo values are determined by mass and not unit. The CRAVED framework
assists in explaining why certain ports would have facilities more likely to be targeted by

6

Frozen shrimp are a CRAVED product (Zambito 2006). They are easy to transport, perishable such that evidence
after sale is disposed of quickly, and can be easily sold, with a constant demand from restaurants. Ports that receive
frozen shrimp might therefore become a target for criminal networks that can learn shipping schedules for delivery of
frozen shrimp, target drayage truck drivers who move the refrigerated containers from the port, and the port or local
warehouses where frozen shrimp are stored for subsequent distribution. The port functions as the locus point for
facilities, administrative access points, and companies involved in the pre-distribution process. This increases their
attraction to criminal networks that seek to steal this kind of CRAVED cargo.
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criminal networks for theft, thereby increasing the overall vulnerability of the port. To protect
against theft and administrative intrusions, in the past two decades, supply chain security
procedures have been strengthened around the world through both regulatory frameworks and
private sector innovations. Insights from supply chain security research inform the vulnerability
focused on identifying the lack of physical and administrative security procedures at U.S.
seaports.
2.7 Supply chain security procedures
Since 2001, ports in the U.S. and around the world have been subject to increased
scrutiny for supply chain security. In the U.S., seaports have mandated physical and
administrative security requirements through the MTSA and the Safe Ports Act, which mandate
security procedures such as improved lighting, access control, and perimeter fencing that are
reflective of physical techniques identified in the situational crime prevention literature. Ports
and cargo are subject to federally mandated security procedures but private companies will often
take extra steps to ensure supply chain security through the use of CCTV and formal surveillance
systems.
The primary focus of recent supply chain security efforts is on the container as the unit of
securitization. At some seaports, security focuses on protecting maritime infrastructure while
maximizing the easy flow of cargo (Martonosi, et al. 2006; Pate et al. 2008; Grillot et al. 2009).
Cargo screening technologies enable this efficiency/security trade off, and particularly nonintrusive tools aim to mitigate the use of the maritime transportation system by criminal
networks and terrorist groups. These measures can generally be incorporated into Clarke SCP
prevention framework as increasing the perceived effort and increasing perceived risks (Clarke
1997). However, as Von Lampe (2011) has detailed in his examination of applying SCP to
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organized crime, organized offenders or criminal networks are often more resourceful and less
easily deterred by general physical or administrative security techniques:
-

Container seals: Container seals lock in cargo and increase liability protection for
shippers. Seals, however, have been identified as easy to forge and replace (Dahlman et
al. 2005). While training of customs officers can mitigate some concerns, criminal
networks have developed manufacturing processes to produce false seals of identical
shape and quality. Smart seals do exist, but are prohibitively expensive except for high
value container shipping. Because of their relationship to cargo value, smart seals can be,
in and of themselves, an attraction for theft groups (Lechner 2009).

-

Radio frequency identification (RFID): RFID technology can wirelessly track container
shipments and monitor container seals for tampering (Michael and McCathie 2005;
Tsilingiris et al. 2007).

-

Non-intrusive inspection (NII): NII at seaports often takes the form of stationary or
mobile gamma radiation scanners, such as SAIC’s Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System
(VACIS), capable of producing an orthographic image of a container (Orphan et al.
2004).
In connection with currently applied screening technologies, Pate et al. (2008) examined

seaport security best practices through case studies of 17 U.S. seaports. Similarly, Grillot et al.
(2009) developed a security framework to assess supply chain security and port security
preparedness at seaports worldwide by focusing on institutional, administrative, and physical
measures identified through case studies at 17 seaports worldwide, including the Port of New
York and New Jersey. Both sets of researchers find that institutional measures at large
international seaports have created robust physical and logistical security while focusing on the
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continued need for inter-agency cooperation and implementation of existing initiatives. Grillot
et al. (2009) do further note that while national regulations set the overlying securitization
regime, implementation remains the responsibility of port authorities and localities, and in this
area, there is space for corruption in public and private seaport economic and labor sectors.
2.8 Complicity with criminal networks
Companies and employees in key seaport economic and labor sectors have been
portrayed in some accounts as victims of organized crime and criminal networks (Waterfront
Commission 2009; 2010; 2011). However, the same employees or companies that are perceived
as having been “victimized,” through thefts of goods or services, may be complicit actors in
criminal network activities (Vander Beken et al. 2005).
Some criminal networks prefer to lower their risk of detection by increasing investment
into their operations through placement or recruitment of complicit employees or business
entities at a seaport (U.S. Customs Service 1997; Interagency Commission on Crime at U.S.
Seaports 2000; Presidia Security Consulting Inc. 2011). This allows a network to act under the
guise of a bona fide trade or business activity, as opposed to more traditional theft or fraud. The
use of legitimate maritime industry channels toward illicit ends necessarily implicates the
cooperation of complicit employees in shipping entities, freight forwarding operations, the landside labor force, or public agencies such as a customs or law enforcement (Gounev and Bezlov
2010). The vulnerability of a particular economic or labor sector can, therefore, be understood in
terms of the vulnerability of certain companies, individual employees within those companies,
and their susceptibility to compromise or recruitment by criminal networks. Because of the high
level of regulatory security at ports in the U.S., access to the maritime transportation system
through a complicit company or employee is highly sought (Zaitch 2002; Lantsman 2013).
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2.9 Criminal networks and seaport vulnerabilities
At seaports, illicit cargo movements require a flexible order not present in a rigid
hierarchical administration (Sparrow 1991; Natarajan 2006; Morselli 2009). Criminal networks
have been portrayed as local in nature (Reuter 1985; Hobbs 1998) and are heavily dependent on
local environments that allow them to operate unimpeded. A criminal network structure also
allows for the quick incorporation of participants with specialized knowledge and subsequent
speedy network dissolution after the particular goal has been achieved (Sarrica 2005; Bjelopera
and Finklea 2012). Criminal networks are able to exploit opportunities in other locales that more
traditional organized crime groups may be unable to exploit due to hierarchical structures
informed by the local environment. As a result, criminal networks mirror legitimate businesses
that utilize partners in multiple locations to work within the “just in time” strategy that
minimizes production and inventory stock and enables the quick identification of market
openings and procurement services to meet the identified demand (Schonberger 1984). Criminal
networks therefore form multi-nodal structures that are an illicit mirror of legitimate business
structures (Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004).
These networks also function as entrepreneurial groups working together for a common
remunerative cause (Van Duyne 2005; Walterbach 2007) and thrive in the transnational spaces
created by modern supply chain movements (Kleemans and van der Blunt 2008; UNODC 2010;
Bjelopera and Finklea 2012). Within the licit flow of commerce, networks that traffic in illicit
goods across transnational borders seek out entry points of least resistance to destinations that
promise the most reward (Levitsky 2003; Kleemans and van der Blunt 2008; Shane 2010;
Bjelopera and Finklea 2012). Those entry points may not be geographical; rather, entry points
may often take the form of willing accomplices - companies or individuals in the licit trade
sector. Kleemans and van der Blunt’s (2008) examination of Dutch organized crime case files
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focuses heavily on the licit occupations that support transit crimes: dockworkers, cargo handlers,
and cargo management firms. Seaports employ a significant proportion and diversity of transit
workers, among which vulnerability may spread. Through this embedded vulnerability, coupled
with the cross-border movement of cargo, a criminal network is also able to practice
jurisdictional arbitrage by taking advantage of low levels of local or regional regulation to insert
or extract illicit cargo from the maritime transportation system (Williams 2001).
Criminal networks speculate on and benefit from similar supply and demand pressures as
legitimate importers and exporters. Identifying vulnerabilities that enable or allow a network to
gain access to the maritime transportation system may lead to decreased illicit flows by
identifying focusing on the “entry” points for a network. Law enforcement may then take more
appropriate action either through increasing regulatory oversight or actual operational changes.
Despite previous identification of the institutional and administrative security structures at
certain seaports (Barnes and Oloruntoba 2005; Pate et al. 2008; Grillot et al. 2009),
vulnerabilities continue to exist that allow criminal networks to (a) insert illicit cargo into the
maritime transportation system and (b) transfer cargo safely in spite of significant security and
customs enforcement procedures. From an economic development perspective, a significant
presence of organized crime, measured at the macro- level, may exert downward pressure on port
efficiency, leading to increased transportation costs (Clarke et al. 2004) and have an outsize
impact on the regular citizen, not factoring in the harm caused by narcotics (National Drug
Intelligence Center 2011f) and counterfeit products (Philips 2005).
Furthermore, recent research focused on strengthening SCP techniques to disrupt
organized crime groups notes that it is the preventative approaches that require careful analysis
and law enforcement coordination, which may be the most successful in addressing organized
crime threats, but which law enforcement organizations are the most averse to (Kirby and Snow
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2016). As Von Lampe (2011) demonstrated in his study examining the application of SCP
techniques organized offenders are more resourceful and less dependent on any given opportunity
structure defined in time and space and more likely to create or modify the exiting opportunity
structures, or otherwise “shop” for those structures with greater opportunity for exploitation
(Shane 2010). This has direct relevance to the interagency coordination required in the port
security environment. At ports where interagency coordination is lacking, there can be
significant adverse effects in terms of successful law enforcement approaches to address
organized crime and criminal network threats.
Criminal networks conduct port shopping, targeting particular seaports based on the
ports’ particular vulnerabilities (Shane 2010; Natarajan 2011), and researchers note that focusing
on the business processes of criminal groups can provide a method to understand the types of
routes traffickers use (Spapens 2010). As ports are locus points for cargo along a finite number
of possible routes, this simplies the task for law enforcement to focus resources. If a known
amount of traffic moves through the maritime transportation system and all of it passes through a
finite number of points, understanding what makes one point more vulnerable for criminal
network exploitation, or victimization, allows law enforcement groups to target their limited
resources to those spaces. Vulnerabilities can be structural in that a port may be situated in a
region rife with criminal network activity or with a high demand for illicit products and goods.
They can be internal, inhabiting the administrative spaces of the agencies operating at the port.
Or they can be physical, taking the form of poor physical and/or facility security. In each of
these cases, transnational trafficking networks (as opposed to organized crime groups) may be
better positioned to benefit from seaport weaknesses because of the structural flexibility inherent
to criminal networks. Recent research has however focused on the “stickiness” of organized
crime operations within specifics areas and economic spheres. Spapens (2010: 215) terms this
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criminal macro networks and notes that these are “relatively stable over time.” As a result,
disruptive operations by law enforcement which do not focus on the criminal macro network will
be less successful than those that do.
2.10 Integrated theoretical approach to address seaport vulnerability
The underlying theoretical structure of the Seaport Vulnerability Framework consists of
an inter-disciplinary approach, weaving together aspects of crime pattern theory, defensible
space, CRAVED, research on criminal networks, and supply chain security. Much like Bernard
and Snipes’ (1996) idea that an integrated theoretical approach is required to make sense of
overlapping, empirically defensible theoretical perspectives, understanding seaport vulnerability
requires an integrated theoretical approach. Examples of integrated approaches exist in recent
research including the approach to integrate crime place theory with social disorganization to
focus on understanding longitudinal persistence of crime in micro places (Weisburd, Groff, and
Yang 2012) or the approach focused on integrating functional, economic, and social network
theories of criminal network formation to develop an integrated theory of organized crime
creating the new concept of a criminal macro networks (Spapens 2010). This last approach has
direct relevance to the Port of New York and New Jersey where organized crime has been a
longstanding, if latent, presence in some aspects of port operations. The theoretical framework
outlined in this chapter is the first step in developing a integrated theoretical approach to
understand vulnerability at seaports.
Defensible space, CRAVED, and crime pattern theories inform the set of physical
vulnerabilities, while research on the formation and structure of criminal networks inform the set
of vulnerabilities categorized under administrative vulnerability, which focus on the conditions
of port economic and labor sectors that increase their vulnerability to criminal networks. Finally,
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theories of crime place, CRAVED, and criminal network research inform the logistical
vulnerabilities. This is because the vulnerability inherent in the logistical movement of cargo is
both a function of the spatial location of large amounts of cargo creating physical bottlenecks at a
port and the administrative decisions by regulatory and business entities to inspect, load, and
offload that cargo at the port.
This confluence of theoretical perspectives provides a more holistic examination of port
vulnerability than previous research (Zaitch 2002; Klima 2011; Eski 2011; Petrossian,
Marteache, and Viollaz 2014; Eski 2016). As a result the key determination in this chapter is
that the confluence of vulnerability leads to increased seaport vulnerability and that it is
impossible for one theoretical perspective to provide a holistic view of vulnerability at a port.
The theories described in this chapter and how they inform specific vulnerabilities creates the
integrated theoretical approach outlined in the following chapter’s examination of the Seaport
Vulnerability Framework.
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Chapter 3 Seaport Vulnerability Framework
3.1 Overview
The Seaport Vulnerability Framework presented in this chapter was developed from a
pilot study at the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor (Waterfront Commission), a
literature review of administrative seaport literature, an examination of publicly available
accounts of criminal network activity at seaports, and informed by the integrated theoretical
approach described in the previous chapter. The Seaport Vulnerability Framework has 21
discrete vulnerabilities organized into port security funding, physical, administrative, and
logistical categories.
3.2 Port security funding vulnerability
Seaports in the U.S. have widely disparate levels of security funding. Although the
MTSA and the SAFE Ports Act of 2006 created base level security requirements at U.S. ports,
investment in port security technologies and equipment varies between ports (Pate et al. 2008).
Many different factors affect the amount of port security funding invested in any given port or
even port district7, from levels of container cargo traffic to U.S. Coast Guard regulated facilities.
Ports with high levels container traffic may not necessarily receive commensurately high levels
of security funds due to U.S. Coast Guard vulnerability assessments which quantifies risk and
targets at U.S. seaports (USCG). U.S. seaports’ primary funding mechanism for increased
security has, since 2002, been the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP), administered by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). PSGP funding for a port district is a better
7

U.S. ports of entry are categorized as “ports” which are aggregated under listings of “districts” (U.S. Census). Port
districts as categorized under U.S. Census nomenclature refer to a district which may be composed of multiple ports.
PSGP funds are disbursed across U.S. Coast Guard sectors of which there are 36. Port districts are the local, or in
some cases regional areas which fall under the jurisdiction of the port authority that manages the port.

31

indicator of how much funding a port has received to invest in port security (AAPA 2006; DHS
2007; DHS 2008; DHS 2009; DHS 2011; DHS 2012; DHS 2013). While the lack of PSGP
funding is not alone a significant vulnerability, the amount of security funding received per
container, compared across other U.S. ports, provides a baseline with which to understand how
much has been invested in port security procedures and technologies. While SCP techniques are
often considered to be low cost, in that they rely on disrupting the decision making of criminal
actors, some techniques can require significant financial expenditures if they are to be instituted
properly. For example, proper mast lighting at ports fulfills a SCP technique of natural
surveillance and is supported through PSGP grants in certain ports. A dearth of PSGP funds can
lead ports to forego these crucial SCP practices and lead to increased vulnerability at the port.
3.3 Physical vulnerabilities
Seaports are spaces with unique geographic and spatial qualities. The nature of seaports
with their “open structures, critical physical locations, ease of accessibility, massive importation
and exportation of containerized cargo, and large numbers of personnel on the scene,”
emphasizes their vulnerability to criminal threats (Barnes and Oloruntoba 2005; Blumenthal
2005: 3). Physical vulnerabilities are those aspects of the seaport’s physical structure(s) that
create opportunities for criminal networks to gain access to the seaport. These include
vulnerabilities related to cargo removal, as well as introduction of illicit goods into the legitimate
stream of commerce.
3.3A Open structure
The physical environments of seaports are multi-varied and diverse (Tioga Group 2010),
yet shipping consolidation has led seaports to trend toward larger, sprawling spaces with multiple
access and entry points. For example, the structure of the harbor of New York, with 900 miles of
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waterfront between New York and New Jersey (Blumenthal 2005), may create conditions that
foster areas of indefensible space (Cozens et al. 2002), as well as areas of offensible space
(Felson 2006). Recent changes to the fundamental component of maritime shipping, the
container ship, have increased the amounts of cargo transported on a single container vessel.8
U.S. ports on the West Coast have not been able to keep up with the pace of these changes, and
in late 2014, they experienced severe congestion, with containers stacked high on yard space,
and queues to unload cargo extending out to sea and causing delays (Mongelluzzo 2014; 2015).
Although such severe congestion is unusual, it is indicative of the rising volumes of cargo, and
with more containers held on-site, this increases the number of theft targets and provides cover
for networks that seek to extract cargo from the port without detection.
3.3B Spatial concentration of CRAVED products
Most seaports are recipient and holding areas for CRAVED products (See 3.5D
CRAVED product imports). In the United States, most large ports also have Customs and
Border Patrol (CBP) Central Examination Stations (CES) where cargo from nearby smaller ports
is stored and examined. Ports with CES facilities and which are destination points for CRAVED
goods may be more likely to attract criminal theft networks (Clarke 1999). For example,
networks have targeted CRAVED products such as vehicles, perfume, and perishable high value
food goods (such as shrimp or lobster) (Leeds 1997; Waterfront Commission 2006; Zambito
2006; Lantsman 2013). Seaports that receive and hold CRAVED products can also act as crime
attractors (Brantingham and Brantingham 2009). The presence of a CES can, in fact, signal to
criminal networks that high value cargo will be present at the port. As such, theft of valuable
cargo products from a seaport or nearby warehouses may be used as a measure to determine

8

The latest class of container vessel, Triple E class, can hold 18,000 Twenty Foot Equivalent Units (TEU), or 50%
more than the next largest vessel, New Panamax class, which holds 12,500 TEUs.
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whether CRAVED products at seaports attract criminal networks. Furthermore, using CESs as
the proxy measure for spatial concentration of CRAVED cargo is especially relevant since CBP
has been identified as having lax security procedures at CES facilities (Department of Homeland
Security Office of the Inspector General 2012). In fact, Office of the Inspector General at the
Department of Homeland Security damningly notes:
CBP does not have effective management controls to ensure that employees do
not pose a security risk at bonded facilities. CBP has not issued national
requirements for background checks on employees of bonded facilities and does
not ensure that port directors have management controls over background checks
at bonded facilities. As a result, background checks are inconsistent and often
ineffective (pg. 1).
3.3C Peripheral seaport companies
A seaport’s footprint extends past the piers, wharves, and buildings that comprise the
physical layout. This broader catchment area houses the companies that provide ancillary
services, which may not be located directly on the port. It has been noted that ancillary service
providers are normally subject to less regulation than primary function providers, such as
terminal operators (Trujillo and Nombela 1999; Fritelli and Lake 2006). Because many of these
ancillary service providers are located off the waterfront and outside the jurisdiction of
waterfront agencies, these companies may also be less likely to implement proper security
procedures and regulations (Mayhew 2001), while enjoying privileged access through trade and
labor relationships.
Freight forwarders can act as a proxy for peripheral companies at-large in measuring this
vulnerability, since they are rarely co-located with the port and have already been identified by
outside research as a vulnerable sector (Zaitch 2002). Ports with many freight forwarding
companies can function as crime generator ports, as there will be a greater number of targets for
exploitation through the theft of goods or the greater opportunity to access valuable services.
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Smugglers at the Port of Rotterdam (Zaitch 2002) have noted that seaports with many operating
entities are also desirable places through which to smuggle narcotics amid the suffusion of cargo
- the multitude of entities present creates layers of administrative complexity that seaport
stakeholders often have difficulty disaggregating (Hecker 2002).
3.3D Vehicle traffic
The number of vehicles and visitors to a seaport is a physical vulnerability as networks
can use daily traffic to disguise illicit entry or exit. Under some circumstances, vehicles may
provide the concealability factor of the CRAVED framework. In one instance of vehicle theft
from a terminal at the Port of New York and New Jersey, a stolen vehicle was driven behind a
common car transport truck, literally using legitimate port traffic as cover for theft (Lantsman
2013). Large numbers of daily entry vehicles, such as drayage truck traffic, create conditions of
indefensible space, especially if authorities do not take appropriate security measures.
Furthermore, a large amount of vehicles create conditions of vulnerability to cargo thieves,
which radiates out from the port to what can be theoretically defined as the port’s immediate
hinterland or roughly the commonly understood distance of short haul drayage, 75 miles
(Bensman and Bromberg 2009).
3.3E Small vessels in/near seaport harbor
Small vessels can be used to break into containers, extricating cargo, and/or inserting
illicit cargo. The physical environment around a port acts a “choice structuring property” as drug
trafficking networks assess and select opportunities to bring drugs into the United States (Decker
and Chapman 2008: 79). Drugs can be loaded onto larger ships and then offloaded to smaller
vessels, such as pleasure boats, when closer to shore. In the United States, pleasure vessels must
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report to customs authorities only once they have docked, allowing drugs to enter the country
before authorities can inspect the vessel (U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2011).
In recent years, Southern California, the Gulf Coast, and the southern Atlantic coast has
seen a surge in small vessel drug smuggling movements (GAO 2013c). Termed “pangas,” these
small outboard motor boats can evade detection by CBP and USCG officials and when
apprehended, are loaded with significant quantities of illicit cargo, such as marijuana, cocaine,
narcotics, and in some cases have been used for human smuggling (DHS 2012b; Welsh 2014).9
While CBP and law enforcement officials use risk management metrics to identify which vessels
may be carrying illicit cargo, the presence of small vessels in a harbor or in the vicinity of a port
make it more difficult to differentiate between licit and illicit vessel behavior. According to the
Director of Marine Operations in San Diego, “a smuggler posing as a legitimate recreational or
commercial boater is the proverbial needle in a sea of needles in a place like Southern California
and Baja Mexico, where boating is a way of life” (U.S. Customs and Border Protection 24
February 2014).
In addition to recreational vessels, fishing boats are also known to smuggle narcotics.
The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime cites numerous examples of this (UNODC 2011). As
reported by UNODC, the smell of fish confuses drug sniffing dogs and allows fishing vessels to
go directly to port and unload narcotics to waiting distributors (UNODC 2011: 131).
The presence of small vessels in or near the harbor creates indefensible space, whereby
small vessels can function not only as disguising tactics to insert illicit cargo onto piers but also
may themselves be moving illicit cargo. A recent seizure at the Port of Long Beach from a small
vessel shows how port security agencies may be tasked with the dual purpose of not only

9

Since 2009, CBP has publicly identified at least 79 incidents of smuggling by small vessels, primarily pangas,
though jet skis have been used as well. See Appendix B for a list of panga incidents and the closest nearby ports.

36

providing port security services but also identifying suspicious small vessels and increased levels
of small vessels in or near the port decrease port law enforcement resources devoted to other port
security tasks (Riviera 2016).
3.3F Intermodal connections
Over the past several decades, containerization and larger container vessels have reduced
the number of active seaports (Levinson 2006; Rodrigue and Guan 2008). Increasing throughput
among fewer locations has necessitated the development of strong intermodal connections
(Fleming and Hayuth 1994). Intermodal transport is “transport of unitized loads by the
coordinated use of more than one transport mode, in such a way that comparative advantages of
various modes are maximized and the transport chain is guided as one unity” (Van Klink and
Van den Berg 1998: 2). Intermodal connections enable the seaport to access its hinterland, or the
regional area that the port services (Notteboom 2008). The presence of numerous intermodal
connections can create vulnerabilities attributed to administrative complexity and can therefore
increase criminal access to the seaport (Albanese 2003; Harrald et al. 2004; Barnes and
Oloruntoba 2005; Haveman, Shatz, and Vilchis 2005). Therefore, the quantity and the types of
intermodal connections at a seaport are an important factor when considering vulnerability.
Previous research has also employed “access to transportation” as an indicator to predict whether
criminal groups that traffic illegally caught fish will seek to use a particular port to offload the
catch (Petrossian, Marteache, and Viollaz 2014). This translates as a method to measure the
decision making behavior of criminal groups relative to the existence of enough transportation
methods to easily move their illicit products to alternative destinations.
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3.3G Physical/Administrative security procedures
The level of security at U.S. ports has since 2002 been greatly affected by federal
mandated physical and administrative security. The introduction of the Maritime Transportation
Safety Act (MTSA) in 2002 and the SAFE Port Act in 2006, introduced a wide range of
obligatory security procedures such as the use of access controls through the Transportation
Worker Identification Credential, or TWIC card, U.S Coast Guard inspections of port facilities to
check for fencing, lighting, and other physical impediments to access.
While these are considered to be standard supply chain security procedures some of these
have also been conceptualized in the criminological literature as situational crime prevention
techniques, including the techniques of target hardening, concealing targets, identifying property,
removing targets, creating access control, and others. As U.S. ports have to employ the baseline
procedures mandated through federal regulations they have a commensurate high level of
physical and administrative security. The criminological research on SCP provides us with a
method of conceptualizing other techniques that may be useful to enhance physical and
administrative security at seaports (Haelterman 2011), though it may not be mandated through
federal regulations. This vulnerability therefore measures the level of physical and
administrative security by focusing on whether SCP techniques are used at a port. 10
Seaports with an absence of effective, additional SCP techniques are more vulnerable to
criminal networks. Mayhew’s (2001) best practices to prevent cargo theft form a primer on

10

Through federal mandates and private sector innovations in supply chain security, U.S. seaports have a baseline
level of physical and administrative security. However, for the SVF to function outside of the United States context
ports should be examined for security procedures that, though mandated in the United States, may not be standard
overseas. While it may be useful to look at the specific mandated security procedures under the MTSA and SAFE
Port Act, for the SVF to be more universally applicable, this vulnerability is conceptualized by measuring ports on
whether specific SCP techniques, which are theoretically relevant to port security are utilized at the port. For example,
well-lit facilities are mandatory under the MTSA (MTSA 2002), but, in practice, some ports have poor quality lighting
that does not function (Lantsman 2013).
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effective seaport SCP measures at ports as e applied the SCP framework to logistics facilities and
port share similar features with the cargo facilities he was examining.11 In addition, Clarke and
Eck’s (2003) 25 SCP techniques provide an evaluative framework that can be applied to
seaports, utilizing the first three categories of techniques (increasing the effort, increasing the
risk, and reducing the reward) which are more applicable to organized offenders than reducing
provocations or excuses.
3.3H Illicit import/export markets
Certain seaports are destination or embarkation points for illicit goods due to several
factors such as: proximity to a criminal network’s base of operations; proximity to a large
available market for illicit goods; and/or proximity to a large available supply of illicit goods.
For networks that move large amounts of cargo, the proximity of the port to a market is an
important factor in port selection (Blickman 2005; EUROPOL 2011; Presidia Security Services
201l), as it will affect ease of distribution. Crime pattern studies have noted that offenders rarely
travel far from local areas (Van Koppen and Jansen 1998; Wiles and Costello 2000; Smith and
Clarke 2000). However, recent research has also found that in some instances, the distance
traveled by offenders is not as low as previously believed (Morselli and Royer 2008; Van Stijle
and Vander Beken 2012). These long-distance offenders tend to be less aware of the situational
and contextual space through which opportunities arise and are instead more likely to actively
seek out opportunities (Ekblom 2003; Von Lampe 2011).

11

These measures include perimeter fencing, installing heavy doors to prevent ease of entry, tagging loose cargo,
vehicle barriers, cargo storing cargo in different areas based on origin and contents, placing expensive cargo in high
security indoors facilities, and installing well placed and functional security cameras.
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3.4 Administrative vulnerabilities
3.4A Port divergence
Differential hinterland access and markets may affect criminal network decision-making
through the dispersion of container traffic across ports, also referred to in the supply chain
literature as port divergence (Rodrigue and Guan 2008). For example, divergence of cargo has
led maritime traffic to be spread across numerous smaller ports along the U.S. eastern seaboard.
This divergence has created a situation where “smaller ports are a risky proposition compared
with large established terminals having access to nearby consumption markets” (Rodrigue and
Guan 2008: 22).
In studies of organized crime and legitimate business interactions, finances are an
important factor in whether companies participate in criminal ventures (Bagelius 2005; Tilley
2008). The transportation industry is furthermore highly prone to corrupt activity (PWC 2014)
and indicators of decreased business in a particular node in the sector (i.e. at a port), are an
indication that corruption risks are increased. Combining these two insights from the organized
crime literature and the supply chain field, port divergence, or a situation where a port loses
business at the expense of other nearby ports, create financial pressures which may increase
vulnerability to criminal networks through two vectors: (a) greater incentive to decrease security
pressure on the remaining throughput or (b) decreased security outlays as throughput decreases.
For example, the Port of Portland, Oregon, recently lost its primary shipping line and largest
customer, Hanjin, in a move that will decrease container traffic at the port between 65-80%
(Conway 2013; Harburger 2015). This traffic will be moving to the Port of Seattle, less than 50
miles from the Port of Portland. Dockworkers, drayage drivers, warehouses, and other
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employers operating at the Port of Portland will struggle for employment as a result of this loss
of business.
3.4B Automation/cyber security vulnerability
In both the port and maritime sector, automation is an increasing trend with implications
for maritime and port vulnerability. While shipping vessels have increasingly been automated
such that massive container ships now require only small crews (Stewart 2014), only certain
seaports around the world have fully automated terminal technology. Some ports, such as the
Port of Rotterdam have fully automated terminals; others, like nearly all the ports in the United
States, have either minimal or a small proportion of terminal operations automated (Mongelluzzo
2015b). Automation increases vulnerability of computerized terminal movements to cyberattacks or hacking (DHS 2016). However, while terminals may not be fully automated ports and
vessels do have a large number of systems which have some level of automation including
systems terminal operating, automated cargo tracking, shore based systems that directly support
vessel operations and navigations, automated cargo handling equipment, and container cranes in
some ports (Wallischek 2013).
There are already several benchmark examples of criminal networks hacking to locate
containers on yards and of criminals hacking into terminal management systems and exploiting
physical vulnerabilities to place technology onto port infrastructure (Magal S3). In 2013 at the
port of Antwerp, a drug trafficking network hired Belgian hackers who were able to penetrate the
cargo management system of the port, identify containers, and extricate narcotics hidden in
banana shipments (Europol 2013). When the port installed a firewall to block the breach, the
drug trafficking network broke into the port’s physical facilities, installed wireless bridges into
computer operating systems, and continued to extract illicit cargo for two years before authorities
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identified the breach (Caldwell 2014). While many ports have automated systems for cargo
management, increasingly automated port and terminal systems will create greater vulnerability
to hacking and increased cyber security vulnerability (Wallischek 2013; DHS 2016). As a result
of this increased vulnerability, in any individual case study of a port, the degree of automation
and automation trends in the port are integral to understanding new vulnerability vectors (see
Section 7.11b for a discussion of automation at the Port of New York and New Jersey).
3.4C Vulnerable labor sectors and sector size
Particular sectors of seaport labor may be classified as vulnerable labor sectors. The first
type of vulnerable labor sector is a sector that is predisposed, through historical associations with
criminal networks, to employ workers with links to those networks (WCNYH 2010; WCNYH
2011; WCNYH 2013; WCNYH 2014). The second type is a sector that is targeted by criminal
networks because it occupies a central and valuable role at the seaport and may not be subject to
regulatory authority, creating a jurisdictional vulnerability. Jurisdictional gaps create spaces
where corrupt companies or criminal networks can operate without fear of enforcement and
allow networks to engage in jurisdictional arbitrage by taking advantage of lax or nonexistent
regulation in one area or region (Williams 2001: Shane 2010). The literature on jurisdictional
arbitrage points to a diversity of organizations using this tactic as a way to avoid prosecution for
criminal activity (Williams 2001b; Kshetri 2010; Leslie 2014). This tactic has been most heavily
used by networks seeking to exploit lax intellectual property right laws in order to traffic in
fraudulent goods, and in committing cyber-crime (Leslie 2014) where actors can perpetrate cyber
fraud in one country knowing that their acts do no constitute a prosecutable offense in their
country of residence (Kshetri 2010). At ports, these gaps are most often a function of a
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jurisdictional structure that has grown to deal with perceived or real crime threats in the port
region.
Gambetta and Reuter (1995) note that traditional labor sectors with a history of organized
crime, sectors whose activity is connected to the locality, sectors with a relatively high
proportion of small firms, and sectors with a disproportionate public sector presence will have a
high level of vulnerability to organized crime. Lavezzi (2011) further supports this contention
and adds two characteristics to the profile of a company prone to mafia intrusion: (1) the
company is small; and (2) is in a traditional and/or low-tech sector. To this group, Kleemans and
van de Bunt (2008) add occupations in the transit industry. At ports in the United States, two
primary sectors have these characteristics.
First are short haul (drayage) truck drivers and their working conditions. For example, at
the Port of New York and New Jersey, most drayage drivers are non-unionized and have few
benefits such as health care (Bensman and Bromberg 2009). These conditions create a working
environment which leads them to be more susceptible not only to be exploited by criminal
networks operating at ports but also to participate in illicit schemes.
The second sector is freight forwarding (Zaitch 2002; Klima 2011; Lantsman 2013).
Forwarders or cargo handlers are small companies that ship goods to destinations around the
world (Kleemans and van de Bunt 2008). Previous work on shipping agents identified several
factors that make shipping agents a vulnerable labor sector, and given the similarities, these
factors also likely to be present in the freight forwarding sector: physical proximity to ports,
presence of longstanding relationships with customs, propensity to not inspect consigned cargo,
and a lack of regulatory oversight creates disincentives to report illicit shipments (Klima 2011).
Access to a forwarder can provide criminal networks with important information on where and
how to export or import illicit cargo.
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3.4D Interagency cooperation
A lack of interagency communication between waterfront security agencies creates a
further administrative vulnerability (Pate et al. 2008; Grillot et al. 2009), even when agencies are
not perceived or known to be corrupt such as the Waterfront Commission. The Waterfront
Commission’s main institutional partner and the landlord of much of the territory at the PNYNJ
is the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ). For up to a decade before 2008,
these two agencies had a troubled relationship as the Port Authority would refuse to engage or
work with the Waterfront Commission (Executive director, Waterfront Commission, personal
communication, November 9, 2011). This lack of cooperation was the result of what was
considered to be widespread and entrenched corruption at the Waterfront Commission (Fisch et
al. 2009). Much of this corruption occurred between the period of 1990-2008, as research
previous to that period on the Commission had not noted any specific level of corruption (Block
1982; Levy 1989). Also contributing to the lack of cooperation was the PANYNJ’s perception
that Waterfront Commission was incompetent as a result of organizational drift and internal
corruption. The lack of interagency cooperation as a result of perceived/actual corruption is a
serious hindrance to effective investigation of criminal network use of port facilities, exploitation
of maritime/port private sector companies, and a sustainable approach to port security.
This vulnerability has been noted in other areas, particularly in the context of national
intelligence failures (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004).
When agencies do not cooperate or exchange information effectively, knowledge of criminal
network methods adaptation and tactics is not filtered through to the necessary stakeholders
(NATO Review 2009; Presidia Security Consulting 2011), creating gaps in information and
vulnerability.
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3.4E Historical presence of criminal networks
Seaports with companies or agencies with historical associations to criminal networks
will continue to have greater vulnerability to continued use by networks (Albanese 2003). At
certain East Coast U.S. seaports and some Canadian seaports such as Halifax, Vancouver, and
Montreal, the long-standing presence of criminal networks has led to continued illicit use of
these ports (WCNYH 2008; 2009; 2010; Presidia Security Consulting 2011). Vulnerabilities at
these ports are more deeply entrenched, as seaport cultures develop around the knowledge that
criminal networks control certain aspects of trade or labor. This phenomenon may also lead to
entrenchment of offensible spaces (Felson 2006; Presidia Security Consulting 2011).
Furthermore, historically, U.S. East Coast waterfront labor unions have been implicated
with criminal networks (Block 1982; President’s Commission on Organized Crime 1986: 36-43;
Abadinsky 1990: 357-63; United States Attorney’s Office 2004; United States Department of
Justice 2011; Presidia Security Consulting 2011). Even though practices at ports have changed,
through new innovations such as container shipping, connections between labor unions and
criminal activity remain strong in some ports (Levinson 2006; Jaffee 2010).
In the United States, waterfront unions are regional: the International Longshoremen’s
and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU) represents most West Coast waterfront laborers and the
International Longshoremen Association (ILA) is the primary representative for longshore
workers at East Coast and Gulf of Mexico ports. As organized crime groups have retained
strong ties to waterfront labor unions (Waterfront Commission 2009; 2010; 2011), laborers’
collusion in criminal ventures is likely to continue to occur (U.S. Customs Service 1997).
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Unionized and non-unionized workers may have different reasons for abetting criminal
networks.12 Workers in unions with particularly strong associations with criminal networks may
be more likely to cooperate in crime due to the threat of job loss or other types of intimidation or
retaliation (Edward and Levi 2008).
3.4F Organizational corruption
Organizational corruption refers to systemic wrongdoing by employees who violate
societal norms with the support of their organization’s internal norms (Segal 2002). Even with
controls in place, organizations characterized by an entrenched culture of deviance will continue
to have issues with corruption (Sherman 1978; Maynard-Moody, Stull, and Mitchell 1986; Susan
Rose-Ackerman 1993; Segal 2002; Friedrichs 2002).
Stakeholder agencies and/or companies at seaports with a history of organizational
corruption are considerably more vulnerable to criminal networks. Localized instances of
collusion with criminal networks may not last for long periods of time nor provide deep access to
a port, but a corrupt agency or company can facilitate the use of the seaport for a longer period of
time and a greater amount of cargo transfers. Furthermore, corruption within agencies can lead
to weakened oversight, if the corruption occurs in a regulatory or security agency (Albanese
2003). Agency corruption can create an empty space for networks to facilitate the transfer of
licit goods illegally, such as in hazardous waste (Bisschop 2012), or illicit goods illegally, such
as drugs (Zaitch 2002). Compromised investigations or a lack of investigative drive are

12

Unionization does not in and of itself create port security vulnerability, as the ILWU on the West Coast displays
almost no public evidence of collusion or cooption by criminal networks. The presence of organized crime associates
in union locals at East Coast ports is more a function of the historical development of port operations and the locales
where ports are situated. This is further detailed in Chapter 7 on the Port of NY/NJ.
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important limitations in effectively preventing networks from accessing regulated seaport
economic and labor sectors (Fisch et al. 2009).
3.4G Employee corruption
As a sub-type of the vulnerabilities associated with corruption, corrupt employees
provide criminal networks privileged access to the seaport, though less access than a corrupt
agency or company. Through this vulnerability, internal conspiracies are one of the main
methods by which criminal networks access the functions of the port (Interagency Commission
on Crime at U.S. Seaports 2000). For example, longshore labor may cooperate with a drug
smuggling network (Kleemans and van den Bunk 2008; Dienst and Prokupecz 2011) or a
company with compromised employees may acquire a contract to work at the port and gain
access to the facilities. Corruption in the hiring process allows for individuals sympathetic to a
network’s illicit aims into a seaport company or agency in order to facilitate the criminal venture
(Zaitch 2002; Kleemans and van den Bunk 2008). As illicit trade is in constant flux and security
regimes adjust to different patterns of illicit activity, access to specific types of economic or
labor sectors may be of particular importance to certain networks (Brown 2004; Vander Beken et
al. 2005; Klima 2011; Lantsman 2013). However, the ease of access to employees in a company
is dependent on the activity, the density of the sector where network presence is required, and the
level of regulatory oversight of that sector.
In some companies, network members may gain access to seaports through complicit
relationships with criminal groups (Van Duyne 2005; Vander Beken et al. 2005). Therefore,
instances of internal hiring corruption have to be viewed through the lens of complicity - whether
the company or agency hired corrupt employees as the result of a relationship with criminal
networks or lax internal hiring procedures. In the United States, some ports have a longstanding
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history of internally corrupt employees that allow criminal networks access to the port either for
extracting cargo or inserting illicit cargo (Interagency Commission on Crime at U.S. Seaports
2000; Waterfront Commission 2008, 2009, 2010; Presidia Security Consulting 2011).
The utility to criminal networks of corrupt employees is substantial when considered
from the criminal network’s viewpoint. Access to corrupt labor allows criminals to import
substantial quantities of illicit goods without having to establish shipping companies, deal with
false bills of lading, or pay concealment costs (U.S. Customs 1997: 4; Zaitch 2002; Presidia
Security Consulting 2011). As Zaitch (2002: 253) notes, regarding the utility of corrupt contacts
at the Port of Rotterdam: “…corruption at destination points is a scarce precious resource.
Entire operations can be organised around a single contact that guarantees access to the port.”
With regard to export, corrupt employees in the freight forwarding sector may facilitate a similar
circumvention of outbound customs controls.
3.5 Logistical transport vulnerabilities
The third vulnerability category encompasses logistical transport vulnerabilities. These
are vulnerabilities that result from of the flow of trade through a seaport. At seaports, the flow of
trade is commonly referred to as “throughput.” Throughput is the number of containers which
are imported or exported through a port, and includes containers which are referred to as
“empties,” or those which are shipped without any cargo.
3.5A Container throughput
A recent assessment of organized crime activity at Canadian seaports identified high
levels of throughput at three principal Canadian seaports, Halifax, Montreal, and Vancouver, as
one of the primary reasons why criminal networks used those ports (Presidia Security Consulting
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2011). Zaitch (2002: 243) cites Colombian cocaine smugglers who made the same conclusion
about the Port of Rotterdam in Amsterdam.
From a logistical perspective, seaports with a high level of throughput will likely have a
large amount of goods passing through a limited physical space allowing networks to take
advantage of fluctuating seasonal flows to insert illicit cargo into the transportation stream
(Chambers 2012). They may initially exploit physical or administrative vulnerabilities to
introduce the cargo into the transportation chain but a high level of throughput may more easily
mask the goods as they continue to move through the transportation chain. As such, not only
does port size, conceptualized as container throughput, offer smugglers greater concealment of
illicit cargo (Zaitch 2002), but it also contributes to more efficient movement of those same
goods (a function of port divergence) (Rodrigue and Guan 2008). In essence, criminals co-opt
the legitimate economy of scale incentive to move goods through a large seaport for criminal
purposes.
3.5B Export cargo vulnerability
At ports in the United States, CBP devotes vastly fewer security resources to export cargo
than to import cargo (Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General 2007), with
the result being that export shipments are often not targeted consistently or inspected by CBP
officers for illicit cargo. This is mainly due to established resource allocation policies and is
supported by interviews with CBP officers (Lantsman 2012). As a result, for the purposes of this
analysis, ports in the United States that export more shipments than import will be more
vulnerable to criminal network use because cargo is less likely to be inspected for illicit
shipments.
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3.5C Vessel traffic
Ports in the United States have differing vessel traffic profiles. Some ports specialize in
specific types of traffic such as bulk cargo vessels or ro-ro (vehicle transport) vessels and focus
less on container cargo. As such, agencies and port security stakeholders at those ports may
develop specialized facilities or expertise to handle those types of vessels. Based on an analysis
of U.S. Maritime Administration (2013) vessel compositions at the top 30 container ports in the
U.S., container vessel calls made up only 33% of all vessel calls, see Figure 1.13 Ports which
handle primarily container vessels will likely have developed specialized knowledge of not only
the container shipping processes and procedures but also have a better understanding of which
companies operate in the container shipping sector, such as the trucking companies moving
cargo to and from the port and the forwarding companies which organize pickups of their
containers. Ports in the United States that handle an above-average number of container vessels
would likely have a more developed understanding of container security procedures and be less

13

Vessels over 1000 gross register tons (GRT). See Appendix C for a breakdown of container vessel calls at the top
30 U.S. seaports.

50

vulnerable to criminal network use of the container shipping system.

Bulk
16%

General
Cargo
11%

Tankers
30%

Roll-On/Roll-Off
8%
Gas (LNG/LPG)
2%

Containers
33%

Figure 1: U.S. Maritime Administration statistics on the types of vessels that called at U.S. seaports in 2013.
Source: (MARAD 2013)

3.5D Imports of CRAVED products
This vulnerability is the other facet of understanding the presence of CRAVED cargo at
ports. In section 3.3B I detail the vulnerability of whether CRAVED cargo is spatially
concentrated at the port. This vulnerability examines whether CRAVED cargo constitutes a
majority of the imports at the port. U.S. ports are significant import points for a wide variety of
cargo but not all ports specialize or import CRAVED products. The specialization of U.S.
seaports in specific types of cargo (Tomer and Kane 2015) assists in understanding which ports
will have a greater vulnerability than others. This vulnerability examines the level of trade at
U.S. ports to identify if CRAVED cargo constitutes any of the top ten import commodities at the
port.
3.6 Theory of seaport vulnerability
Consistent with the approach described in the previous chapter of using multiple
theoretical approaches to develop a unified theoretical approach to understand seaport
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vulnerability, the Seaport Vulnerability Framework (SVF) described in this chapter constitutes a
theory of seaport vulnerability, building in aspects of criminological theory, supply chain
security, and observations of port activity at the Port of NY/NJ. By operationalizing
vulnerabilities in the framework, the SVF then enables the creation of an assessment tool that can
be used by port security stakeholders to develop a model of port vulnerability to identify where
their port is most vulnerable to criminal network use. Table 1 below re-caps the theoretical
approaches that inform the vulnerabilities in the framework.
Table 1: Seaport vulnerability framework theoretical overview
Category/Vulnerability
Theoretical Perspective
Port Security Funding
Situational Crime Prevention, Supply Chain
Security, Defensible Space
Physical
Open structure
In/Defensible Space, Offensible Space
Spatial concentration of CRAVED
CRAVED, Crime Place
products
Peripheral seaport companies
Defensible space, Crime Place
Vehicle traffic
Defensible space, Crime Place
Small vessels in/near seaport harbor
Defensible space
Intermodal connections
Defensible space
Physical/Administrative security
Situational Crime Prevention
procedures
Proximity to illicit import/export market
Situational Crime Prevention, Opportunity
theory
Administrative
Port divergence
In/Defensible Space, Offensible Space, criminal
network theories
Automation/cyber security vulnerability
Offensible Space
Interagency cooperation
Organizational cooperation
Vulnerable labor sectors
Criminal network theories
Number of service providers in a sector
Criminal network theories
Historical criminal network presence
Crime Place, Criminal network theories
Organizational corruption
Criminal network theories
Employee corruption
Criminal network theories
Logistical
Container throughput
In/Defensible Space, Offensible Space, criminal
network theories, rational choice
Export cargo vulnerability
In/Defensible Space, Offensible Space, criminal
network theories, rational choice
Vessel traffic
Supply chain management
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Imports of CRAVED products

CRAVED, Crime Place

3.6 Conclusion
The SVF and criminal network activities outlined in this chapter provide the foundation
for the research propositions outlined in the following chapter. Seaport vulnerabilities identified
through the pilot study and subsequent research likely represent a subset of the universe of
vulnerabilities among different ports outside of the U.S. Even within the United States, there are
significant differences in vulnerabilities at certain seaports. However, by identifying and
classifying the broad types of vulnerability that can exist at a seaport, this research seeks to move
towards a better understanding of: (1) the typology of vulnerability; and (2) how those
vulnerabilities can be used to provide criminal networks with privileged access to the functions
of a seaport.
From a criminological theoretical standpoint, this chapter identifies the three primary
categories of vulnerability as physical, administrative, and logistical, and disaggregates 21
vulnerabilities within those categories. As a result, this provides a means to move towards
creating an analytical framework that when properly applied to seaports with appropriate data
should enable the concentration of prevention resources towards the appropriate vulnerability.

53

Chapter 4- Research propositions
This dissertation is composed of two analyses. The first analysis is an examination of the
top 30 U.S. container seaports using the Seaport Vulnerability Framework detailed in the
preceding chapter. This analysis uses 15 of 21 vulnerabilities to profile the top 30 seaports in the
United States to build a weighted vulnerability profile identifying which ports in the U.S. display
the greater vulnerability to criminal network exploitation. The second analysis is an in-depth
case study of the Port of New York and New Jersey (PNYNJ) of all 21 vulnerabilities to detail
how vulnerability manifests itself in this port. Both parts of the dissertation examine
propositions that focus on the assumed consequences of a seaport’s vulnerability. The
propositions are categorized below, measured in Chapter 6, and examined in further detail in
Chapter 7 at the PNYNJ.
4.1 Port security funding


Funding levels - Ports that receive less security funding relative to other ports in the U.S.
will be less secure.

4.2 Physical vulnerability


Open structure - Seaports with large open structures are more susceptible to criminal
network exploitation than seaports with closed structures. Open structure ports have
multiple entry/exit points, open air facilities, and open storage areas.



Spatial concentration of CRAVED products - A seaport that concentrates CRAVED
products will be targeted by criminal networks for theft and will have a higher level of
overall vulnerability.



Peripheral seaport companies - Seaports with numerous freight forwarders or cargo
handlers, relative to the amount of cargo moved on a monthly basis, will be more
susceptible to criminal network exploitation.
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Vehicle traffic - A large quantity of daily truck traffic to the seaport, relative to average
daily container transits, will allow criminal networks greater ease of access to the port.



Small vessels in/near port - Large numbers of fishing or recreational vessels in or near
the seaport harbor will allow networks to bypass customs procedures for declaring goods
and can support illicit trade.



Intermodal connections - A large number and variety of intermodal connections create
more opportunities for networks to insert illicit cargo into the legitimate stream of
commerce.



Physical/Administrative security procedures – Ports in the U.S. that have added SCP
techniques to existing baseline levels of physical and administrative security procedures
will display decreased vulnerability.



Proximity to illicit import/export market - A seaport with a large illicit import/export
market within range of the port hinterland or an average drayage truck trip will make the
port more vulnerable to criminal network use.

4.3 Administrative vulnerability


Port divergence - Port divergence creates different types of vulnerability at ports that
lose traffic and at ports that gain container traffic.



Automation/cyber security vulnerability - Cyber security vulnerability increases with
greater automation in port operations.



Interagency cooperation - Ports without adequate procedures for interagency
cooperation can have jurisdictional gaps that create offensible and vulnerable
administrative space.



Vulnerable labor sectors - Vulnerable licit labor and economic sectors provide networks
the opportunity to insert illicit goods into the stream of legitimate maritime commerce.
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o A high number of service providers in a seaport’s labor and economic sectors
increases the opportunities for access.


Historical criminal network presence - Seaports with historical associations with
criminal networks will be more vulnerable to contemporary criminal network use.



Organizational corruption - Seaports with companies that engage in corrupt or criminal
activity are more vulnerable to criminal networks.



Employee corruption - Employee corruption provides networks with access to the
physical and administrative space of a seaport.

4.4 Logistical vulnerability


Container throughput - High levels of throughput at a seaport create greater opportunity
for criminal networks to ship illicit cargo.



Export cargo vulnerability- If container exports are a sizeable percentage of a port’s
annual operations, the port has increased overall vulnerability to criminal network use.



Vessel traffic - Ports with a below-average level of container vessel calls will have a
higher level of vulnerability to criminal network use of container shipping.



Import of CRAVED products - A seaport that imports large quantities of CRAVED
products will be targeted by criminal networks for theft and will have a higher level of
overall vulnerability.
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Chapter 5 Methodology
The analysis of seaport vulnerability at U.S. ports employs a comparative port
vulnerability analysis using the Seaport Vulnerability Framework and an in-depth case study
analysis of the Port of New York and New Jersey.
5.1 Comparative Seaport Analysis
The comparative seaport analysis examines the top 30 U.S. cargo seaport through 15 of
the 21 SVF categories. These categories were chosen for three primary reasons:


They represent a cross-section of the primary vulnerabilities in the SVF and include the
highest rated vulnerabilities.



They can be measured with publicly available data sources or proxy data sources..



They can be used to measure vulnerability at domestic and international seaports and
provide a scalable framework to identify vulnerability across ports both within the U.S.
and abroad.

5.1A Multi-port analysis sample
The seaports in the comparative analysis are the top 30 U.S. cargo seaports as determined
by the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA).14 The AAPA is the primary
organization for port authorities in the Western Hemisphere and compiles statistics across its
member ports, which include all of the major ports in the United States. This analysis excluded
land ports and focuses on the top 30 container maritime ports in the United States, including
territories such as Guam and Puerto Rico. These ports account for 99.3% of all container

14

See Appendix D for a list of the expanded sample.
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shipping traffic in the U.S. and capture almost the entire spectrum of container traffic in the
United States.
While the sample ports were selected based on container throughput, other selection
options include cargo volumes or the number of vessel shipping calls as the primary selection
criteria. For this study, container shipping is the ideal selection criterion because containers are
the primary transport mode for illicit cargo (UNODC 2010; UNODC 2012).
5.1B Units of analysis
The SVF examines vulnerability at seaports across multiple levels of analysis. The
primary unit of analysis is the seaport.15 Due to the multi-jurisdictional and multi-stakeholder
webs which characterize seaports, some vulnerabilities are coded using a divergent spatial or
administrative level of analysis. For example, at a higher spatial order of analysis, vulnerability
at a seaport is examined at the port district level, which may be defined differently by each local
port authority. If the port district level is left undefined by the port authority, the PNYNJ’s port
district limitations (New York Code: Art. II) definition is adopted by default: a 25 mile radius
from the port’s main shipping terminal. Within seaports, the economic sector is another unit of
analysis. Within economic sectors, the individual company is a unit of analysis. The employee is
also used as a unit of analysis when examining employee corruption. Finally, the waterfront
labor union is a unit of analysis that cuts across the organizational and individual units listed
above.
5.2 Data
Note on coding

Defined as “harbors for seagoing vessels with facilities to lade and unlade cargo and/or passengers and with easy
access to the sea (from the 24 nautical mile contiguous zone to the terminal) (Interagency Commission on Crime at
U.S. Seaports 2000: 2).”
15
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The comparative analysis framework is divided into three categories of vulnerability
based on the theoretical level of utility of the vulnerability to a network: low, moderate, and
high order vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities are coded based on a tri-order scale of
measurement with 3, 6 and 9 as the highest code depending on the order of utility for a network.
1. Low order vulnerabilities are coded between zero and three (0-3).
2. Moderate order vulnerabilities are coded between zero and six (0-6).
3. High order vulnerabilities are coded between zero and nine (0-9).
Five of 15 vulnerability categories had a baseline of one (1) as the lowest possible score.
As a result, the minimum score is 5 and the maximum is 63, with a range of 5 to 63. This
chapter examines the data used for the analyses, explains the coding schema, and discusses
limitations of data sources.
Table 2- Vulnerability Coding Chart
Low order vulnerability
Coding Creates a low level of access or
attraction to a criminal network; alone
Port security funding per 2013 container
0-3
this is not enough to create access to a
Open structure
0-3
port.
Spatial concentration of CRAVED
0-3
products
Import of CRAVED products
0-3
Peripheral companies
1-3
Vehicle traffic
1-3
Intermodal connections
1-3
Physical/administrative security
1-3
procedures
Throughput
1-3
Container vessel traffic
0-3
Interagency cooperation
0-3
Moderate order vulnerability
Coding Creates a moderate level of access or
serves to attract networks to a specific
Illicit import/export market in port district 0-6
port.
Historical presence of criminal networks
0-6
High order vulnerability
Coding Creates a high level of access; alone
this may be sufficient for a network to
Organizational corruption
0-9
access a seaport.
Employee corruption
0-9
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5.2A Port security funding per 2013 container (0-3)
Since 2002, port security agencies and private entities have been eligible to apply for Port
Security Grant Program (PSGP) funding. From 2002 to 2013, the PSGP provided
$2,431,381,580 in funding or $56.41 per 2013 container (AAPA 2006; DHS 2007; DHS 2008;
DHS 2009; DHS 2011; DHS 2012; DHS 2013; DHS 2014; FEMA 2014). While a significant
portion of PSGP funding is not focused directly on container traffic, funding for port security
nonetheless affects container security and the overall movement of illicit cargo. PSGP funding
records which note the port, the amount, the project description, and, in some cases, the direct
beneficiary, were used to build a proxy dataset to measure how much funding has been disbursed
for a particular port’s security for the seaport sample in this study. Measuring the amount per
container across a longitudinal period provides a way to quantify how much security funding was
invested at one particular seaport relative to other seaports.
-

A port with no or less than 25% of the average PSGP investment per container is coded 3.

-

A port with a PSGP investment between 25% - 50% of the average PSGP investment is
coded 2.

-

A port with a PSGP investment less than the average PSGP investment but more than
50% of the average is coded 1.

-

A port with a PSGP investment at or above the average PSGP investment is coded 0.

Data quality/limitations
This category relies on U.S. government issued data, either identified directly through the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which determines PSGP levels, or the
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American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), which collates FEMA PSGP data.16 This
provides for a strong level of reliability as the same data sources is used across all ports. The
primary limitation with this data source is that for certain ports, FEMA and AAPA listings only
displayed the organization that received the funding as the Port Authority, without
disaggregating which specific agencies or organizations received funding.
5.2B Open structure (0-3)
Open structure was analyzed using Google Earth and internal port documents. In some
cases, it was possible to identify the seaport boundaries without the use of internal port maps,
such as with the ports of San Diego, Oakland, and Freeport (Texas). A number of seaports
structures were unusually complex, with multiple terminals across a wider area. For these ports,
such as the Ports of New York and New Jersey, Savannah, and Houston, both internal port maps
and Google Earth were used to identify port facilities. Where a port had more than one terminal
with separate entry/exit points, it was scored as if it had multiple entry/exit points, since access to
one terminal would provide access to others, particularly if cargo were to be moved once in the
port.
-

Open structure is coded for ports that display the following features: (a) more than one
entry/exit point; (b) port facilities near public access roads; or (c) containers in large open
access yards. Open structure ports are coded between 1 and 3. If a port displayed all
three features it was coded as 3; ports with two of the three features are coded as 2; and
those with one feature are coded as 1.

-

16

Ports without these features are coded as closed structure ports and are coded 0.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014); AAPA 2006.
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Data quality/limitations
Google Earth has previously been used as a tool and data source for criminological
research (Duwe, Donnay, Tewksbury 2008; Irvin-Erickson 2014) as an accessible crosscomparative data source. While researchers (Cayo and Talbot 2003; Zandbergen 2008) have
identified that using Google Earth for geocoding presents significant data limitations, for the
purposes of identifying access roads, entry/exit points, and open container yards, Google Earth
data triangulated with available port maps provided a reliable data source.
5.2C Spatial Concentration of CRAVED products (0-3)
Among its containerized cargo, a port may have a high concentration of CRAVED
products. Not all seaports will have high concentrations if they are primary entry points for bulk
cargo such as paper, timber, and petroleum. To code for CRAVED products spatial
concentration at the port, this analysis uses the proxy measure of whether the port had a
centralized examination station (CES) where CBP examines cargo for illicit inclusions or
fraudulent declarations. According to the Code of Federal Regulations (19 CFR 118.2), the CBP
Port Director determines whether there is a need for a CES at the port, and this will depend on a
multitude of measures including whether high value cargo transits the port and there is a need for
specialized inspection facilities (CBP January 2012). Since more expensive commodities, often
with higher duty rates (Mason 2013), are more likely to be incorrectly declared, purposefully or
accidentally (Hintsa et al. 2011), the presence of a CES (where those goods will be inspected) at
the port, or within a short distance from the port (five miles or less) is used as a proxy measure of
whether CRAVED products are spatially concentrated at the port because CRAVED products are
likely to be concentrated in the same location, increasing vulnerability to criminal networks.
Where available, private warehouse data was used to identify high value storage at a port; this
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was as an additional data source to confirm the presence of CRAVED products. This
vulnerability is coded either a 0 or 3 with no intermediary score.
-

A seaport with CRAVED products was coded as 3 if: (a) it contained CES locations; or
(b) if it contained facilities that house high value items within seaport boundaries.

-

A seaport was coded as 0 if it did not have either a CES or other identifiable locations
with high value cargo.

Data quality/limitations
The greatest data limitation was identifying the presence of a CES. Because there are no
standardized listings of these stations, internet searches were used to identify (1) whether the port
had a CES and (2) where the CES was located. The CES location was then identified on Google
Earth to determine the proximity to the port.
5.2D Imports of CRAVED products (0-3)
In addition to the spatial concentration of CRAVED cargo at a port, this vulnerability
measures the presence and amount of CRAVED product imports. To identify the level of
imports of CRAVED products, I use a trade data aggregator WorldCity Trade Numbers
(www.ustradenumbers.com), which aggregates U.S. CBP import/export data by commodity for
each port area in the U.S. by both tonnage and value of the commodities. I use the tonnage
aggregator to measure the quantity of CRAVED cargo imported into the port, in the latest
available period of data June 2015 to May 2016. This enables this analysis to examine the top
ten import commodities by tonnage in each of the 30 ports in the sample.17 Commodity
categories are aggregated using titles from The Statistical Classification of Domestic and

17

The only port that utilizes non-U.S. CBP commodity data is Apra, Guam, which is provided through the Guam
Bureau of Statistics and Plans (2014b). Port of Boston data is aggregated by value as tonnage data is not available.
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Foreign Commodities, or Schedule B, which lists 9,000 export codes used to identify
commodities (U.S. Census Bureau 2016). To determine whether the top ten commodities are
CRAVED cargo, I used the 2014 FreightWatch International Global Cargo Theft Report
(FreightWatch International 2014) to identify the top stolen commodities, see Figure 2 (Jaillet
2015). I aggregated the entire set of import commodities into a unified list and then crossreferenced with the top ten stolen commodities to identify which import commodity is a
CRAVED product.18 Vulnerability is then coded based on the number of import CRAVED
commodities.

Pharmaceuticals
1%
Alcohol
4%
Miscellaneous
5%
Personal care
5%

Tobacco
1%

Food and drinks
19%

Auto and parts
7%

Electronics
16%

Metals
9%

Clothing and shoes
9%

Building and
industrial
10%

Home and garden
14%

Figure 2: U.S. cargo theft by type of product (2014): Source (Jaillet 2015)

18

Appendix K lists all of the commodities identified under this analysis and whether they met the CRAVED criteria.
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This vulnerability is coded between 0 and 3.
-

A port where more than five of the top ten commodities are CRAVED is coded 3.

-

A port where three to five of the top ten commodities are CRAVED is coded 2.

-

A port where one to two of the top ten commodities are CRAVED is coded 1.

-

A port with no CRAVED imports in the top ten commodities is coded 0.

Data quality/limitations
U.S. Census Bureau aggregation of U.S. CBP data is used by companies around the
United States and throughout the world as a reliable source of financial data to identify
import/exports by commodity (Tomer and Kane 2015). The WorldTrade aggregator is a
respected site that provides financial and commodity data to clients. The primary limitation with
using census data is that it aggregates the category of the commodity. For example, the Schedule
B commodity title “Computers” does not provide further detail as to the type of computers, size,
or other physical characteristics that would enable greater dis-aggregation under CRAVED
criteria.
5.2E Peripheral companies (1-3)
Peripheral companies are entities that provide services that require them to be present at
the port on a semi-regular basis, freight forwarders being the most common peripheral company
at ports. The size of the freight forwarder sector is the proxy measure to identify the level of
peripheral companies operating at the port. The number of freight forwarders at the port relative
to the monthly container throughput provides a measure of the proportion of the freight
forwarder presence at the port. I used a widely used freight forwarder directory to compile the
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list of freight forwarders capable of operating at the port.19 The cut off measure for freight
forwarder area of operations is 75 miles from the port, which is the outer length of what is
considered a drayage truck distance (Bensman and Bromberg 2009). Based on the fact that in
certain parts of the U.S. ports are located within 75 miles of each other, overlaps of freight
forwarders operating at multiple ports were often identified. However, under the determination
of this vulnerability, a freight forwarder could be identified as operating at more than one port
and was considered an individual forwarder for each port, and at ports which are contiguous,
there are very closely similar, if not identical, determinations of vulnerability in this category.
These ports include the port pairs of Ft. Lauderdale and Miami, Long Beach and Los Angeles,
and Seattle and Tacoma – all clustered within 40 miles of each other. Similarly, at island ports
such as such as Honolulu, Kahului, Apra, or San Juan, freight forwarders would likely work
throughout the whole island, not those just near the port; as such, island-wide listings are used.
To determine the level of peripheral company presence at a seaport, the following formula
was used: [Service providers in a sector/Average Monthly Container throughput in last full year
of data] X 10^4 (weight).
-

Ports that scored over 21 were coded as 3 for a high proportion of freight forwarders to
the amount of monthly container cargo.

-

Ports that scored 11 to 20 were coded as 2 for a medium proportion of freight forwarders
to the amount of monthly container cargo.

-

Ports that scored 0 to 10 were coded as 1 for a low proportion of freight forwarders to the
amount of monthly container cargo.

19

www.forwarders.com.
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Data quality/limitations
The measurement for this vulnerability relies almost exclusively on one data source,
www.forwarders.com. While this is the largest resource online for identifying freight
forwarders, it is self-selected since freight forwarders have to request to be listed on the site. In
areas with many small entities, such as Miami, NY/NJ, Houston, and LA/Long Beach regions,
the website likely undercounts the number of forwarders providing services to that port because
small providers may be more likely to operate for local diaspora communities and for specific
local clients without a need or desire for widespread advertising.
5.2F Vehicle traffic (1-3)
To identify the number of trucks using a port daily, data was obtained primarily through a
variety of public sources, such as media accounts, industry publications, and environmental
impact studies. Truck traffic at seaports is a significant concern for city and state environmental
agencies mainly because many ports are often legacy structures located within built-up urban
areas, and environmental concerns of the impact of ports on local communities have led to
environmental impact studies which identify truck traffic. For example, a number of West Coast
ports, including Seattle, Tacoma, Oakland, Los Angeles, and Long Beach instituted “green” port
trucking requirements due to the environmental and health impacts of diesel fumes (Ross and
Associates Environmental Consulting 2007; Board of Port Commissioners City of Oakland
2009; Port of Seattle 2014; Unified Port of San Diego).
The absolute number of daily truck visits to a port alone does not provide a reasonable
measure of the volume of truck traffic since it does not take into account the amount of cargo
passing through the port on a daily basis. As a result, the scoring for this measure is based on a
ratio of daily container traffic to daily average truck visits. This method paints a fuller picture of
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a port’s vehicle traffic. For instance, some ports may have significant throughput without a
significant level of truck traffic due to heightened intermodal transfers through rail or barge
traffic. In contrast, other ports have significant truck traffic without a significant number of
container throughput because the port lacks intermodal transfer options and a high level of bulk
transfers must be transported by truck. To determine the level of vehicular traffic at a seaport,
this formula is used: [Average daily truck traffic/Average Daily Container throughput in last full
year of data] X 100 (weight).
-

Ports that scored over 51 are coded as 3 for a high proportion of daily truck traffic to the
daily amount of container cargo.

-

Ports that scored over 21 to 50 are coded as 2 for a medium proportion of daily truck
traffic to the daily amount of container cargo.

-

Ports that scored 0 to 20 are coded as 1 for a low proportion of proportion of daily truck
traffic to the daily amount of container cargo.

Data quality/limitations
There is no single data source that identifies daily truck traffic to a port. Each individual
port analysis required specific internet searches to identify the daily number of truck visits to the
port. In some cases, media articles identified the number of truck visits per day through
interviews with port officials often in relation to security (Swedberg 2007) or environmental
impact surveys (Environmental Defense Fund 2009). The major limitation was that truck traffic
was not always available for the same year as the container traffic, which used 2013 data, and
therefore vulnerability coding in this category has to be examined per port to identify how off set
the actual vulnerability is by the year of traffic. For example, in a port with an estimate of truck
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traffic in 2011 coded against 2013 container traffic, the actual vulnerability may fluctuate higher
or lower depending on whether truck traffic increased or decreased in 2013.
5.2G Intermodal connections (1-3)
The more intermodal port connections a port has, the greater the transport opportunities
not only for legitimate entities but also for illicit entities (Petrossian, Marteache, and Viollaz
2014). Intermodal connections are identified by the presence of an international airport, large
number of railway transfers and multiple rail lines, and a heavy level of vehicle traffic as
determined the vehicle traffic category. The primary sources consulted were internal port
documents and listings of railways, media accounts of railway transfers at the port, and economic
studies. In addition, standard internet searches were used to determine the presence of an
international airport in the port district.
Ports were coded based on the variety and extent of intermodal transfers.
-

Ports are coded as 3 if: they have more than one rail connection to the port hinterland
and surrounding regions; they have a large number of railway TEU transfers, determined
by yearly TEU throughput / yearly TEU railway lifts, and where the percentage of
railway lifts is over 10% of all loaded import/export TEUs; or they have at least one
international airport within the port district or a large presence of short haul trucking
operators.

-

Ports with two of the three coding criteria are coded as 2.

-

Ports with one of the three coding criteria are coded as 1.

Data quality/limitations
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The primary data limitation encountered in determining vulnerability in this category
relates to railway transfers. Some ports have highly detailed monthly and annual statistics
regarding container throughout which includes railway traffic statistics (Port of New York and
New Jersey), while other ports do not post monthly container statistics (Port of Mobile,
Alabama). To identify the level of rail traffic at ports alternate sources of data were required
such as railway traffic surveys, regional transportation plans (Cambridge Systematics 2016), and
other documents.
5.2H Physical/Administrative security procedures (1-3)
This vulnerability measures whether key physical or administrative security procedures
are employed at the port and is coded through the presence of situational crime prevention (SCP)
techniques which have specific relevance to seaport security (Clarke 1997). The 11 SCP
techniques include, with orange highlighted techniques now standard practice at U.S. ports either
through U.S. CBP recommendations for container seals (U.S. CBP B) or federal regulations
through the 2002 MTSA and SAFE Port Act.
Table 3: Physical/Administrative Technique Relevant to Port Security
SCP Technique
Port specific application
Target Hardening Containers are locked with tamper proof seals;
Tamper detection for containers
Access control
Access is restricted to only entrants holding port specific documentation
Screen exits
Vehicles are searched upon exit from the port facility
Extend
Employees are encouraged to report signs of criminal activity in their
guardianship
employer or in their workplace
Natural
Adequate lighting is available for all sections of the seaport
surveillance
Reduce
Seaport employees carry clearly visible identification
anonymity
Use of place
Maritime security training is prominently highlighted by the port
managers
authority and companies operating at the port
Formal
Port facilities are fully covered by working CCTV cameras
surveillance
Conceal targets
Knowledge of container manifests is restricted to select employees
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Remove targets
Identify property

High value cargo is kept in enclosed secure facilities with high security
than for open access cargo
Cargo is identified by unique seal identification numbers

To identify the baseline security techniques in 17 of the 30 ports for the comparative port
sample, I relied on a previous port security study by Pate et al. (2008), which identified baseline
security through site visits. In addition, primary source data from the Port Security Grant
Program project descriptions was used to triangulate data to determine whether a particular SCP
technique was present. Several SCP techniques are now standard practice at U.S. ports due to
the requirements of the Maritime Transportation Safety Act of 2002 (MTSA) and the Security
and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act). These techniques are
highlighted in Table 3 and confirmed through site visits to four seaports: Port of Miami, Port of
San Diego, Port of Long Beach, and Port of New York and New Jersey.
-

Ports are coded as 3 where 7 or more of these SCP techniques were not applied.

-

Ports are coded as 2 where between 4 and 6 techniques were not applied.

-

Ports are coded as 1 where 3 or fewer techniques were not applied.

Data quality/limitations
While six of the eleven SCP techniques are standardized practice at U.S. seaports, the
remaining techniques remain at the discretion of security agencies at ports. Remaining
techniques were determined by public sources. In some cases it is likely that specific techniques
would not be identified or highlighted in port documentation, either through PSGP grant funding
announcement or in port documentation highlighting security procedures. For example, it was
difficult to determine whether port employees are encouraged to report signs of suspicious

71

behavior. Some ports, such as PNYNJ, specifically highlight that in public documentation, while
others do not.
5.2I Throughput (1-3)
Container throughput at the top 30 ports was assessed using the American Association of
Port Authorities (AAPA) annual survey of seaports in North America and Mexico. The survey
information was collected via the 2013 NAFTA Regional Container Traffic Survey and
comprises the latest and most complete data set for container throughput for all available
seaports. Ports with a higher level of container throughput are coded for a higher level of
vulnerability.
-

Ports with over two million TEUs annually are coded as 3.

-

Ports with one to two million TEUs annually are coded as 2.

-

Ports with less than one million TEUs annually are coded as 1.

Data quality/limitations
The AAPA, the primary port industry group, develops the NAFTA Regional Container
Traffic Survey as the primary comparative data source for cargo traffic across North American
and Mexican seaports. This provides a strong level of reliability for comparative port analysis.
While there may be questions raised as to the incentive for ports to report higher levels of
container traffic, these levels are often provided to federal and state agencies for regulatory
reasons and there is no reason to expect that ports will provide falsified figures to the AAPA.
5.2J Container Vessel traffic (0-3)
The U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) compiles vessel call data at U.S. maritime
ports of entry to produce a report detailing the number of vessel calls for privately-owned ocean72

going merchant vessels of all flags of registries for over 1,000 gross registered tons calling at
ports and selected ports/terminals within the contiguous U.S., Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, and Puerto
Rico. In 2013, container vessels comprised, on average, 33% of all vessels calling at ports in this
comparative sample ports. The 2013 average (Maritime Administration 2013) was used as the
baseline to determine whether a port had advanced experience handling containerized
import/export traffic. Ports with low levels of container vessel calls would be scored for higher
vulnerability, using the average vessel calls in 2013 as a baseline.
-

Ports are coded as 3 where less than 20% of vessels were container ships.

-

Ports are coded as 2 where between 20-32% of vessels were container ships.

-

Ports are coded as 1 where between 33-50% of vessels were container ships.

-

Ports are coded as 0 where over 50% of all vessels were container ships.

Data quality/limitations
MARAD data (2013) provides a strong level of reliability for comparative port analysis,
as this is the primary and only comparative data source for vessel calls across U.S. seaports.
5.2K Interagency Cooperation (0-3)
At Coast Guard district sectors (See text box on page 36), the MTSA mandated the
institution of Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSC), which were developed to resolve
issues identified in the Interagency Commission on Crime at U.S. Seaports (2000). AMSCs are
chaired by the U.S. Coast Guard and include all port security stakeholders with a port security
interest or mandate in the port region, which may be more expansive than the port district. Each
of the 36 Coast Guard sectors has a stand-alone AMSC and the composition of the group varies
across each sector. At U.S ports the presence of an AMSC provides for a minimum level of
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interagency cooperation and communication, in addition to coordinating annual security
exercises and trainings. Participation in an AMSC provides four components of cooperation (1) a
mechanism for joint training among agencies; (2) consistent information exchanges; (3) an
appropriate venue to share information; and (4) an oversight mechanism to limit territoriality.
Data sources to identify AMSC composition vary but normally include local port region Coast
Guard documentation or public press releases and in some cases public media articles noting the
port’s participation in the AMSC.
-

Ports with one or zero components are coded as a 3.

-

Ports with two components are coded as a 2.

-

Ports with three components are coded as a 1.

-

Ports with all components are coded as a 0.

Data quality/limitations
Despite the federal mandate, the composition of AMSCs is at the discretion of maritime
and port stakeholders in the region. In some port regions, the Coast Guard has to release regular
circulars in the Federal Register soliciting applicants to participate in AMSCs (Federal Register
A; Federal Register B). In certain port districts, the local Coast Guard sector did not publish or
cite the composition of the AMSC, and publicly available documentation did not provide
evidence that the port was a member. As a result, it was not always possible to identify whether
the port participated in the AMSC.
5.2L Illicit import/export market (0-6)
Three standardized data sources were used to determine whether an illicit import/export
market existed in the port district. First, U.S. Department of Justice High Intensity Drug
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Trafficking Area (HIDTA) data was used to identify whether the port is located in a county with
a high level of drug trafficking and to identify which transport methods of trafficking are most
prevalent in the port district area.20 Second, to determine the level of cargo thefts in the port
district, FreightWatch International’s Route Analysis Tool was used to map cargo theft incidents
within a 75 mile radius of each port. A high level of cargo thefts in the port district is a
supporting factor to identify whether the port region is located in an area with organized criminal
network operations, as many types of cargo thefts are conducted by organized theft rings
(FreightWatch International 2013; 2014; 2016). Finally, to determine the rate of suspect auto
theft transfers, datea from the 2003-2008 National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB) database of
suspect unique VINs and the 2003-2008 National Criminal Information Center (NCIC) on
identified stolen vehicles yielded a data set from which to identify above-average levels of such
vehicle transfers.
Ports in close proximity to a large import/export market for illicit goods will be coded on
the following criteria, and the sum of scores for the three composing variables comprise the total
code for this vulnerability:
1) If the port district is in an HIDTA county where maritime transportation is a known method
for drug trafficking, the port will be scored as 2. If the port is in an HIDTA county where
maritime transportation is not a known transportation method for drug trafficking, the port will
be scored as 1;
2) If the port or port hinterland experienced more than 10 cargo theft incidents within the past
two years, as reported by FreightWatch International, it is scored 2;
3) If the port has an above-average rate of NICB and NCIC hits (1 point each).

20

See Appendix F for a map of HIDTA counties designated in 2015.
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Data quality/limitations
HIDTA surveys provide the best method of identifying narcotics trafficking areas.
However, while ports may be located in an HIDTA identified county, the vector of narcotics
trafficking into that region may primarily be through road or air. To alleviate this limitation,
HIDTA analyses which cite maritime trafficking as a known method in the area support a higher
code in this segment of the category.
A common problem with using self-reported maritime statistics is that data is likely
skewed conservatively as companies and individuals do not want to highlight thefts or incidents
in their commercial environments (Europol 2009; Lombardo 2014). FreightWatch theft data is
self-reported and likely under counts actual numbers of thefts in specific areas. As a result while
thefts are likely under reported, this cross comparative data source provides a reasonable
measure to identify the level of cargo theft in port regions, if the assumption that it is
underreported in the sector applies to all geographical representatives in the sector. In
consideration of alternate data sources, such as Uniform Crime Report, cargo theft statistics do
not allow for a method to determine whether thefts took place in the port region of the state.
Moreover, since agency participation in the Uniform Crime Report is voluntary, there are
significant gaps in participation which occlude comparative analysis in port regions (FBI 2014
B).
The NICB and NCIC database entries for vehicle transfers at U.S. ports have their own
set of limitations. It is likely that a proportion of the vehicles identified through NICB data do
not include all stolen vehicles. Furthermore, this data could contain false positives where cars
were not yet registered under new VINs or were broken down in “chop shops” for resale
overseas, but which were not stolen. NCIC data is of a greater level of reliability and as a result
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the number of vehicles identified is significantly smaller. Furthermore, the available data was
from the period of 2003 to 2008 and vehicle transfers and movement trends will likely have
fluctuated since that time period.
Note on next three vulnerabilities
The following three vulnerabilities rely on the use of public data sources, such as media
accounts, to identify cases of organizational and employee corruption and historical presence of
organized crime or criminal network involvement in the port economic sectors. Organizational
and employee corruption data was supplemented with data from CBP and ICE media release
notes. Both data sources provide a rich library of media releases detailing illicit activity
throughout the U.S. including data on arrests, indictments, prosecutions, and sentences for
individuals processed through the federal justice system (with primary jurisdiction over
trafficking cases) for illicit trafficking.
CBP data primarily identifies incidents of seizures. However, in some cases, CBP also
identifies which organizations were involved in the incident and whether internal conspiracies
were suspected or confirmed in the seizure incident. ICE news releases focused on arrests,
investigations, prosecutions, and sentencing data for networks involved in smuggling, and, as
such, the ICE news releases provided a wider source of data. To measure the extent of official
corruption, I used a secondary database of CBP officers who have been indicted or arrested for
corrupt activity.
5.2M Historical presence of criminal networks (0-6)
To determine whether a port had a history of organized crime in any of the labor or
economic sectors, data was gathered from open source searches of media on illicit or organized
activity in the port sector. The primary database used was Lexis-Nexis, and the searches were
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structured to cast a wide net to identify instances of organized crime presence. The primary
search terms were “name of the port” AND “organized crime,” or “criminal network,”
“corruption,” “internal conspiracy.”
This vulnerability was coded based on the duration of criminal network(s)’ financial
interests in some aspect of seaport administration, maintenance, or maritime function.
-

Seaports with sectors with over 20 years of criminal influence are coded as 6.

-

Seaports with sectors with between 5 and 20 years of criminal influence are coded as 4.

-

Seaports with sectors with fewer than 5 years of criminal influence are coded as 2.

-

If there is no evidence in the public record of criminal network influence in some aspect
of seaport administration, maintenance, or maritime function, the seaports are coded as 0.

5.2N Organizational corruption (0-9)
In addition to Lexis Nexis media searches, CBP and ICE media releases enabled
identification of indictments and pending cases of port employees involved in illicit activity at
ports. CBP media releases are publicly available from 2010 through the present and can be
searched through a key word search term.21 Media releases covering incidents of seizures were
used to identify the types of organizations involved in the smuggling incident and whether there
was involvement by freight forwarding companies, terminal employees, or management. ICE
media releases were searchable through 2008 and yielded a wider data set from which to identify
ports with employee or organizational corruption, but also included data on immigration and an
array of other criminal activity under ICE’s jurisdiction.22 ICE media releases could be searched
with a keyword but could also be grouped based on the topic of the release and the country or

21
22

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/media-releases/all.
https://www.ice.gov/news/all.
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countries mentioned in the release. In addition, to press release data, to identify official
corruption in CBP, I used a database developed by the Center for Investigative Reporting that
collated cases of CBP officers who were reprimanded, arrested, and/or sentenced for violations.23
In some instances, CBP officers were identified in port districts that had land and air ports of
entry. Because CBP officers are rotated across different postings within a district (GAO 2013b),
if the officers identified were within the port district and had operated at a land or air crossing,
the port would be coded for vulnerability.
While organizational and employee corruption were measured, organizational corruption
focused on any type of corrupt activity and not necessarily those that led solely to illicit maritime
transportation. Corrupt incidents could include taking bribes for construction payouts, and price
fixing in local maritime services, among others. Seaports marked by organizational corruption
experienced multiple incidents of corruption involving either public or private employees within
single entities. Corruption involving public employees was coded higher due to the privileged
access conferred.
-

A port with a high level of organizational corruption has three different entities with more
than two publicly documented instances of corrupt public or private employees in the
past five years and is coded as 9;

-

A port with a medium level of organizational corruption has two different entities with
more than two publicly documented instances of corrupt public or private employees, or
one entity with more than two documented instances of public employee corruption in the
past five years and is coded as 6;

23

http://bordercorruption.apps.cironline.org/.

79

-

A port with a low level of corruption has no documented instances of public employee
corruption and one entity with more than two instances of private employee corruption in
the past five years and is coded as 3.

-

A port without any incidents of private or public corruption is coded as 0.

5.2O Employee corruption (0-9)
Employee corruption focuses on corrupt activity that led to a maritime transfer or
facilitated a maritime transfer, and this vulnerability was identified and coded to operationalize
the commonly used term “internal conspiracy.” An employee working in a public or private
seaport sector is corrupt if he/she exploits his/her position to: (1) take an offered or solicited
bribe to improperly influence an action or decision on behalf of a criminal network; (b) engage
in theft of employers’ resources; (3) engage in fraud, involving the use of false or misleading
information to induce the owner of property to part with it voluntarily; (4) embezzle property
that has been entrusted to them; (5) extort goods or services on behalf of a criminal network; or
(6) hire or fire individuals on behalf of a criminal network. This definition is based on the
United Nations (2004) definition of corruption.
A port with documented incidents of employee corruption that lead to illicit maritime
transfers is coded as 9.
-

A port with documented incidents of employee corruption which do not lead to illicit
maritime transfer or a port with suspected or alleged employee corruption leading to
illicit transfers is coded as 6.

-

A port with suspected incidents of corruption which do not lead to illicit transfers is
coded as 3.

-

A port with no evidence of employee corruption is coded as 0.
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Data quality/limitations
As the highest rated vulnerabilities, evidence of organizational or employee corruption
are also the most difficult to measure comparatively. Because ports in the U.S. are subject to
many different security agencies and in any given port, the only similar agencies will be CBP,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and other federal agencies, it is difficult to
identify a comparative data source for evidence of corruption at ports. Public media accounts
and federal and local agency press releases provide the primary data sources for all three
vulnerabilities but have a set of limitations:
1) CBP and ICE press releases provide a data source, which is comparative and chronological
but incidents of corruption at specific companies operating at specific ports are not easy to
extrapolate within the press release information which often provides minimal detail.
2) One of the key issues with secondary data is the need to identify the original purpose of the
source material and the source itself (Earl et al. 2004). Organizations put out press releases
to show their particular strengths in their area of operations. Both CBP and ICE follow this
pattern, in addition to Waterfront Commission press releases of longshore worker corruption
at the Port of New York and New Jersey, a key source of data in the case study analysis. As
a result, incidents identified by CBP, ICE, and the Waterfront Commission will reflect
opaque decision making processes, which likely aim to reflect the organization in a positive
light. Cases involving corruption where the agency misidentified individuals or mishandled
the case would not likely be sent out for public consumption, though this would be valuable
data to understand the efficacy of these organizations.
3) To further identify information, public media accounts are used to identify the number of
individuals involved, timeline of the incidents, and other key details. Relying on media
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sources means that in certain news markets, stories on the port or port operations may not be
deemed valuable enough to the reading public and therefore creating a void of public
information on that port (McCarthy et al. 1996; Oliver and Maney 2000; Bevan et al. 2013).
This may be the reason why relatively few ports received scores for employee or
organizational corruption as this would be the primary method to identify cases of
corruption.
4) For those articles that do discuss corruption at ports or the influence of organized crime at
ports, they will likely be biased by what has been published before and may be less attune to
new forms of criminal activity at the port. Even organizations, which themselves are
supposed to identify new forms of crime, may focus on older groups where they have
greater resources such as informants and a better historical understanding24.
5) The Center for Investigative Reporting database is built from publicly available data sources
including law enforcement press releases. As such, the attendant issues discussed above
apply to the use of this source.
5.3 Port of New York and New Jersey (PNYNJ) specific vulnerabilities
The comparative seaport analysis examines 15 of 21 vulnerabilities while the PNYNJ
case study employs the entire SVF due to greater access to data. Operationalized definitions for
the remaining six vulnerabilities enable the case study method to examine the entire SVF at the
PNYNJ. These additional operationalized definitions are below along with discussion regarding
data quality and limitations.

24

This was my experience at the Waterfront Commission, where operations focused on traditional organized crime
groups at the expense of new diaspora groups. Greater resources and a better law enforcement understanding of more
established organized crime groups drove some of that focus, in addition to the actual operations of newer groups
which have not made inroads into physical control of companies that operate within the Waterfront Commission
jurisdiction.
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5.3A Small vessels in/near the seaport harbor (0-3)
Some port regions are co-located with a large presence of recreational or fishing vessels.
While the U.S fishing fleet rarely shares space with commercial ports,25 small vessels do make
up part of the environment of the harbor and port. The larger the number of small vessels
present in the harbor the more complex it is for officials to identify legitimate vessels and their
intentions (U.S. DHS 2008). In addition, certain ports in the U.S. are in close proximity to areas
of small vessel smuggling, primarily in Southern California and South Florida. To identify cases
of small vessel smuggling and proximity to port operations, a database of CBP press releases and
nearest proximity ports was developed26 and is used to identify small vessel smuggling incidents
and nearest proximity ports. This provides a method to determine whether small vessels in the
area are used for illicit trafficking, heightening the vulnerability of the port for criminal network
use:
-

If the port is located within twenty miles of more than five incidents of small vessel
smuggling in the past two years, it is coded 3.

-

If the port is located within twenty miles of less than five, but more than one, incidents of
small vessel smuggling in the past two years it is coded 2.

-

If the port is located within twenty miles of one incident of small vessel smuggling in the
past two year it is coded 1.

-

If the port is not located within 20 miles of smuggling incidents it is coded 0.

Data quality/limitations

25

The Port of Seattle is the main exception and houses the Pacific Northwest fishing fleet at its own marine
terminal.
26
See Appendix B.

83

The same limitations apply as those discussed in the previous set of vulnerabilities when
using press release data.
5.3B Port divergence
Port divergence is coded as a decreasing volume of trade, relative to ports in the region.
Port divergence is measured using the AAPA NAFTA Regional Container Traffic Survey
throughput statistics for North American seaports in 2013. Divergence is measured by
examining the percent change in seaport throughput over a twelve year period, relative to major
comparable throughput ports in the region (e.g., divergence at the Port of New York and New
Jersey is measured by comparing container throughput at the Port of Baltimore and Port of
Philadelphia). If the port has decreasing cargo traffic - measured as an overall reduction in
container throughput by 2014 - while neighboring ports see an increase in cargo throughput, the
port will be coded for this vulnerability.
-

If the annual percent change between the port and the average of the nearest two ports is
greater than 10% (ex. Port X has an average yearly difference of -7% between 20002014, while the port’s nearest neighbor ports have an average yearly difference of 5%, a
difference between the two of 12%), the port is coded as 3.

-

If the annual percent change between the port and the average of the nearest two ports is
between 5-10%, the port is coded as a 2.

-

If the annual percent change between the port and the average of the nearest two ports is
between 0-5%, the port is coded as 1.

-

If the port has a greater increasing throughput relative to the two nearest ports, the port is
coded as 0.

Data quality/limitations
84

The AAPA, the primary port industry group, provides the NAFTA Regional Container
Traffic Survey as the primary comparative data source for cargo traffic across North American
and Mexican seaports. This provides a strong level of reliability for comparative port analysis.
5.3C Automation/Cyber security vulnerability
A port’s level of cyber security vulnerability will increase with the greater use of
automated terminal operations. All ports have a baseline of automation with inherent cyber
security vulnerability. More dependence on automation (i.e., more port functions are automated
than at the average port) generates greater terminal operations vulnerabilities to hacking and
cyber penetration. For example, where a port has one automated terminal for 35% of all
container traffic at the port, the port would be coded as 4 for a medium level of cyber security
vulnerability. To identify port terminal automation, port documentation and information listed
on terminal websites provide detail of the level of automation at the port.
-

A port with more than 50% automated port terminal operations is coded as 6.

-

A port with between 50% and 25% automated port terminal operations is coded as 4.

-

A port with less than 25% automated port terminal operations is coded as 2.

Data quality/limitations
The primary limitation is that all terminals will be automated to some degree, and it is not
possible, with the current data, to accurately identify the level of automation above the baseline.
For example, container cranes may be handled manually, but they are operated through
computerized systems, even in a terminal where other activities are not automated. This
vulnerability relies on identifying data that can provide an approximation of how much container
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traffic is handled by fully automated terminals, and thereby provide a rough estimate of the level
of automation.
5.3D Vulnerable sectors and sector size
The Port of NY/NJ case study examines four primary vulnerable sectors: longshore
workers; drayage truck drivers; freight forwarders; and the ancillary services. These sectors are
examined through examination of all available data sources, including interviews with port
officials, case file documents, public source documents, and press release documentation from
the Waterfront Commission, ICE, and CBP. Each sector has to be examined in the context of a
specific port, which is why this vulnerability is only examined at the Port of NY/NJ where I had
greater access to data. As a result, this vulnerability does not have a score but nonetheless
constitutes an important vulnerability which should be grouped with all high order vulnerabilities
such as organization and employee corruption. A port with vulnerable economic sectors will
have economic sectors that:
-

are integral to maritime smuggling networks;

-

provide opportunities for criminal network access; and

-

have weak or nonexistent regulatory oversight.

The sizes of the vulnerable economic sectors will impact port vulnerability differently.
-

Sectors consisting of many entities will have wide and shallow access to port operations.

-

Sectors consisting of few entities will have deep and narrow access to port operations,
often developed through long-standing presence at the port.

Data quality/limitations
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The limitations of press releases have already been discussed, but this vulnerability also
uses interview and primary sources such as agency documents to support the analysis. Case file
data on port specific trafficking was difficult to identify, though those files which I was able to
obtain did provide a strong level of granularity for the participation of employees in specific
labor sectors in trafficking operations. In addition, through participant observation, I was able to
sit in on testimony of longshore workers at Waterfront Commission administrative proceedings.
This produced a skewed picture of the type of illicit activity occurring at the Port of NY/NJ since
all of the administrative hearings were focused on labor exploitation issues and not trafficking.
Fourth, I utilized public case file and testimonials from law enforcement officials to supplement
information on the kind of activity occurring at the port. As Natarajan et al. (2015) note, one of
the primary difficulties of studying illicit trafficking organizations is that law enforcement is
attracted to particular groups, and this skews what is available for researchers and, as a result, the
perception of the most prevalent types of illicit activity.
5.3E Export cargo vulnerability
A port with a high percentage of export containers will be more vulnerable to illicit
exports, such as stolen cargo, cash outflows, unlicensed defense tools/equipment, and other
illegally exported goods. Port of NY/NJ official monthly statistics are used to identify the levels
of import/export traffic.
-

A port where exports constitute over 50% of all container cargo is coded as 3.

-

A port where exports constitute 25-50% of all container cargo is coded as 2.

-

A port where exports constitute less than 25% of all container cargo is coded as 1.

Data quality/limitations
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Some ports provide official container throughout statistics highlighting the levels of
imports and exports. The Port of NY/NJ publishes official trade statistics that provide up to date
information on the levels of import/export traffic (Port Authority 2014D; 2015), both in raw
volume of tonnage and in containers, the unit of measurement for this study. As official
statistics, these are reliable and provide the best measure of import/export traffic available.
5.4 Case Study Method
The second analysis in this dissertation examines in detail the PNY/NJ using a case study
design (Yin 2009: 59). Yin (2009: 18) defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that
investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” Furthermore,
the case study inquiry “copes with technically distinctive situations in which there will be many
more variables than data points, and as one result; relies on multiple sources of evidence, with
data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result; benefits from the prior
development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis.” A case study
design offers the distinct advantage of supporting a set of defined theoretical propositions (the
SVF outlined in Chapter 3).
The methodological approach herein builds upon previous research in which a case study
was used to examine seaport administration and economic sector vulnerability to criminal
networks (Cirtwell, Crowly and Frost 2001; Hall 2004; UNESCAP 2005; Zauner 2008).27 The
case study method allows for the examination of multiple units within the overall case, to focus
on the primary research question and propositions (Easton 1998). The unique multi-

27

Diamond industry (Van der Beken et al. 2004); the European transport sector (Bucquoye et al., 2005; Klima
2011); the European pharmaceutical sector (Calovi and Pomposo, 2007); the European waste management industry
(Van Daele et al. , 2007); the trade in electronic waste (Bisschop 2012); and the timber trade in Europe (Bisschop
2012b).
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administrative and multi-jurisdictional complexity of most modern seaports means the case study
method is well-suited for application to seaport analysis.
5.4A Case selection
The case study examines the Port of New York and New Jersey (PNYNJ) as an example
of a theoretically high vulnerability port (Patton 1990; Coyne 1997) making it an ideal test case
to apply the vulnerability framework.
5.5 Data Sources
The six most commonly used sources of data for case studies are: documentation,
archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observation, and physical artifacts
(Yin 2009: 101). Interviews, documentation, archival records, and direct observation constitute
the primary sources of data for this case study. Agency documents contained information which I
developed into data sets for application in the SVF. In addition, primary source data from
interviews, archival documents, and site visits was used to triangulate observations derived from
the analysis of secondary data sources.
Interviews
For the interviews, I used a selective sampling strategy and focused on individuals with
pre-identified knowledge of seaport functions (Patton 1990). Due to the compartmentalization of
port functions, no specific individual has knowledge of overall vulnerability at any given seaport.
Rather, interviews revealed vulnerabilities in specific seaport sectors or procedures, such as
import/export patterns and trends, knowledge of the organizational culture in companies or port
authorities, and other port functions. For the PNYNJ case study, 19 interviews were conducted
with Waterfront Commission, Port Authority, U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials, and
freight forwarders to supplement documentation and public sources.
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Document Analysis
Internal documents reveal organizational and agency standards, and illicit activity and
unethical behavior can be determined by examining an organization or agency’s standard of
operations and administrative penalties for unethical behavior. For example, the Waterfront
Commission requires compliance with numerous standards prohibiting association with
organized crime and with ethical standards for licensed longshore workers at the PNYNJ. These
standards are examined and then overlaid with information from instances of criminal or
unethical behavior to illuminate vulnerabilities at the port. In addition, at the PNYNJ, publicly
available case file data is also used to identify criminal network exploitation (Natarajan and
Belanger 1995; Natarajan 2006; Shelley 2011; Natarajan et al. 2015).
5.6 Conclusion
To provide a dual process of understanding port vulnerability, the comparative analysis
of the top 30 seaports scores each port on 15 of 21 SVF vulnerability categories and the PNYNJ
is examined on each of the 21 SVF vulnerability categories. Table 4 below details six types of
information.
-

Vulnerability categories.

-

Primary data sources.

-

Whether the vulnerability is examined in the comparative port analysis and the PNYNJ
case study, graded as red or green.

-

Consequentiality of the vulnerability to criminal network access, graded as low, medium,
or high where:
o low consequentiality means that the vulnerability alone cannot produce access to
the port for a criminal network,
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o medium consequentiality creates a moderate level of access or serves to attract
networks to a specific port,
o high consequentiality creates a high level of access; alone this may be sufficient
for a network to access a seaport.
-

The conceptual level of policy or regulatory manipulability of the vulnerability, graded as
low, medium or high policy manipulability where:
o low means that authorities have few options to decrease the level of vulnerability,
o medium means that authorities have options to decrease the level of vulnerability,
but options may be cost prohibitive, not a priority in light of other security
requirements, or may not be easily applicable across the and
o high means that authorities have a wide range of inexpensive and proven
interventions which can lead to decreased vulnerability.

-

The generalizability of the vulnerability to non- U.S. seaports using the conceptualized
data sources and coding schema where:
o low means that the vulnerability cannot be generalized without major revisions to
the coding structure,
o medium means that with minor modifications to the coding structure the
vulnerability can be generalized to non U.S. seaports, and
o high means that the current coding structure of the vulnerability can be applied to
non U.S. seaports.
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Table 4: Seaport Vulnerability Framework Summary
Vulnerability category
Index

Data

Comparative
Examined
Not Examined

Port Security Funding

PSGP funding
announcements compiled by
the AAPA

Open structure
Spatial concentration of
CRAVED products
Peripheral seaport
companies
Vehicle traffic

Google Maps; Port maps
Public data on CES locations

Port Security Funding

Physical

Small vessels in/near
port

Intermodal connections
Physical/Administrative
security procedures

Proximity to illicit
import/export market

Forwarder.com listings
Port traffic studies,
environmental impact
studies, media accounts
CBP press release small
vessel interceptions, state or
municipal data on
recreational boating
community
Port literature, container
traffic studies
MTSA 2002, SAFE Port Act
2006, port literature, public
media accounts, PSGP
funding announcements
NCIC/NICB vehicle export
data, HIDTA listings, Freight
Watch International Route
Analysis Tool

Administrative
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Port divergence
Automation/cyber
security vulnerability

AAPA 2000-2013 NAFTA
Container Traffic Survey
Port terminal listings, public
data analysis

NY/NJ

Consequentiality
Low
Medium
High

Manipulability

Generalizability

Interagency cooperation

Vulnerable labor
sectors

Number of service
providers in a sector
Historical criminal
network presence

Organizational
corruption
Employee corruption

U.S. Coast Guard documents,
port literature, media
accounts of AMSC
participation or security
exercises
CBP Corrupt Office Database
(Center for Investigative
Reporting), individual media
accounts, press releases (ICE,
Waterfront Commission,
CBP)
Forwarders.com, FMC
forwarder listings, port
documents
Individual media accounts,
press releases (ICE,
Waterfront Commission,
CBP), CBP Corrupt Office
Database (Center for
Investigative Reporting)
IBID
IBID

Logistical
Container throughput
Imports of CRAVED
products
Export cargo
vulnerability
Vessel traffic

AAPA 2013 Container
Traffic Survey
FreightWatch International
2014 Commodity Theft data;
U.S. Census Import data
IBID
U.S. Maritime
Administration container
vessel statistics
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Chapter 6 - Vulnerability of the Top 30 U.S. Container Seaports
6.1 Port results
This chapter examines the vulnerability scores of the top 30 U.S. container seaports.
Individual seaport analyses for the top nine most vulnerable ports are included in this section
(with Chapter Seven focusing in depth on the Port of NY/NJ), and, for the remaining 20 seaports,
in Appendix G. Each individual port analysis details vulnerability in the three primary
categories. Ports are coded between 5 and 63. The average code is 26.5, while the average of
the top ten ports is 39.7.
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6.2 Vulnerability scores
Top 30 U.S. Container Ports

52
47

46
42

41

39
35
32

31

30
27 26.5 26

24 23.5 23

23

22

21

20

20

20

18

18

17

17

16

16
13
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Figure 3: Vulnerability Scores of Top 30 U.S. Container Ports

11

6.3 Vulnerability analysis
The top ten ports in the comparative SVF analysis display several key characteristics,
which manifest themselves most clearly along geographic lines but also along the examined
vulnerabilities, see Figure 4.28
6.3A Location

5,986 miles
from California

Figure 4: Top ten scoring ports.

Of the top ten most vulnerable ports, six are on the East Coast, with the Ports of Los
Angeles/Long Beach, Port of New Orleans, Apra (Guam), and San Juan (Puerto Rico) as the
outliers representing the other U.S. maritime region on the West Coast, Gulf Coast, Caribbean,
and Pacific regions. The location of the most vulnerable ports is a function of the confluence of
vulnerability but is heavily affected by the highest order vulnerabilities measuring corruption at
ports and the historical presence of organized crime. The geographic delineation of vulnerability

28

The data set for the top ten ports, with base data for the Port of NY/NJ can be found in Appendix E.
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is clearly visible in Figure 9. However, this is not purely a function of the geography and
historical development of ports but also of the labor organizations at ports. East Coast port
vulnerability is, in part, a function of longshoreman participation in illicit trafficking (see
Hampton Roads, Miami, Everglades, Baltimore, and NY/NJ) but also the historical involvement
of organized crime groups in aspects of port operations, whether through ownership of
companies (Miami and NY/NJ) or in aspects of labor control (NY/NJ).
6.3B Port size
The average code of the top ten ports for container throughput is 1.7, slightly above the
average across the SVF sample (1.6). However, six of the top ten vulnerable ports are coded as
low-throughput ports with less than one million annual TEUs. Only three ports are coded as
high-throughput ports and include two of the largest ports in the country: NY and LA/LB. The
phenomenon of smaller ports scoring high on vulnerability may be due to several factors:
Smaller ports are less likely to have standalone police forces and more likely to rely on divisions
of local law enforcement for security services. While this alone does not increase vulnerability,
port police divisions in law enforcement organizations may be under-resourced and attract older
officers, in some cases retired from municipal or state agencies (Messing 2014).29
For example, airport police divisions share similar characteristics to port police divisions.
At Jacksonville International Airport, a debate over whether to contract airport police services to
a local department or to keep the services in-house outlined several key concerns which are
applicable for seaport agencies (McCormack 2011).

29

This is based on observations and informal discussion with officers at the Waterfront Commission of New York
Harbor and PortMiami.
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1. Expense: It is more expensive to contract with local law enforcement to provide services than
to keep an in house force.
2. Continuity: Continuity of personnel is a concern as officers trained on port specific issues
can be rotated out due to department issues not related to port security.
3. Training: Training can be expensive and due to rotation officers may not be ready to conduct
duties while training.
Four of the top ten ports used a division of a
local law enforcement agency as their primary port
law enforcement force, including the Ports of Long
Beach, Miami, Everglades, and San Juan. Separate
port law enforcement and port authority entities
require greater coordination and without increased
resources and built in interagency communication
procedures; this may lead to increased vulnerability.
For example, low-level incidents which may indicate
larger issues may not be communicated across all port
security stakeholder agencies

if the

security

organizations are separate from port management.
Smaller ports are also generally under-resourced,
unless they are located in large metropolitan areas
and have other maritime assets which necessitate

Table 5: PSGP Funding per 2013 container
2013
PSGP Funds
container
Kahului
$0.27
Anchorage
$7.73
Savannah
$12.02
Wilmington DE
$13
LA/LB
$19.54
San Juan
$20.45
Norfolk
$23.59
Palm Beach
$25.89
Tacoma
$26.52
Port Everglades
$28.11
Gulfport
$31.96
Honolulu
$33.45
Charleston
$34.86
Oakland
$43.49
Jacksonville
$44.79
Miami
$46.64
Apra (Guam)
$48.82
Portland OR
$49.15
NY/NJ
$52.87
Hueneme
$65.70
Baltimore
$69.53
Mobile
$75.44
Seattle
$80.60
Wilmington NC
$101.01
Houston
$115.08
Boston
$163.97
Freeport TX
$196.23
Philadelphia
$259.56
San Diego
$288.37
New Orleans
$300.28
Container Traffic
High
Medium Low

security funding. Of the top ten most vulnerable ports, only the Port of New Orleans received an
above average level of PSGP funding, while all of the remaining most vulnerable ports received
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less than average PSGP funding, see Table 5.30 One of the smallest ports in the U.S. with a high
level of federal funding for port security is the Port of San Diego. There, every container
receives the equivalent of $288 in port security investments due to the proximity to the United
States’ border with Mexico, the presence of the naval fleet, and multi-use maritime facilities. In
contrast, the Port of Anchorage receives $7.73 per container, lacks multi-use facilities, and is not
likely to be targeted by terrorist attacks on infrastructure – a key factor in port security
allocations in the PSGP. The fact that the ports rated least vulnerable under the SVF also
received some of the highest levels of port security funding may be an indication that PSGP
funds do contribute to decreased overall port vulnerability, however that would require a greater
level of disaggregation at the individual agency and project level – data which is not readily
available for analysis across this comparative sample.
6.3C Non-mainland ports
Of four ports in the comparative analysis which are not located in the contiguous U.S.,
two – San Juan and Apra – display heightened vulnerability. Unlike the other two noncontiguous ports, Honolulu and Kahului in Hawaii, San Juan and Apra are located along
maritime transshipment routes in busy sea lanes with significant levels of illicit traffic (National
Drug Intelligence Center 2011e; Bureau of Statistics and Planning 2014). Cargo which is
transshipped through Guam en route to the U.S. does not need to be inspected by U.S. CBP after
it leaves Guam, but while in Guam, it is subject to Guam Customs and Quarantine Agency
(GCQA) authority. This increases jurisdictional vulnerability considering the smaller resources
and size of the GCQA (CQA 2014). The Port of San Juan, on the other hand, is subject to a
significant U.S. CBP presence at the port itself and through offshore assets in concert with the

30

Figure 17 shows PSGP funding per 2013 container at the top thirty U.S. ports (Sources: AAPA 2006; U.S.
Department of Homeland Security 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014).
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U.S. Coast Guard, but Latin American criminal networks continue to target the Port of San Juan
as an entry point into the continental United States (Gootenberg 2012; DEA 2015). This is due
to criminal network expectations that security will be less sophisticated than at other ports in the
United States, that co-conspirators operating at the port will be easier to identify, and that once
illicit cargo enters Puerto Rico onward movements are not subject to further U.S. CBP inspection
(Ewing 2005; Campo-Flores 2013). The vulnerability of these two ports highlights the need to
examine ports located on the fringe of regulatory and security apparatuses, whether located in
geographical location with a cultural or environmental draw to diaspora criminal networks (San
Juan) or a combination of both territorial distance and jurisdictional separation (Apra). The two
island ports which do not display either of these conditions, Honolulu and Kahului, without
either jurisdictional separation or a cultural or geographical draw for criminal networks, both
score 16 and are among the least vulnerable ports in the sample, respectively fourth and third
least vulnerable of the sample.
6.3D CRAVED products- import and spatial concentration
All but one of the top ten ports have a spatial concentration of CRAVED cargo. The
average code for the top ten is 2.88 (out of a maximum 3), while for the remaining twenty ports,
the average is 1. In fact, seven out of top ten ports are coded the maximum amount for this
vulnerability. While the limitations of data in this category make it difficult to identify exactly
which type of cargo is present in high quantities at the port, the presence of a CES means that
high value cargo is concentrated in or near the port, and therefore increases the attraction of the
port to criminal networks. However, ports that did not rate in the top ten for vulnerability, such
as Anchorage, may still have significant vulnerability in this area since they are heavy
destinations for CRAVED products such as seafood. Not only do the top ten ports rate high for
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the concentration of CRAVED products, they also have a high level of CRAVED imports. The
top ten ports have an average score of 2.4 while the remaining ports score on average 1.95. No
ports received a score of zero, reflecting consumption patterns in the United States.
6.3E Illicit import/export market
The top ten ports also scored high for their location in illicit import/export markets. The
average code of the top ten ports is 4.4 (out of a maximum 6), while the remaining sample
average is 2.85. Theoretically, the presence of an illicit market would drive the need for
transportation of illicit materials into the port region, however the coding also accounts for ports
that were used as transit points for stolen vehicles, one of the few types of quantifiable illicit
cargo exported from the United States to other countries (Clarke and Brown 2003; Dauvergne
2007; Morselli and Roy 2008; Clarke and Brown 2010). While the type of illicit cargo imported
into the United States differs significantly from that which is exported, the mechanisms for
moving that cargo through a port are similar including, among others, relying on cargo volume to
mask illicit shipments, identifying corrupt individuals in a port organization to facilitate transfer,
and creating shell companies to mask illicit shipments. Of all the top ten ports, one was not
located in a High Intensity Drug Trafficking County (ONDCP 2015), Charleston, with Guam not
included in HIDTA assessments.
6.3F Employee corruption
The top ten ports, particularly those along the East and Gulf Coasts, have experienced
significant employee corruption that resulted in illicit maritime transfers. These scores increased
those ports’ levels of vulnerability, and only the top ten ports scored at the highest levels for
employee corruption. The average code for the top ten ports is 8.4 (out of a maximum 9).
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The origins and vectors of corruption varied across these ports. In some ports, such as
LA/LB, a high score was the result of corruption by customs officials facilitating illicit transfers
to avoid import taxes (DHS ICE 2012) and from the recent arrest and sentencing of the Port of
Los Angeles Police Chief for corruption (FBI 2015; Hamilton 2016). In other ports, activity by
corrupt workers with privileged access to port facilities was the primary reason for increased
vulnerability. The port of Hampton Roads in Virginia exemplifies these dynamics. There,
longshore workers facilitated the movement of illicit narcotics through the port with the
assistance of a drayage truck driver (McGlone 2007). At other ports, U.S. Customs officers who
participated in corrupt activity increased the vulnerability level (Port of Los Angeles- DHS ICE
2012; Port of New Orleans- U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana). As, federal
investigations of such cases have improved, consequently, this has also increased the likelihood
that federal employees will be apprehended for participating in illicit schemes than for private
organization employees with privileged access (Homeland Security Advisory Council 2015). In
any case, there are still gaps in the number of investigators focused on corruption in the
Department of Homeland Security and CBP specifically (del Bosque and Michaels 2015). As a
result, criminal networks are more likely to target port workers with privileged access, and these
incidents constitute the primary reason that ports scored higher on employee corruption
vulnerability.
6.3G Official corruption
As discussed above, only a small set of ports had heightened vulnerability due to corruption
by officials in law enforcement agencies at the port or operating directly in the port authority itself
to include the ports of NY/NJ, LA/LB, New Orleans, Apra, Jacksonville, Miami, and Everglades.
Five of these ports had incidents of corruption by CBP officers working at the port or in the district,
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while four (Apra, Jacksonville, NY/NJ, LA/LB) had evidence of corruption in the port authority
or other law enforcement agencies operating at the port.
Corruption in official organizations at ports is multi-faceted and represents the range of
human behavior and motivations. At the Port of Los Angeles, the port police chief was indicted
and sentenced for corruption related to tax evasion and improper use of office. At the Port of New
Orleans, CBP officers transported and smuggled narcotics, and at least one used her office to claim
benefits for housing, while at the Port of LA/LB, a CBP officer assisted in moving cargo to avoid
customs duties. However, in most identified cases, at seaports and port districts, officials did not
actively assist criminal networks with illicit maritime trafficking, either for import or export.
However, along the land border with Mexico, CBP officers have actively assisted networks with
illicit trafficking (Center for Investigative Reporting; del Bosque and Michaels 2015).
While diverse factors led to corruption, there are a number of factors at seaports that can
be identified as precipitating factors, including:
1. Opportunities for abuse: The volume of cargo traffic at U.S. seaports is significant.
Of the five ports identified with official customs corruption, two (NY/NJ and LA/LB)
are the largest in the country with thousands of containers imported/exported daily,
thousands of companies using the port for legitimate transfers, and complex operating
environments. For enterprising customs officers, financial opportunities are rife, and
some officers are tempted to take advantage of their position (DHS ICE 2014).
2. Lack of oversight: Regulatory agencies such as CBP, either through lack of funding or
a full understanding of their operations, lack significant oversight through internal
inspection or auditing authorities. For example, CBP was until recently overseen by 200
investigators from the DHS Office of the Inspector General (which was responsible for
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all 220,000 DHS employees, or one investigator for every 1,000 workers) (del Bosque
and Michaels 2015). At the PNYNJ, the Waterfront Commission had no oversight
mechanism until the State of New York decided to conduct an inspection of the agency
for corruption, an unprecedented oversight action on the Waterfront Commission (Fisch
et al. 2009).
3. Opaque environment: Ports are complex operating environments that develop internal
sub-cultures with security actors who have specialized knowledge over arcane
regulations and day to day operations (Brewer 2014; Eski 2016). This contributes to an
opaque environment not readily accessible or intelligible to most outsiders and makes
regulating the port environment a challenging prospect.
6.3H Organizational corruption
All but one of the top ten ports (New Orleans) received a score in this vulnerability.
However, only the top three ports, the ports of New York, Baltimore, and Miami received the
maximum score. These scores resulted from multiple incidents of employee corruption in
individual companies and within economic or labor sectors. At the PNY/NJ, company owners
have participated in illicit trade, and top level management at companies or labor organizations
have used the organizations they work for to assist criminal networks in multiple separate
incidents. At the Port of Baltimore, warehouse company owners organized thefts of high-cost
raw materials, such as high value metals, in multiple separate incidents, increasing the port
vulnerability score (DHS ICE 5/23/2012). While at the Port of Miami, longshore workers (DHS
ICE 2010) and privately hired security guards assisted Latin American criminal networks (U.S.
Attorney’s Office Southern District of Florida 2013), affecting the vulnerability determination.
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The primary characteristic shared among these three ports is that they are in port regions
with a long standing history criminal network involvement in the labor sector; all three score
either high or medium in that vulnerability category. Another characteristic is that there are large
numbers of immigrant groups in all three areas which may constitute a contributing variable in
whether a port has increased vulnerability for illicit import/export schemes. In the New York
and New Jersey metropolitan statistical area (MSA),31 28.5% of the population is foreign born.
The Baltimore MSA is 9.4%, and the Miami-Ft. Lauderdale MSA is 38.7%, the most of any
MSA in the United States (Migration Policy Institute). However other port regions around the
country also have large levels of immigration and do not display similar heightened
vulnerability. These include the Seattle-Tacoma metropolitan area where the foreign born
population in 2013 was 17.1% of the total population, San Diego at 23.4%, and Houston at
22.5% (Migration Policy Institute). This disparity indicates that diaspora participation in the
illicit import/export trade is tempered by other vulnerability characteristics, and the relationship
requires further research to determine if there is an actual linkage.
6.3I Historical criminal network presence
Of the top ten ports, six scored for a historical criminal network presence in port
operations. This was a difficult vulnerability to code for, but the ports that received a score for
this included the PNYNJ (the port with longest historical record of criminal network
involvement in port operations), Port of Miami, Port Everglades, and Port of San Juan. The three
East Coast ports of New York, Miami, and Port Everglades share a common history of criminal
network involvement with narcotics traffic and with corrupt longshore workers. Evidence of this

31

Metropolitan statistical areas are geographic entities delineated by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
for use by federal statistical agencies in collecting, tabulating, and publishing federal statistics. A metro area
contains a core urban area of 50,000 or more population (U.S. Census).
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history reaches back into the 1980s for the Port of Miami and Port Everglades (U.S. Customs
Service 1997; Zimmerman 2006) and considerably further back for the PNYNJ, as detailed in the
port specific vulnerability analyses. However, it can be inferred that the length of a criminal
network presence at a port contributes to the depth of the influence, such that the greater the
history of criminal network involvement then the deeper the criminal network influence reaches
into some aspect of port operations. For example, at the PNYNJ, the port with the longest
history of criminal network involvement, certain port sectors particularly in the area of labor
operations have mid- or upper level management with significant ties to organized crime
(WCNYH 2012b; Rooney 2013).
Therefore, the identification of a long standing presence of criminal networks in port
operations is an indication of the depth of that influence in port operations. This is due to the
fact that if networks look to develop commercial ties within a port and law enforcement is
unsuccessful in dislodging those groups from commercial entities, then those ties will grow
deeper over time, as has occurred at the PNYNJ.
The converse of this is that in ports such as Miami where narcotics continue to be imported
(DEA 2015), and criminal networks are heavily targeted by federal law enforcement agencies
(Zimmerman 2006; Gootenberg 2012), new entities may constantly have to emerge to handle illicit
traffic. The extraordinary number of freight forwarders operating in South Florida, relative to the
container traffic, may be indicative of the many smaller commercial entities involved in the cargo
trade in the region, of which some proportion are involved in illicit import/export schemes (Weaver
2014; DEA 2016).32 This supports a vulnerability model where time + enforcement pressure 

32

South Florida has by far the largest number of freight forwarders for the level of cargo traffic across the entire
sample of container ports. There are almost the exact same number of forwarders listed for south Florida (697) as
there are in southern California (694), where the amount of cargo is nearly seven times greater (forwarders.com).
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breadth, where time itself is a function of the suitability of the port and the region for the
importation of illicit goods. In Miami, the Latin American diaspora community underlies some of
the suitability of the region to the long standing presence of criminal network operations (Garzón
2013).
Therefore, historical criminal network presence at ports displays two diverging
implications. In one model, criminal groups will develop deeper ties with specific commercial
entities; this is more evident at ports where the activities of those criminal groups are not heavily
scrutinized by law enforcement. In the other model where the activity of the group is considered
by law enforcement to be highly damaging, enforcement pressures will lead to a diffusion of
small entities into the illicit import/export system.
6.4 Port analyses
The top nine of the top ten most vulnerable ports (excluding the Port of NY/NJ, examined
in the following chapter) are detailed below33. Table 6 below outlines the vulnerability
categories and scores across the four vulnerability categories for all thirty ports, while Table 7
provides detailed scores in each category for the top ten ports, followed by detailed case studies
for the top nine ports which delve into the specific vulnerability categories.

Table 6: Categorical vulnerability scores
Port
Overall
Port
Funding Physical Administrative Logistical Score
52
1
2. NY/NJ
15
29
7
0
47
16. Baltimore
15
26
6
1
46
14. Miami
12
29
4
2
42
1. LA/LB
14
20
6
1
41
12. Port Everglades
13
23
4
2
39
10. San Juan (PR)
8
24
5

33

The Remaining 20 port analyses are in Appendix G.
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5. Hampton RoadsNorfolk
8. Charleston
17. New Orleans
26. Apra (GUAM)
13. Jacksonville
3. Savannah
21. Palm Beach (FL)
6. Houston
4. Oakland
7. Tacoma
29. San Diego
24. Boston
18. Philadelphia
27. Freeport
9. Seattle
28. Hueneme
25. Portland (OR)
19. Wilmington (DE)
23. Gulfport
22. Mobile
11. Honolulu
30. Kahului
20. Wilmington (NC)
15. Anchorage

2
1
0
1
1
2
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
3
0
3

12
14
14
7
11
13.5
15
9
14.5
14
10
11
11
9
12
10
12
8
10
10
8
6
10
5

16
13
12
17
10
6
4
7
2
4
6
5
3
6
4
3
0
5
1
1
3
0
0
0

5
4
5
5
5
5
6
8
6
4
7
6
7
5
4
7
5
5
6
6
4
7
3
3

35
32
31
30
27
26.5
26
24
23.5
23
23
22
21
20
20
20
18
18
17
17
16
16
13
11
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Table 7: Detailed Top
Ten Port Scores
Port
2. NY/NJ
16. Baltimore
14. Miami
1. LA/LB
12. Port Everglades
10. San Juan (PR) *
5. Hampton Roads-Norfolk
8. Charleston
17. New Orleans
26. Apra (GUAM) *
Port
2. NY/NJ
16. Baltimore
14. Miami
1. LA/LB
12. Port Everglades
10. San Juan (PR) *
5. Hampton Roads-Norfolk
8. Charleston
17. New Orleans
26. Apra (GUAM) *
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Port
2. NY/NJ
16. Baltimore
14. Miami
1. LA/LB
12. Port Everglades
10. San Juan (PR) *
5. Hampton Roads-Norfolk
8. Charleston
17. New Orleans
26. Apra (GUAM) *

Port Security
Container
Funding (3)
1
0
1
2
1
2
2
1
0
1
Vehicle traffic
(3)
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
*
Interagency
Cooperation (3)
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0

Open structure (3)
3
3
0
3
2
3
3
3
3
0
Intermodal connections
(3)
3
3
1
3
1
0
3
3
3
1
Illicit import/export
market (6)
5
4
5
5
5
6
4
1
3
3

Concentration of
CRAVED Products (3)
3
3
3
3
3
*
3
3
3
2
Physical/Administrative
security (3)
1
0
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
Historical Criminal
Network Presence(6)
6
4
6
0
6
6
0
0
0
2

Imports of
CRAVED
products (3)
3
2
3
3
3
2
2
1
2
3
Throughput
(3)
3
1
1
3
1
2
3
2
1
1
Organizational
corruption (9)
9
9
9
6
3
3
3
6
0
6

Peripheral
companies (3)
2
3
3
1
3
1
1
1
1
2
Container Vessel
Calls (3)
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
Employee
corruption (9)
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
6
9
6

Total
Score
52
47
46
42
41
39
37
32
31
30

6.4A Port of Baltimore – 47
The Maryland Ports Authority (MPA) manages the Port of Baltimore as a landlord port
(Maryland Port Administration), and is one of the larger ports on the East Coast, ranked 16th in
overall U.S. container traffic (AAPA 2013). It has the highest level of vehicle import/exports in
the United States with 753,265 imports and exports in 2015 (Maryland Port Administration
2016). The MPA security division contracts out access control to a private company, Securitas
Inc., while law enforcement functions at the port are provided through a contract with the
Maryland Transportation Authority Police (Maryland Port Administration).
Physical
Baltimore primary displays significant vulnerability in the open structure layout of the
terminals and close proximity to I-95, the eastern seaboard’s primary overland travel corridor.
The port also scores high/medium for vulnerability on both CRAVED categories with a
concentration of cargo in a CES, within 3 miles of the primary container terminal (Belts
Logistics), and three primary CRAVED commodities amongst the port’s imports, including two
types of metal commodities, which is a targeted theft commodity at the port (DHS ICE May
2012).34
Administrative
The primary vulnerabilities at the Port of Baltimore are administrative. The port has a
strong illicit import/export market, as a port in an HIDTA county with maritime transportation as
recognized method of illicit importation (National Drug Intelligence Center 2009b; ONDCP
2015), and 20 cargo thefts within a 75-mile radius over the past two years FreightWatch

34

www.usatradenumbers.com.
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International Route Analysis Tool). The Port of Baltimore’s connectivity along the eastern
seaboard has fostered a high level of intermodal connectivity. In addition to this intermodal
connectivity, a large truck fleet services the Port of Baltimore, with estimates varying between
3,000-10,000 trucks a day at the port, with the low end estimate reflecting a high level of truck
traffic relative to the amount of container traffic. Economic sectors in the Port of Baltimore have
a record of criminal network exploitation and organization corruption. For example, with the
warehousing sector, there have been multiple incidents of warehouse owners abetting theft of or
actively stealing CRAVED and expensive metals warehoused on their premises (DHS ICE May
2012), increasing the port’s vulnerability for organization corruption. The port scores higher for
employee corruption through numerous incidents among cruise ship employees who assisted in
narcotics trafficking (U.S. CBP December 2012). In the longshore sector, federal agencies have
targeted longshoreman and time keepers for no-show jobs, including indicting and sentencing
individuals with strong ties to the narcotics trade in the Baltimore region (U.S. Department of
Justice 2010; FBI 2010; FBI 2011a). This wide variety of illicit activity across multiple sectors
increases the vulnerability at this port.
Logistical
While the Port of Baltimore does not have a significant level of container traffic, it does
have the largest level of automobile import/exports and has been identified as a port which is
used for exports of stolen vehicles (Lantsman 2013).
6.4B Port of Miami (PortMiami) – 46
PortMiami is one of the two largest container ports in South Florida. It has the highest
level of passenger traffic in the United States with 15 cruise lines calling at the port and is 14th in
the nation for container traffic (AAPA 2013). Security duties at the port are divided between the
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PortMiami Safety and Security division responsible for access control and the Miami-Dade
County Police Seaport Operations Bureau stationed at the port (Pate et al. 2008). This sub-unit,
in turn, works with the PortMiami Safety and Security Division.
Physical
PortMiami is the only major port in the United States wholly located on an island with
significant restricted access control.35 Accordingly, the port scores low on open structure
vulnerability, though the port scores high for peripheral access based on the high level of freight
forwarders relative to cargo traffic. This large freight forwarding sector in South Florida
services many small shipping lines that call at PortMiami, PortEverglades, Port of Palm Beach,
and small terminals along the Miami River. Only recently the port re-furbished a disused
railway line to add a rail link to its intermodal options (PortMiami B), but the port still has a high
volume of truck traffic to service the cargo and cruise industries with nearly 4,500 trucks per day
in 2009 (Port of Miami Tunnel).
Administrative
Historically, South Florida has had a significant illicit import market for narcotics and
export market for illicitly trafficked firearms (ONDCP 2011b). PortMiami, and the Miami River
terminals, had been at the heart of the cocaine trade in the 1980s and early 1990s, though
narcotics traffic dropped off in the 1990s and early 2000s (Zimmerman 2006; Gootenberg 2012).
The resuscitation of Caribbean drug trafficking routes in the 2000s has led to increased narcotics
smuggling through South Florida (DEA 2015), some of which now transits through small
vessels. Accordingly, South Florida ports are the only ports on the East Coast which have an
increased vulnerability due to the illicit small vessel trafficking of people and narcotics. Of the

35

In the past year, the PortMiami Tunnel was built to provide greater access to the port, but the tunnel is highly
monitored via CCTV, license plate-reading equipment, and a heavy police presence (Observation 6/21/2015).
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101 incidents detailed through CBP press releases identifying interceptions of small vessels, 18%
were in the Miami, Ft. Lauderdale, and West Palm Beach region, primarily identified as migrant
smuggling vessels.36 In addition to illicit imports, South Florida ports are also an export point
for illicit firearms bound for Central and South America and the Caribbean, where the firearms
can sell for over 10 times their U.S. value (Ramsey 2012; Cayman Compass 2013; U.S. State
Department 2014). Traffickers normally export firearms in “dribs and drabs” as part of
piecemeal shipments, often hiding firearms in legitimate exports of used vehicles (Small Arms
Survey 2015).37 In the Small Arms Survey (2016) study of illicit firearms trafficking, South
Florida figures prominently as a region where maritime exports of illicit firearms are conducted
by legitimate freight forwarders and illicit networks, taking advantage of the maritime shipping
afforded by PortMiami, Port Everglades, and the Port of Palm Beach. South Florida also
experiences significant problems with cargo theft, with 93 thefts reported between March 2013
to 2015 (Freightwatch International), including thefts of CRAVED cargo,38 such as food
products (including yogurt, bone-in hams, and frozen seafood), home and garden products
(including small appliances, A/C units, and other electronics). Furthermore, cargo theft at the
port is organized and increased likely as a result of the dissolution of the Miami Dade County
Cargo Theft task force (Burges 2012; American Institute of Marine Underwriters 2013). In
addition, PortMiami has an above average NCIC hit rate of export vehicles identified as stolen,
though the NICB hit rate is lower than average.
PortMiami scores high on organizational and employee corruption indicators, in addition
to a historical criminal network presence in port and maritime operations (Gootenberg 2012).

36

See Appendix B
In the Small Arms Survey (2016) study of 159 criminal cases of illicit firearms trafficking of 52 cases where the
mode of smuggling was identified, 25% involved hiding firearms in an export vehicle.
38
Identified through FreightWatch Route Analysis tool
37
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Port security employees were arrested for theft as recently as 2012 (Munzenreider 2013), and
eight incidents of corruption, involving Miami-area CBP officers were involved in drug
trafficking offenses occurring between 2005 to 2012 (BorderCorruption.Org). Furthermore, the
longshore labor sector has significant issues with corruption linked to illicit maritime transport of
narcotics (DHS ICE 2010).
Logistical
PortMiami’s average annual container throughput hovers between 900,000 and one
million containers and scores low for container throughput (AAPA 2013).
6.4C Ports of Los Angeles/Long Beach (POLALB) - 42
The largest port complex in the country, the POLALB is ranked third with a significant
vulnerability profile. The complex is composed of two separate landlord port authorities, but
because they are co-terminus and share a similar geographic and customs enforcement profile,
they are considered as one unit in terms of this vulnerability assessment, or a port complex. The
ports, however, have divergent security structures. The Port of Long Beach utilizes the Long
Beach Police Department (Port of Long Beach B) as their primary law enforcement agency while
the Port of Los Angeles has a stand-alone police department (Pate et al. 2008).
Physical
The POLALB is an open structure port with cargo and containers stored in open yards
(GoogleMaps). However, the location of the ports abutting the cities of Los Angeles and Long
Beach means that storage space is at a premium and port management and terminal operators
endeavor to move cargo off the port as quickly as possible. On the west coast, the union
organization for waterfront labor, the International Longshore Workers Union has participated in
work stoppages and slowdowns that have created significant issues for cargo bottlenecks
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(Journal of Commerce 2014). While both ports have primary trucking gates, they have other
multiple entry/exits, and the port complex has a CES location located within three miles of the
port (PriceTransfer Inc). Notably, despite the large amount of cargo that passes through, the port
complex does not have a relatively large presence of freight forwarders. Even accounting for the
cargo traffic separately between both ports, they still register a low presence of forwarders
relative to the cargo throughput. Conversely, for vehicle traffic, the port complex registers a
high volume of truck trips, though the complex has a high level of inter-modal connectivity, with
nearly half of cargo moving by rail (Port of Long Beach; Port of Los Angeles).
Administrative
The port complex is a key example of how a confluence of vulnerability creates
heightened vulnerability, not through a strong level of criminal network presence in port
operations, but through heightened vulnerability across three of four highest vulnerability
categories. As would be expected from a port complex, located in the heaviest import/export
environment in the United States, the ports score high for the presence of an illicit import/export
market with 158 incidents of cargo theft within 75 miles of the ports (FreightWatch International
Route Analysis Tool),39 numerous instances of illicit import traffic seizures, especially of IPR
infringement seizures,40 primarily due to its function as the largest import gateway for Chinese
made goods (LA Times 2011), and an above average rate of NCIC and NCIB hits. Though the
port complex is located in a HIDTA county, maritime methods are not the primary method of
transportation in the area (ONDCP 2011c). While the port complex does not display the
maximum score for organizational corruption, there is evidence of companies using the port
complex for the transportation of stolen CRAVED cargo, specifically for high value metals such

39

See Section 5.2L for a justification of measuring cargo theft regionally in addition to those thefts directly at the
port.
40
Roughly 40% of all IPR in the United States seizures occur at the port complex.
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as copper (DHS ICE 2013). The port complex rates high for employee corruption with
numerous instances of CBP officers who colluded to smuggle cargo, including supervisory
officers (DHS ICE 2012). Finally, the Port of Los Angeles specifically has undergone a
tumultuous period when the Port Police Chief was indicted and sentenced for corruption (United
States v. Ronald Jerome Boyd 2015). While a culture of corruption that is present in some
organizational sectors in other ports is not widespread at the port complex, the above examples
show that even individual cases of corruption can rise to the highest levels of port security
management.
Logistical
The port complex scores high for container throughput vulnerability with quadruple the
throughput of the next largest container port in the United States, the PNYNJ (AAPA 2013).
6.4D Port Everglades – 41
Port Everglades is operated as a department of Broward County as a limited operating
port, which means that the port authority operates certain facilities and leases others. The port
hosts a significant amount of cruise ship traffic, with ten cruise lines calling at the port (Port
Everglades 2015), in addition to 35 cargo shipping lines making it the 12th busiest port in terms
of container traffic. The Broward Sheriff’s Office provides law enforcement services at the port
to include access control (Broward County Sheriff’s Department).
Physical
The port maintains three primary terminals, with the main terminal – Port Everglades
Terminal – with one entrance, while the two smaller terminals, including Holt breakbulk
terminal have multiple entry and exit points directly into the city of Ft. Lauderdale. The primary
terminal has large open access yards, but with the single access point, the port receives a medium
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vulnerability score. As the port undergoes a transformation to increase intermodal options for
shippers, it continues to have a high level of vehicle traffic for drayage (Port Everglades 2015).
In addition, the port scored high for both the spatial concentration of CRAVED cargo
(International Warehouse Services), and CRAVED cargo imports, with six of the top ten
commodities as CRAVED cargo (WorldCity Trade Numbers).
Administrative
As with other South Florida ports, the primary vulnerabilities is the location of the port in
a significant illicit import/export market, situated in a HIDTA county (ONDCP 2015). Similar to
the Ports of Miami and Palm Beach, maritime transportation is the primary method of illicit
trafficking (DEA 2015). The port is located in an area known for cargo theft, like Port of Miami,
with over 90 high value thefts recorded between March 2013 and March 2015 (FreightWatch
International). The port has also been the site of significant organizational corruption with an
entire ocean forwarder company heavily infiltrated by Colombian drug trafficking network (U.S.
Attorney’s Office for Southern District of Florida 2013; DEA 2014). This increased the
organizational corruption score for the port and significantly increased the employee corruption
score as well. The operation of Kings Ocean Services was part of a long standing pattern of
criminal network operations at the port from as far back as the 1980s (Gootenberg 2012) through
1990s (Lebowitz 1998). In 1998, for example, nearly 50% of the longshore workers at the port
had criminal records, and the port had no access control at all (Lebowitz 1998). In the early
2000s, the president and two employees of Port Services International (PSI), the contractor
responsible for vetting and hiring port security officers, were arrested and convicted of fraud for
facilitating the hiring of guards who were unqualified and were improperly vetted, leading to the
take-over of security functions by federal agents (Bernard 2004). While these vulnerabilities
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have decreased with the introduction of TWIC cards and the relative equal security standards of
the MTSA, Port Everglades still has registered high levels of administrative vulnerability.
Logistical
With just under one million TEUs in 2013, the port scores low for throughput
vulnerability (AAPA 2013).
6.4E Port of San Juan (Puerto Rico) - 39
The Autoridad de los Puertos de Puerto Rico (the Port Authority of Puerto Rico),
governs the Port of San Juan, one of the largest ports in the Caribbean and the 10th largest port in
the United States (AAPA 2013). A division of the Puerto Rico Police, equivalent of a U.S. state
police agency, the Policia de los Puertos (Port Police) provides law enforcement security at the
port. While the port is heavily secured with CCTV and a centralized command center with
integrated security systems (Honeywell International), the port continues to be heavily targeted
by criminal networks for illicit import/export schemes (Ewing 2005; National Drug Intelligence
Center 2011e; Campo-Flores 2013).
Physical
Despite the port’s island location, San Juan is a large metropolis, and the port is one of
the larger ports in the United States, ranking tenth in overall container traffic. The layout of the
port is spread out over several neighborhoods with eight cargo terminals located in the Puerto
Nuevo district and three located in the Guaynabo municipality. To reach the five primary cargo
terminals at the Puerto Nuevo district, there are multiple entry points, with a main entrance and
at least two other side entrances (GoogleMaps). Furthermore, a major thoroughfare, JFK 2, is
directly adjacent to the port to enable cargo transportation. There is no publicly available
information on the presence of a CES, and the port registers a medium score for imports of
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CRAVED cargo with three CRAVED commodities in the top ten imported and exported goods
(WorldTrade Numbers). Moreover, the port does not have a large freight forwarder presence.
There was no data available to measure truck traffic but a proxy measure for the amount of truck
traffic notes that there is a large presence of daily vehicular traffic in that area (Puerto Rico
Public Private Partnerships Authority 2010).41
Administrative
The Port of San Juan scores high for numerous administrative vulnerabilities. The port is
located in region with increased illicit narcotics smuggling and has a high level of seizures of
narcotics and illicit firearms (National Drug Intelligence Center 2011e; DEA 2015). For
example, in 2013, federal agencies conducted an unprecedented number of seizures, including
21,831 pounds of narcotics and 37,958 illegal weapons and ammunition (US CBP January 2014).
This represented a two percent increase in narcotics seizures and a 118 percent increase in illegal
weapons and ammunition seizures compared to the previous year (US CBP December 27 2012;
February 13 2013). These significant increases are related to the increasing use of Caribbean
trade routes for narcotics trafficking following pressure along the Southwest border region in the
United States (Gootenberg 2012; DEA 2015). The port also displays a historical presence of a
criminal network influence in the longshore sector, with a drug trafficking group operating
through longshore workers and through a freight forwarding company for over ten years until the
group was disbanded through federal action in 2013 (U.S. Department of Justice 2013). This
incident increased both the organizational and employee corruption scores of the port, due to the

41

In 2008-09, 85,950,000 vehicles travelled along the PR 22 road that services the cargo terminals of the Port of San
Juan. According to the Port of San Juan, roughly 18% of all yearly traffic is attributable to the port. Average daily
traffic along PR 22 is 235,000 vehicles. A rough estimate places 44,358 trucks per days for the port. This is likely
an overestimate considering that the port carries roughly 3479 containers a day on average. However, figuring in
bulk traffic and that 90% of Puerto Rico’s cargo arrive by maritime methods there is likely a heavy flow of truck
traffic into and out of the port (Puerto Rico Public Private Partnerships Authority 2010).
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fact that the criminal network was in full control of freight forwarding company and facilitated
illicit maritime transfers through the port.
Logistical
The Port of San Juan is the tenth largest container port in the U.S. and carries a
significant amount of throughput, putting it in the mid-level of vulnerability (AAPA 2013).
6.4F Hampton Roads-Norfolk – 35
Virginia Port Authority (VPA) operates Hampton Roads facilities through a separate
private operating company, Virginia International Terminals, Inc. (Old Dominion University
2010). The VPA owns Norfolk International Terminal, Newport News, Marine Terminal, and
Portsmouth Marine Terminal, all in the Hampton Roads area, and is the fifth largest container
port in the United States (Pate et al. 2008). The VPA Police Department provides all law
enforcement services, and unlike many other ports, no private security is allowed on the premises
(Virginia Port Authority).
Physical
The ports primary container terminals have multiple entry and exit points at both Norfolk
International Terminals and Newport News Marine Terminal. However, CRAVED cargo is not
spatially concentrated as the CES is located nearly 20 miles from the port in Chesapeake,
Virginia (Hampton Roads Examination Warehouse). The port has a medium level of CRAVED
cargo imports, with commodities such as foodstuffs, motor vehicle parts, and furniture among
the CRAVED imports (WorldTrade Numbers). While the port has a high score for vehicle
traffic (Bronzini 2008) and significant intermodal capabilities with 33% of all cargo transiting
through rail (Port of Virginia 2015), it does not have a significant presence of peripheral
companies such as freight forwarders. This may be due to several factors including the lack of a
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large immigrant diaspora population and that a significant portion of container traffic at the port
is military traffic.
Administrative
Hamptons Roads scores high in three administrative categories. First, it is a mid-level
vulnerability illicit import/export market region, showing both above average scores of NICB
and NCIC hits for exported vehicles from the port, and the presence of an illicit import market
for narcotics, evidenced by several seizures of narcotics in container traffic at the port (DHS ICE
2012; Daugherty 2014).42 In 2014, Hampton Roads and the six surrounding counties were
designated as HIDTAs (Federal Register 2014), and in drug market assessments, the port is
identified as a vector for illicit narcotics transportation (National Drug Intelligence Center
2003b; 2009b). The port also scores high for employee corruption through incidents in which at
least two longshore workers belonging to the ILA, and a port trucker, were indicted for
offloading narcotics from Panama for distribution in the area and for onward transit to New York
State (McGlone 2007).
Logistical
Hampton Roads, as the fifth largest container port in the in the United States, has a high
score for vulnerability with over two millions TEUs annually (AAPA 2013).
6.4H Port of Charleston - 32
The Port of Charleston is operated by the South Carolina State Ports Authority (SCSPA)
and ranks eighth in container traffic (AAPA 2013). The SCSPA owns the five primary terminals

42

Led by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the BEST teams incorporate personnel from ICE,
CBP, and the U.S. Coast Guard within DHS; the DEA, FBI, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
(ATF), and U.S. Attorney’s Offices within the Department of Justice; as well as other key federal, state, local and
foreign law enforcement agencies to leverage federal, state, local, tribal, and foreign law enforcement resources to
combat transnational crime and collaborate on intelligence led seizures of narcotics and other illicit cargo (ONDCP
2013).
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and operates them with its own staff, with some exceptions for licensed operators at the port
(Pate et al. 2008). Law enforcement is provided by the SCSPA Police Department though
terminal lease holders may hire private security (Pate et al. 2008).
Physical
The Port of Charleston scores high for: (1) the open structure of the port with five
terminals (Wando Welch, North Charleston, Columbus Street, Union Pier, and Veterans) all
within one mile of large public access highways; (2) the container serving terminals with open
yards; (3) the presence of CRAVED products (Port of Charleston); and (4) through an onsite
CES, and for a high presence of vehicular traffic. In addition, the port has a high level of
intermodal connectivity through the presence of two rail lines, CSX and Norfolk Southern
(SCSPA), with an estimated 25% of cargo moving by rail (Wilbur Smith Associates 2002).
Administrative
The port scores a low level of vulnerability for an illicit import/export market though it
registers a significantly above average score for NCIC registered exported vehicles but below
average for NICB hits. In recent years, however, the port’s seizures of illicit cargo has been
trending significantly lower. For example, in 2006, CBP reported that they had seized over
2,000 pounds of narcotics, while by 2007 CBP reported seizing only 1l pounds (U.S. CBP). In
addition, in 2015, the ONDCP did not identify Charleston County, the location of the Port of
Charleston as an HIDTA county (ONDCP 2015). Despite this, the port has been used by illicit
smuggling groups including the same group that operated at the Port of Hampton Roads
(McGlone 2007). The port has also had incidents of CBP officers abusing their authority,
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slightly increasing its vulnerability score under organization corruption
(BorderCorruption.Org).43
Logistical
The port scores a mid-level of vulnerability with 1.6 million TEUs in 2013 (AAPA
2013).
6.4G Port of New Orleans (PONO) – 31
PONO owns or controls 22 miles of wharves and terminals spread along the Mississippi
River, the Industrial Canal and the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet as a landlord port and ranks 17th
in the United States (Port of New Orleans). The port is an important export port for bulk cargo
such as grain and petroleum products. It has a specialized Harbor Police Department, which is
responsible for law enforcement in the port but private security provides gate services and
security for tenant spaces (Harbor Police Department 2005).
Physical
PONO scores high for open structure, the presence of CRAVED products with an on-site
CES location (U.S. CBP), and a high level of vehicle traffic (Port of New Orleans B).
Furthermore, the port has a significant intermodal presence as the only port in the United States
to be serviced by all six major U.S. railways (Port of New Orleans C). However, rail is not a
primary mode of intermodal transport with only 3% of containerized traffic shipped by rail (Ports
of Louisiana).
Administrative
The port does not display evidence of a historical presence of criminal networks nor is
there evidence of criminal network involvement in port operations. However, the port is located
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In 2010, two CBP officers at the Port of Charleston were sanctioned for the use of government computer systems
to illicitly check on coworkers, neighbors, and other unauthorized usage.
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in an HIDTA identified trafficking county (ONDCP 2015) and also displays an above hit rate of
NCIC hits increasing the illicit export market vulnerability. There is no evidence of
organizational corruption, though two U.S. CBP officers were arrested for corruption in previous
years including one who assisted in drug trafficking, increasing the employee corruption
vulnerability (U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana; Center for Investigative
Reporting).
Logistical
PONO has a low level of container cargo throughput, with 476,000 TEUs in 2013
(AAPA 2013).
6.4I Apra (Guam) – 3044
The Port Authority of Guam (PAG) manages the Port of Apra which handles more than
90 percent of the island’s total imports, the majority imported from the United States (Port
Authority of Guam). In addition, the Port of Guam also serves as the transshipment hub for the
United States, Hawaii, and Far East to the western Pacific region making it the 26th largest
container port in the U.S. (Parsons Brinckerhoff 2013). As a U.S. territory, Guam is subject to
U.S. law but has a separate customs agency, Guam Customs and Quarantine, which enforces all
U.S. customs regulations on cargo at Guam’s port of entries (Port Authority of Guam). Port
security is provided for by the PAG Port Police (Parsons Brinckerhoff 2013).
Physical
PAG does not have an open structure, though containers are kept in an open yard, and the
port has only one entrance restricting access. The port does have increased vulnerability for both
concentration of CRAVED products (EA Engineering, Science and Technology 2012) and a high

44

Score does not include vehicle traffic input due to a lack of data identifying the daily truck transits.
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level of CRAVED product imports with seven of ten of the top import/export commodities being
CRAVED (University of Guam 2014).
Administrative
Despite the lack of physical vulnerabilities at the port, the Port of Apra displays
significant administrative vulnerability. Due to a lack of funding, the port has identified several
physical security measures that are lacking. For example, both natural guardianship through
adequate lighting and formal surveillance procedures are lacking as “the Port has video cameras
installed throughout the terminal facilities, (but) they are not maintained. Additionally, the
existing camera system does not provide complete coverage of the terminal (Parson Brinckerhoff
2013).” The lack of this standard SCP technique raises the vulnerability score, an uncommon
heightened score at a U.S. seaport.45 PAG also registers a higher score for an illicit
import/export market primarily because once cargo enters into Guam, it is not subject to further
inspection once it is transshipped to the mainland United States (Parsons Brinckerhoff 2013).
Furthermore, maritime transportation in a known method of illicit trafficking into and through
Guam, underscoring that transshipment ports with heightened vulnerability can attract networks
through the jurisdictional arbitrage (Bureau of Statistics and Planning 2014). The Port of Apra
also registers for jurisdictional vulnerability as there is shortage of PAG police officers to handle
the necessary security duties, in addition to difficulty in retaining personnel once hired (Parson
Brinckerhoff 2013). The port also scores highly for organizational and employee corruption due
to corruption within the PAG and more recent incidents with corruption accusations in the Guam
Customs and Quarantine service (Aguon 2012; Toves 2015).
Logistical

45

Of the entire 30 port sample, only five ports registered above a low level of vulnerability in this category,
including: Miami, Philadelphia, Hueneme, Honolulu, and Apra.
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The Port of Apra is a low throughput port, with 169,000 TEUs yearly (AAPA 2013).
6.6 Conclusion
The preceding data collection, analysis, and coding provides a useful method to
determine a baseline level of seaport vulnerability. It is important to mention that the highest
possible score under the SVF is 63 with the tenth most vulnerable port in the United States,
Apra, receiving a score of 30, and the most vulnerable, the Port of NY/NJ, 52. This implies that
port security in the United States is, at a baseline, reasonably secure and that most ports do not
display the vulnerabilities that would attract criminal networks to exploit their operations for
illicit purposes. The average score for a port is 26.5, or less than half of the maximum under the
SVF.
The SVF, therefore, is best used as a baseline framework to move towards further in
depth case analysis of a specific port of interest. By examining the SVF across other available
port security frameworks such as the USCG International Port Security Program vulnerability
analyses, World Customs Organization SAFE Framework assessments standards, and the
International Standards Organization 28000 Port Security standards, the SVF provides a novel
and discretized set of criteria to identify vulnerability at seaports in concert with criteria used by
other organizations. However, to identify the nuances of port vulnerability, any individual
analysis assessment should be followed with in-depth case study analysis.
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Chapter 7 - Port of New York and New Jersey Case Study
7.1 Introduction
The Port of New York and New Jersey (PNYNJ) is the largest port complex on the East
Coast and demonstrates the importance of maritime trade to the development of New York. The
relationships between security stakeholders, the private sector, and historical criminal influence
in port operations have created a complex vulnerability environment.
The PNYNJ is the oldest, continuously functioning seaport in the United States, and like
many other ports, it is spread across multiple shipping terminals, which are spread across a large
geographical area. The Port is in New York harbor, an area of more than 1,200 square miles that
covers more than 430 square miles of water, including the 122 square mile expanse of the Lower
Bay and the protected waters of the Upper Bay where port facilities are primarily located (WPA
Writers Project 2004).46
In the harbor’s early years, the Port was neither the largest nor the most significant port in
Colonial and Federal period America (Albion 1970).

PNYNJ lagged behind Boston and

Charleston in the early eighteenth century and behind Boston and Philadelphia in the late Colonial
period - Boston had a stronger maritime tradition and Philadelphia had a more developed
hinterland (Glaeser 2005). But, by the mid-nineteenth century, New York had overtaken all other
ports on the eastern seaboard to become the premier port for imports (Rodrigue 2004).

46

Note on terminology: In the 19th C. most terminal and cargo operations were concentrated in the city of New
York, particularly the piers and wharves of Brooklyn and Manhattan, which is referred to as the Port of New York.
Towards the early 20th c. Hoboken, Jersey City and Bayonne began to have greater prominence in terminal and
wharf operations, while by the mid-20th C. Elizabeth and Newark began to develop terminal operations as well. By
1921 when the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey was established, the Port of New York would
encompass operations on the New Jersey side of the harbor.
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The advantages of New York harbor became apparent after the opening of the Erie Canal.
As a closed harbor with an open ocean entrance, the short distance from the harbor entrance to
the port itself became a strong incentive for shipping lines to call at the port (WPA Writers
Project 2004).47 The Port of New York also offered lower transportation costs, as manufacturing
grew within and near the city. Shipping volumes rose as immigrants entered the New York
region, which, in turn, lowered transportation costs through economies of scale. As more vessels
called at the port, competition to house and discharge vessels decreased transportation costs
(Glaeser 2005). This pattern of dominance in port operations continued through the twentieth
century. However, as transportation costs fell alongside the rise in technological innovation, the
dominance of New York decreased relative to other ports on the eastern seaboard and across the
United States (Rodrigue 2004). Today, the port, however, retains a strong market share on the
eastern seaboard as the largest container port and overall tonnage port, even surpassing the Ports
Los Angeles and Long Beach (AAPA 2013).
7.2 Port management
The Port is managed by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, or the Port
Authority (Port Authority). The Port Authority was formed in 1921 as a bi-state agency to manage
maritime operations in New York Harbor and to settle increasingly frequent arguments between
the states of New York and New Jersey over the movement of cargo to and from New York City
(New York-New Jersey Port Authority Compact of 1921; Rodrigue 2004).48 For maritime
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Los Angeles and Long Beach have perhaps the easiest entrance to the open ocean and are the largest ports in the
U.S. While access to the ocean is not always the key determinant in port dominance, today it is a factor that
shipping lines consider in their vessel and terminal operations decision making, though with the growth of container
vessels and the ease of rail and road transport this may not be as determinative as in decades past.
48
“The port authority shall constitute a body, both corporate and politic, with full power and authority to purchase,
construct, lease and/or operate any terminal or transportation facility within said district; and to make charges for the
use thereof; and for any of such purposes to own, hold, lease and/or operate real or personal property, to borrow
money and secure the same by bonds or by mortgages upon any property held or to be held by it.” (New York-New
Jersey Port Authority Compact of 1921)
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operations, the Port Authority functions as a landlord port, leasing terminals to private companies
that operate and manage maritime operations on-site. However, port operations only account for
a small percentage of Port Authority operating revenue, totaling just six percent in 2013 (PANYNJ
2014).
7.3 Terminal management and layout49
The port has six primary terminals; four in New Jersey that handle the vast majority of
container cargo and two in New York City. The New Jersey terminals move the majority of
cargo, around 80% of all tonnage (Rodrigue 2004).
The five primary terminals have different management and labor structures, though all
are serviced by the International Longshoreman’s Association, or ILA, through different union
locals. Management ranges from global corporate ownership of APM Terminals (APM;
Notteboom and Rodrigue 2012) in Elizabeth, New Jersey to North American terminal operator
PortsAmerica management of Port Newark Container Terminal (PortsAmerica). Howland Hook
in Staten Island and Global Container Terminals in Bayonne are both owned and operated by
Global Container Terminals, a Canadian based terminal operator with a small footprint in the
United States (Global Container Terminals; Port Authority B). The last remaining operating
marine terminal in Brooklyn, Red Hook Container Terminal is operated by Red Hook Container
Terminal LLC, a sole operator that does not operate any other terminals in the U.S. or worldwide
(Red Hook Terminals).

49

Note: The Port Authority has specific terminology for the marine terminals it leases out, for example Howland
Hook Marine Terminal, but when the lease holders for these terminals change, the common name for the terminals
changes as well. For example, Howland Hook Marine Terminal was operating as New York Container Terminal
prior to acquisition by Global Container Terminals Inc, and now operates as Global Container Terminals NY LLP.
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7.4 Labor at the PNYNJ
The ILA is the primary labor provider for longshore labor at PNYNJ terminals. The
union represents all unionized longshore workers along the East and Gulf coasts and negotiates a
master contract with the United States Maritime Alliance (USMX). The master contract governs
broad ILA-management relations including workdays, traditional benefits, jurisdiction,
technology, and other benefits (USMX 2013). Unlike other ports in the United States, the ILA
master contract for the PNYNJ reflects the special position of the PNYNJ by including PNYNJ
specific provisions on health care and drug testing (USMX 2013).50 In addition to the master
contract, the New York Shipping Association (NYSA) negotiates with the ILA on PNYNJ
specific issues such as work hours, pensions, local work rules, holidays, vacations, and other
issues not covered by the master contract (Waterfront Commission 2012).
In the mid-twentieth century at the height of the port’s reputation as a “mob controlled”
port, the port labor system was governed by the “shape up” (Johnson 2005; Stewart 2012). The
shape up was a daily occurrence where laborers would present themselves at the hiring hall
hoping to be given a position on work gang. As a result, the hiring agent yielded considerable
power and criminal groups sought to install members of their organizations into these positions
(Johnson 2005; Stewart 2012). The Waterfront Commission was formed in response to this
problem, with the express purpose of carefully regulating and modulating the port’s labor supply
(Block 1982; Demeri 2012).

50

Article VII, Section 7.
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The work structure at the port is idiosyncratic to the PNYNJ. The port operates under a
gang system,51 which requires a full gang to finish unloading or loading a vessel (Waterfront
Commission 2012). At the PNYNJ, the gang system actively employs three teams that work an
eight hour shift each and are paid even when they are not working their shift (Waterfront
Commission 2012). The NYSA has admitted that this relatively inefficient and cost intensive
labor structure is a vestigial custom and practice at the port resulting in a variety of abuses by
unscrupulous workers (Waterfront Commission 2012: 4).
In recent years, the introduction of larger container vessels has increased the need for
automated terminals and further reduced the need for longshore labor. Automated terminals can
move 30 containers an hour indefinitely while a skilled longshore laborer can only keep up 30
moves an hour during their peak performance for a few hours a day (Mongelluzzo 2015b). The
PNYNJ has yet to fully automate, with only Global Container Terminals in Bayonne with partial
automation (Strunsky 2014). As automation increases at PNYNJ, its vulnerability profile will
subsequently change, but for the time being, longshore labor remains an important factor to
consider at the PNYNJ. The sprawling terminal layout, multiple ownership structures and labor
idiosyncrasies at the PNYNJ are overlaid with a similarly byzantine set of security agencies.
7.5 Port security structure
The security agency umbrella at the PNYNJ is similar to other ports in the United States
but with a greater number of agencies. These agencies can be categorized as federal, state, local,
and specialized agencies.
Federal agencies

51

West Coast ports operate under a shift system where workers are paid for only the shift they work (Waterfront
Commission 2012).

131

The primary federal oversight agency in the United States is the U.S. Coast Guard
(USCG) which leads the New York section Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC). The
New York AMSC has oversight responsibility for transportation channels and approaches into
New York harbor (Code of Federal Regulations 33 22) and reviewing facility security plans
(USCG 2013).52
While USCG provides oversight of facility security, the Transportation Safety Agency,
(TSA) manages the MTSA-mandated Transportation Worker Identification Card (TWIC)
required for all longshore workers to gain access to port facilities (Emsellem 2009; TSA). TWIC
is the primary form of identification at ports around the country and is a biometric based ID card
that creates a baseline level of identification requirements at U.S. ports (TSA). In recent years,
the TWIC program has been criticized for being ineffective in preventing unauthorized entry into
secure port working environments, and also for loopholes which allow temporary IDs to be
granted to new employees for the first thirty days of their employment (U.S. GAO 2013; Ford).
Container security and inspections are conducted by U.S. Customs and Border Protection, as the
sole customs agency in the United States, while investigations of any smuggled cargo once
identified by CBP are handled by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and, in some
cases, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).
State agencies
The primary state agency with a security role at the PNYNJ is the New Jersey State
Police Marine Services Bureau (NJSPMSB), which has jurisdiction over New Jersey’s
waterways. As Port Newark and Port Elizabeth are located on the west side of Newark Bay, the
NJSPMSB has jurisdiction over the waterways leading into Port Newark and Port Elizabeth and

52

See Chapter 8- Implications for Policy and Praxis for an examination of the USCG assessment tool.
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can participate in investigations and provide additional waterside security in that area (New
Jersey State Police).
Municipal agencies
The New York Police Department Harbor Unit patrols the waterways of New York
Harbor and provides security support to Coast Guard assets when specific vessels require extra
protection, such as cruise ships that dock at the Manhattan Cruise Terminal (South 2008; Baker
2011). In addition, municipal police agencies in Bayonne, Jersey City, Elizabeth, and Newark
all have responsibility for basic law enforcement services in the areas around terminals located in
those cities.
Specialized agencies
The Port Authority Police Department (PAPD) provides overall law enforcement services
at Port Authority facilities. The PAPD is one of the largest port police units in the United States
(Reaves 2011). As marine terminal operations are a fraction of Port Authority revenues, the
number of officers devoted to the marine terminals is a small portion of the total officers in the
department (Citizen Budget Commission 2012). The PAPD also has an investigative division
that investigates transportation-related criminal activity within Port Authority jurisdiction, such
as cargo theft on Port Authority properties (Pate et al. 2008).
The primary specialized agency at the PNYNJ is the Waterfront Commission of New
York Harbor (Waterfront Commission). Arguably the most controversial agency at the port, the
Waterfront Commission was introduced in 1953 by an act of the U.S. Congress and was formed
through a compact between the states of New York and New Jersey (Levy 1989) with the
primary purpose investigating and combatting criminal activity and influence in the Port of New
York and New Jersey to ensure fair hiring and employment practices. This entails the regulation
and licensing stevedoring companies operating in the harbor and on the piers in addition to
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individuals who handle waterborne freight.53 The Waterfront Commission also regulates the list
of registered workers to ensure that full-time work is available to registrants and to limit
competition for slots (Fisch et al. 2009). Unlike other port security agencies, the Waterfront
Commission’s jurisdictional authority has long been questioned by the ILA, NYSA, and
legislators in New Jersey who view the agency as a regulatory burden on port operations and
which therefore affects how other entities at the port cooperate with the Commission on
investigations (Levy 1989; NJ State Bill 2277 2015; Aron 2015; NJ State Bill 2277 2015).
The multiplicity of agencies with differing jurisdictions and with historically volatile
relationships (Fisch et al. 2009) is a factor leading to increased vulnerability, and one which may
be unavoidable due to the development of the PNYNJ across two states in one of the largest
commercial regions in the United States. The mitigation factors to address jurisdictional and
interagency vulnerability are especially important at the PNYNJ and are examined in the section
that details interagency cooperation at the PNYNJ.
7.6 Data sources54
Public sources
The case study relied on data sources used in the comparative port analysis using
identical or similar sources where applicable, to develop a baseline level of vulnerability, in
addition to additional data sources not available for other ports.

The Commission’s jurisdiction has been a source of contention. According to the Compact, the Commission has
jurisdiction over licensing any companies operating with 1,000 yards of a “pier” that perform activities inherent to
the transportation of waterborne freight. In a 2013 suit, the Commission contended that a pier includes the area
where waterborne containerized freight is loaded, unloaded and stored, and that the 1,000 yard measurement should
be taken from the property line of the pier nearest the company under question for licensing. In Continental
Terminals Inc. V. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor 2013, the Southern District of New York agreed
with the Commission’s interpretation of that jurisdiction and effectively allowed the commission to continue with
licensing warehouses and other companies operating within 1,000 yards from the nearest point of the nearest pier,
provided they meet the requirements and do not function as a regular warehouse (Continental Terminals Inc. V.
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor 2013).
54
See Appendix H for IRB approval documentation.
53
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Observations
Between June 2011 and December 2012, as a research analyst at the Waterfront
Commission I completed background checks on companies and individuals, observed Waterfront
Commission public hearings,55 and conducted site visits to Howland Hook Marine Terminal,
Port Newark Container Terminal, and Global Container Terminals on routine visits with
Waterfront Commission police.
Interviews
In addition to sitting in on public hearings, conducting site visits, and participant
observation during the period of June 2011 to December 2012, I conducted interviews with 19
port security stakeholders at the port.56 All interviews were de-identified and interviewees
agreed verbally to participate in the study. Using ATLAS.TI software, interviews were
transcribed and coded based on vulnerability categories. In addition to these formal interviews, I
had multiple informal conversations and discussions with port security stakeholders at the Ports
of Miami, Baltimore, Los Angeles, Long Beach, U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the World Customs Organization.
Documents
In addition, I examined primary documents such as: proceedings of public Waterfront
Commission decisions to revoke longshore registration; New Jersey Superior Court of Appeal or
New York State Court appeals (Waterfront Commission 2013; Waterfront Commission 2013b;
Application of Margaret Dilin v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor 2013; Superior
Court of New Jersey Appellate Division 2015); Waterfront Commission Annual Reports 20002012; Port Authority of New York and New Jersey annual reports; indictments of individuals

55

Hearings were held January 19, 2011, May 19, 2011, September 20, 2011, October 27, 2011, December 15, 2011,
February 8, 2012, and March 7, 2012.
56
See Appendix I for the list of interview subjects.
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with waterfront connections (United States V. Stephen DePiro et al. 2010); New Jersey State
legislature hearing transcripts (New Jersey State Legislature Waterfront Commission Hearing
2010); Union contracts including the master USMX-ILA (USMX 2013) and the NYSA-ILA
CBA (NYSA 2013); New York State Inspector General’s Report (Fisch et al. 2009); affidavits of
federal agent testimony at trial (Southern District of New York 2010); and CBP, ICE, and
Waterfront Commission press releases documenting arrests, indictments, and sentencing of
longshore workers.
7.7 Vulnerability analysis
The PNYNJ displays the highest level of vulnerability across the top 30 U.S. container
ports. To create a baseline for comparison, I scored the PNYNJ on the SVF categories applied in
the previous chapter to the other 29 seaports. The PNYNJ receives a score of 52 out of 63. The
case study provides further detail on the individual vulnerabilities at the PNYNJ and shows that
vulnerability at the PNYNJ is the result of a confluence of individual vulnerability, which
combines to create the most vulnerable port to criminal network exploitation.
7.8 Port security funding
Between 2002 and 2013, in absolute terms, the PNYNJ received the second largest
amount of PSGP funds, or $292 million (AAPA 2006; DHS 2007; DHS 2008; DHS 2009; DHS
2011; DHS 2012; DHS 2013; DHS 2014; FEMA 2014). Relative to the amount of container
throughput, the port scores a low level of vulnerability in this category, with $52.87 for every
2013 container transiting the port. However, as shown in the previous chapter, port security
funding is not always a function of container or cargo traffic. Regression analysis of PSGP
outlays and container throughput shows no statistical relationship between container throughput
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and port security grant program funding at the PNYNJ.57 In fact, cargo volumes grew by 45%
from 2002 to 2013 and did not result in a commensurate growth in funding (PANYNJ 2014d).
The lack of increased PSGP funds for the port may be attributed to several factors:
including the DHS formula which heavily weighs terrorism over criminal network exploitation
(US GAO 2011); the total available amount of PSGP funding, which decreased from $388
million to $93 million in 2013 (AAPA); and that some ports are able to secure funds despite
having low cargo throughput as a function of having a higher terrorist threat profile. Lack of
security funding alone does not create vulnerability, but PSGP funding is a key source of
additional security funds to invest in basic physical security infrastructure such as lighting,
fencing, and CCTV. Without PSGP funds, physical security measures may not be implemented
and increase the level of physical vulnerability.
7.9 Physical vulnerabilities
7.9A Open structure
The PNYNJ is an open structure port with multiple access points within terminals,
proximity to interstate transportation and road such as Interstate 95, and open container storage
(Google Maps). At a basic level, the five shipping terminals each have primary gate entrances,
but facilities are directly adjacent to public access roadways that allow easy access to intruders
(GoogleMaps). This is a function of the port’s development in a highly dynamic and populated
region.

The value of R is -0.0441. The value of Pearson’s R^2, the coefficient of determination, is 0.0019 and shows that
container throughput is able to predict less than 1% of variability in port security grant funding.
57
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Because there is no critical infrastructure at the port outside of the USCG defined secure
zones (33 U.S.C. 1231), these roads are accessible to anyone. Security stakeholders recognize
the vulnerability:
Within the last month there was an emotionally disturbed individual, with a
warrant out for his arrest, who hopped a fence into the port and was found in the
Masters office…When you look at that incident; you can’t physically monitor
hundreds of miles of fence line in a port…Could we have prevented that? Some
would argue yes and some would argue no. There are always going to be areas
of vulnerability…The public berth is essentially an open parking that is just a
thoroughfare to the vessel...There’s not a thing you can do there. (Director of
Security Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 10/10/2012).
Despite the subject’s determination that this type of vulnerability is not preventable, it
nonetheless contributes to the criminological vulnerability profile of the port (Albanese 2003).
Other observers note that the level of public access through adjacent roads provides significant
access:
The problem with the port of New York is that it’s…an open port…In most other
ports there’s one facility. There’s only one access point. You enter the port, and
you leave the port. The closest thing we have here is the north and south entrance
to Port Elizabeth and Port Newark, but even all those roads in there are public
roads. (Director of Legal and Licensing WCNYH, 10/12/2012).
The open structure of the port increases the access points for criminal networks that may
seek to participate in theft from the port or adjacent areas. However, based on the classic routine
activities framework, open structure vulnerability functions is a contributing factor to the lack of
a suitable guardian, while the presence of targets in the form of CRAVED cargo creates a set of
suitable targets for criminal networks.
7.9B Imports of CRAVED goods
The New York and New Jersey region is a heavy consumer market and has a high level
of CRAVED cargo (FreightWatch International 2016). In 2014, two of the top three import
commodities by tonnage were CRAVED, including beverages and preserved foods, while all of
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the five top containerized cargo imports were CRAVED including furniture, beverages,
machinery, appliances, and apparel (Port Authority 2014d). In this category the PNYNJ, like
other ports in the United States scores high as the consumer market in the region creates a trade
profile where ports in large urban areas generally have higher levels of CRAVED imports to
satisfy consumer demand. This then leads to the continual presence of suitable targets for theft
networks at ports like the PNYNJ.
7.9C Spatial concentration of CRAVED goods
As the largest port on the East Coast, the port is a primary import location for every
imaginable type of product sold in the United States. To create centralized inspection sites for
the volume of cargo, CBP has five Centralized Examination Stations (CES) in the region
(PANYNJ E).58 Four of the five are either located directly or adjacent to the port, leading to a
concentration of CRAVED goods.
In addition to these stations, the Port Authority also leases port property to numerous
warehouses (Port Authority F). However, the spatial concentration of cargo at the port has
shifted away from the port especially in the past twenty years. Not only has the Port Authority
sought to reduce warehouse space on port property to increase space for container housing
(Director of Legal and Licensing WCNYH, 10/12/2012), the Waterfront Commission’s increased
licensing of warehouses has had a displacement affect (Executive Director, WCNYH 9/28/2012).
As warehouse space decreases, warehousing within 15 miles of the port, a standard industry
measurement for seaport real estate accessibility, has increased, with vacancy rates declining
steadily since the end of the recession which began in 2007 (Jones Lang and LaSalle 2014).
However, cargo held in warehouses away from the port is subject to less oversight authority, as

58

Anti-Terrorism Contraband Enforcement Team (ATCET), Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII), Agricultural
Inspection, and Trade Compliance Inspection.
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the Waterfront Commission’s jurisdiction does not extend past the PNYNJ. This means that not
only is CRAVED cargo spatially concentrated at the port, but that as cargo moves off the port, it
is subject to decreased regulatory control increasing the attractiveness of the PNYNJ for theft
groups, indicated by the high level of cargo thefts in the port region (FreightWatch International
Route Analysis Tool).59
7.9D Peripheral companies
The large amount of cargo that transits the PNYNJ necessitates support and peripheral
services such as freight forwarders. In the New York and New Jersey region, there are a total of
622 listed freight forwarders: 487 in New York and 135 in New Jersey (www.forwarders.com).
The greater concentration of forwarders in New York reflects the larger and denser population
center and the distribution of immigrant diasporas. Immigrant diasporas often provide small
scale forwarding services to their countries of origin through quickly formed and dissolved
companies (Eckstein 2009). Study informants confirm the quick start-up and dissolution of
companies operating in this sector:
There [are] many more smaller forwarders than NVOs (non-vessel operating
common carrier). A lot of freight forwarders are ‘fly by nights,’ a lot of Asian
[forwarders]. (Former Customs Broker, 10/1/2012).
While the large number of forwarders that operate in the port region is an indicator of the
absolute size of the forwarding sector in the area, the sector is at a medium level of vulnerability
based on the monthly cargo throughput60. This contrasts with a port like Port Miami or Port
Everglades, where there are 10% more forwarders for a cargo throughput amount that is only
25% of PNYNJ’s throughput amount. Nonetheless, even with a medium level of vulnerability in

59
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There were 166 thefts between July 2013 and July 2015.
The port receives a score of 13.49 and is coded for a medium level of vulnerability.
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this category, access to even an individual forwarder can assist a network with illicit transport
(Zaitch 2002; Lantsman 2013).
7.9E Vehicle traffic
Due to the level of cargo traffic, there is a constant need for drayage service at the port.
While the number of drayage companies, 142, is a strong indication of the size of the sector, the
estimate of daily truck trips, 16,000 (PANYNJ 2012; PANYNJ 2014 B; PANYNJ 2014 C), is an
indication of the drayage sector labor structure. This reflects the preponderance of owneroperators (Bensman and Bromberg 2008; Belzer and Swan 2011). As a result of the high level
of daily truck trips, the port is coded for a high level of vulnerability relative to the amount of
daily cargo throughput.
To mitigate security risks from the level of vehicle traffic, the Port Authority has security
systems to determine whether trucks are supposed to be at the port on any given day. For
example, trucks must be registered internally in the Port Truck Pass (PTP) where they are issued
and managed Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags for drayage trucks. A series of readers
installed at each container terminal gate then read the RFID tags and allow the terminal operator
to determine if the truck meets the requirements for entry (PANYNJ 2014 C). While physical
mitigation procedures are strong asset to the PNYNJ, the number of daily truck trips means that
there are many more opportunities for illicit networks to not only smuggle cargo in and out of the
port but also for organized crime groups to exploit drayage workers.
7.9F Small vessels in/near the port
A large small vessel community in a port area can create higher levels of security
vulnerability by deflecting resources away from port security to focus on mundane marine calls
for service. To determine the extent of this vulnerability, the size of the boating community in
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the port area is used as a proxy measure. The New York and New Jersey region has a large
boating community, but this analysis focuses primarily on the boating community in New York
counties because the port takes up the majority of area in industrial north New Jersey, and the
marine community is concentrated further south (Marine Trades Association of New Jersey
2008; NY State Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation 2014). New York counties in the
port district have a combined total of 21,308 registered small vessels (NY State Parks,
Recreation, and Historic Preservation 2014). This does not factor in the vessels registered in
Nassau County, with nearly 29,000 registered alone. In New York State, the ratio of small
vessels to inhabitants is 1:43, while in the PNYNJ port district counties, it is 1:394. As a result,
there are significantly fewer recreational vessels in the harbor in comparison to a port like Miami
where law enforcement officials note that small vessels are their greatest security concern
(Personal Communication June 23, 2015).
As an additional measure of small vessel vulnerability, an analysis of small vessel
smuggling shows that the PNYNJ is not a proximity port for smuggling traffic, which is mainly
concentrated in South Florida and Southern California.61
For port security, the small vessel threat is different from that currently conceptualized by
federal security agencies where the concern is focused on terrorism (DHS 2008). The vector of
the threat is mainly through a more complex harbor environment that requires scarce law
enforcement resources to focus on small vessels at the expense of other port security concerns.
The PNYNJ registers in a low range for this vulnerability with a small boating community in
relation to other areas around the country and few marinas for small vessels (Marine Trades
Association of New Jersey 2008; NY State Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation 2014).

61

See Appendix B for the panga interception data set.
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7.9G Intermodal connections
The PNY/NJ has a high level of intermodal connectivity with rail, air, and road networks
linking the port to its hinterland and the rest of the country and use this level of intermodal
connectivity as a selling point for business (PANYNJ 2014 G). While this is a net positive for the
port in terms of economic benefits, this creates a higher level of vulnerability.62 For rail, the
primary intermodal connector at the port is the ExpressRail, which in 2014, moved roughly 10%
of all containers at the port, meeting the minimum criteria for rail intermodal use (PANYNJ 2014
D; PANYNJ 2014 C). Furthermore, with three international airports in the port district and 3,500
domestic and international movements, illicit cargo can transit by air quickly and easily anywhere
in the United States and worldwide (PANYNJg). Finally, the high level of trucks using the port,
16,000 daily, shows that by road, the port has a high level of connectivity (PANYNJ 2012).
Intermodal connectivity creates port security vulnerability only in as much as greater
connectivity allows licit traffic to flow from a larger number of inbound and outbound points
(VECTOR 2009; Moser 2013). As the number of intermodal vectors increase, the security of
each of those vectors becomes interconnected with the security of the port, since inserting cargo
at a rail distribution point may be easier than doing it at the port (Kolbenstvedt and Amundsen
2012).
7.9H Physical/Administrative security procedures
As with other ports in the United States, the PNYNJ has a baseline level of physical and
administrative security as part of the mandated security under the MTSA. Seven of the eleven
62

In a demonstration of the importance of intermodal connections to illicit networks, a recent study examined at why
Chicago an inland city far from the southwest border has become a distribution point for the Sinaloa cartel (Moser
2013). In fact, it is the historical development of the city as a geographic hub of transportation for rail, road, air and
maritime shipping along the Great Lakes that served the city so well in the 20th century and today creates the ideal
hub to ship illicit drugs to points across the U.S. (McGahan 2013).
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SCP techniques below have been incorporated in port procedures, whether as a standard practice
as a result of the MTSA, through Coast Guard enforcement or another agency.63 The PNYNJ
primarily experiences lapses in three areas: screen exits, natural surveillance, and formal
surveillance through evidence of faulty lighting and poor functioning CCTV cameras, as detailed
in Table 8.

Table 8: SCP techniques at the PNYNJ
SCP
PNYNJ Practice
Technique
Containers are locked using de-identified container seals under CBP mandate
Target
that allow a consignee, customs, or other entity to check whether a container
Hardening
has been opened or tampered (U.S. CBP April 2014).
TWIC cards function as baseline access control at U.S. ports and the PNYNJ
Access
(Director of Security, PANYNJ 10/10/2012). Port Authority also uses the
Control
Secure Worker Access Consortium (SWAC), to screen employees who
require access to secure areas or confidential information (Director of
Security, Port Authority 10/10/2012; Secure Worker Access Consortium).
It is not possible to inspect all vehicles on exit. On any given day the PAPD
Screen exits
has four officers at Port Newark (Chief of WCNYH Police, 11/11/2012). To
mitigate this, the Port Authority institutes random vehicle inspections
(Losak).
The Waterfront Commission has an established tip line and works through a
Extend
guardianship consortium site that provides anonymity to informants (Chief of WCNYH
Police, 11/11/2012; MYPD).
The Port features high mast lighting at all five terminals (Observation,
Natural
November 18, 2014). However lighting does not always function and in a
Surveillance
number of vehicles thefts at the port, poor lighting enabled criminals to slip
into the high value lot to steal vehicles (Lantsman 2013).
All employees must carry TWIC cards, have a Port Authority issued ID, and
Reduce
longshore workers must also carry a Waterfront Commission ID card.
anonymity
The Port Authority has an Operational Security Program that provides
Place
training for employees and tenants (PANYNJ 2014 B). In addition, the
managers
Waterfront Commission incorporates security trainings for security guards
that work at port facilities (Chief of WCNYH Police, 11/11/2012).
The Port Authority has CCTV cameras throughout its facilities including all
Formal
marine terminals (Amsec). However, in several instances of vehicle theft
surveillance
from lots at the port, Waterfront Commission investigators identified that due

63

See section 5.2H for a discussion of how SCP techniques comport with physical and administrative procedures
required at U.S. ports.
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Conceal
targets

Remove
targets
Identify
property

to non-functioning CCTV cameras thieves were able to get past the security
perimeter to steal vehicles from holding lots at the port (Lantsman 2013).
High value cargo is kept in a high value yard at Port Elizabeth. It is a
standardized practice, due to the anonymity of shipping and consignee data
that few employees have access to container manifests, consignee
information, and yard information.
There is a high value container yard for higher value cargo (Maritime lawyer,
10/17/2012).
Container seals are de-identified based on a set of numbers and letters, but
allow property to be retrieved based on matching consignee and consigner
information to seal number (U.S. CBP April 2014).

U.S. ports have a strong framework of port security mandates, which create physical and
administrative security mitigation procedures. As a result, it is more useful to look for lapses in
security mitigation procedures, theorized through the SCP framework. However, it is important
to consider that SCP techniques and mitigation procedures are most effective when applied at the
facility level, or even lower units of analysis. While the port may have mandatory mitigation
procedures, lapses at individual facilities create increased vulnerability. This analysis does not
focus at the individual facility level, which is instead accomplished through USCG vulnerability
assessments of facility security procedures (USCG 2015).
7.9I Illicit import/export market
To determine whether the port is in a large illicit import/export market, three primary
measures are analyzed based on ONDCP and HIDTA accounts of maritime transportation as a
known method for illicit imports, cargo thefts in the port hinterland region (75 miles), and
suspect vehicle exports and customs recovered stolen vehicles at the port. These focus on three
primary types of supply chain illicit activity- illicit imports, cargo theft, and illicit exports.
Narcotics imports
The New York and New Jersey High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) identifies
multiple drug trafficking networks operating in the region, primarily in the southern tier of New
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York and in northern New Jersey. These include the strongest concentration of Colombian and
Dominican networks in the United States, in addition to Mexican networks that traffic in a wider
range of narcotics than the Colombian or Dominican groups, which focus on cocaine (ONDCP
2011). Furthermore, the HIDTA drug market analysis (NDIC 2009; ONDCP 2011), the Drug
Enforcement Agency (Southern District of New York 2010), and the Waterfront Commission
note that maritime transportation is a known method of importing narcotics into the region.
Dominican networks primarily smuggle cocaine from South America and Caribbean and
Jamaican networks transport marijuana from Jamaica aboard shipping vessels and in containers,
while there is evidence that Afghani and Pakistani drug trafficking organizations smuggle limited
quantities of southwest Asian heroin into the New York and New Jersey region in maritime
cargo as well (NDIC 2009).
Cargo thefts
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Figure 5: Cargo theft incidents in the Port of New York/New Jersey region, July 2013-July 2015
(FreightWatch International Route Analysis Tool)

Cargo theft in the port region is significant with 166 reported incidents, of various level
of intensity from thefts of entire containers to pilferage of CRAVED cargo, reported to
FreightWatch International in the period of July 2013 to July 2015 (FreightWatch International
Route Analysis Tool). See Figure 5. In the comparative analysis, it was highly uncommon to
identify cargo thefts that occurred on actual port property, but at the PNYNJ, a number of thefts
were reported in Port Authority jurisdiction. This casts doubt on the effectiveness of countertheft physical and administrative mitigation techniques. Furthermore, this measure is based on
self-reported insurance data and likely undercounts the actual level of cargo theft in the region.
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By focusing on the port region, the cargo threat profile provides a method to determine if
CRAVED cargo is actually targeted by theft networks and is a key indicator of the of illicit
activity that the port may be generating through CRAVED cargo import/exports. At PNYNJ, as
warehousing space on the port decreases, cargo thefts related to import/exports are more likely to
be found in thefts from warehouses in the port region as opposed to the port itself.
Suspect vehicle shipments
In 2014, the PNYNJ was the largest port for

Table 9: CBP recovered stolen vehicles
(Sherman 2014)

vehicle import/exports in the United States with
shipments of 640,820 new and used vehicles

FY 2011

FY 2012

FY 2013

PNYNJ

270

130

312

National

1329

1177

1554

(PANYNJ C). In 2013, CBP reported 312 recovered stolen vehicles, more than double the
amount reported by CBP in 2012 with 20% of all recovered vehicles from the PNYNJ (Sherman
2014). See Table 9. This provides a baseline measure of the level of recoveries at the PNYNJ
but not a proxy for the number of illicit shipments. Available NICB and NCIC data for vehicle
exports shows that the port has a slightly above average rate of NICB suspect vehicles in the
period of 2003 to 2008 with 35.27% of all exported vehicles, and a near average rate of NCIC
suspect vehicles with .88% of all exported vehicles. While actual numbers of stolen vehicles
shipped through the PNYNJ are unavailable, NICB and NCIC data, along with the picture filled
in through recovery data, provides a further method to identify that the port is a preferred export
point for criminal networks.
As one of the largest consumer markets for consumer goods in the United States, the New
York and New Jersey region illicit import/export profile is similar in scope as well (Caulkins and
Reuter 2004; ONDCP 2015). Across illicit imports, exports, and cargo theft, the PNYNJ has a
high vulnerability to illicit networks. The size of the illicit import/export markets is in part a
factor of all the vulnerabilities in this analysis, and others latent vulnerabilities waiting to be
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identified. At a minimum, the physical vulnerabilities highlighted in this section combine to
create the market that use the port for illicit transfers. In confluence with the administrative
vulnerabilities highlighted in the following section, the PNYNJ is the epicenter of port security
criminal network vulnerability.
7.10 Administrative vulnerabilities
7.10A Port divergence
Divergence of cargo traffic is theorized as an economic structural change that can lead to
vulnerability by decreasing the security scrutiny of existing port tenants and new companies that
are considering doing business at the port. The PNYNJ is not at risk of this vulnerability as
cargo traffic at the port has grown consistently in the period of 2005 to 2013, consistent with
ports across the eastern seaboard, including Hampton Roads, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and
Boston (AAPA 2013; PANYNJ 2014d)64.
7.10B Automation/cyber-security vulnerability
All ports in the United States have a baseline level of automation through (1) container
management systems that electronically track container movement throughout the port from the
vessel to where on the yard the container is kept or in a vessel itself (Verizon 2016) or (2)
automated security systems such as CCTV (Cloudview; Russon 2015). The PANYNJ is leading
the way in automation with partial automation at Global Container Terminal (GCT) in Bayonne
which has semi-automated, rail-mounted cranes for stacking containers in the yard (Kulisch
2014). Through GCT’s expanded operations, it can handle roughly 36% of all container traffic
capacity at the port (Strunsky 2014). This increased automation does create heightened cyber
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In 2009, ports around the country experienced a strong drop in cargo throughput as a result of the economic
recession (Notteboom and Rodrigue 2009b). See Appendix J for cargo throughput data.
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security vulnerability at the PNYNJ. However, there have been no recognized incidents of cyber
penetrations at the PNYNJ, with the primary cyber incident a result of a different terminal,
Maher, switching computer systems leading to a slowdown in operations (Mann 2013;
Bloomberg News 2013). In addition, cyber vulnerability is micro-located in individual
computers, systems, or through human-created vulnerability, such as workers responding to
spear phishing which requires further micro-assessments outside the scope of this document
(USCG 2015).
7.10C Interagency cooperation
The PNYNJ has one of the most complex port security jurisdictional environments in the
United States, with a large set of port security stakeholders in federal, state, municipal, and
specialized agencies (Smythe 2013). This is a function of the development of the port across two
states but also labor conditions, which led to the creation of a port specific agency. The primary
oversight mechanism at the PNYNJ that fosters interagency coordination is the MTSA-mandated
Area Maritime Security Committees (GAO 2012). At the PNYNJ, more than 350 different
agencies and stakeholders are members of the New York AMSC with six different committees
(O’Brien Jr. 2007). While a committee is often the starting point for strong interagency
cooperation, the PNYNJ requires an added level of interagency cooperation through a joint
operations center (JOC).
Instead of a physical JOC, the PNYNJ has a virtual JOC through the implementation of a
USCG-developed communications system, WatchKeeper, mandated through the 2006 SAFE
Ports Act (GAO 2012b). However, the lack of a physical joint harbor operations command
center that provides a unified working environment is a key vulnerability at the port and not an

150

issue at other large ports around the country such as the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach
(POLB C).
Due to the physical layout of the PNYNJ, large number of security agencies, the large
private sector, and the population distribution in spatial proximity to port operations, a virtual
operations center may not create the level of interagency communication required for effective
port security information sharing. Information sharing and cooperation is a key requirement to
support physical security but is more important when managing the security challenges created
by vulnerable economic or labor sectors.
7.10D Vulnerable economic sectors and sector size
This section describes the four primary economic sectors, the profile of the workers in the
sector, the vulnerability conditions, and the size of the sector that lead employees to be targeted
by criminal networks as victims or participants in criminal ventures. Sector size is a key
consideration in any vulnerability assessment and constitutes one of the primary vulnerability
categories when examined in concert with a vulnerable sector. Similar to how members of
criminal networks note that the more cargo throughput there is in any given port, the easier it is
to transport illicit cargo through that port (Zaitch 2002), vulnerability is heightened when there is
a large number of entities operating in a sector.
Complicating the assessment is that the shipping industry is undergoing a process of
massification and atomization, terms which have been developed to described the underlying
structural conditions for increased numbers (atomization) of operating entities at ports as a result
of fewer but larger (massification) container vessels (Notteboom and Rodrigue 2009).
Massification is the process where increasingly large vessels carry greater quantities of cargo
(whether containers or bulk) leading to increased strain on shipping terminals to load and offload
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cargo. In response to massification, atomization is the process more drayage drivers and
forwarders are required to handle the larger quantity of offloaded cargo. These processes have
led to increases in the quantity of operating entities in both of the sectors that participate in
destination or origin distribution, freight forwarders and drayage truckers.
At the PNYNJ, this has created a nuanced vulnerability profile such that sectors even
with few operating entities, such as ancillary services, can display significant criminal network
vulnerability due to structurally fixed conditions. The primary sectors with low composition but
high vulnerability is the longshore sector and ancillary services.
Longshore labor
The waterfront labor sector in the port has a significant vulnerability profile. While the
nature of the work itself does not lend the sector vulnerability, privileged access to the port,
coupled with the historical presence of criminal networks in waterfront operations, produces a
profile that creates vulnerability to criminal networks.
Labor profile
Labor at the port is a patchwork. The Waterfront Commission register lists 6000 to 7000
employees specializing in different types of work such as driving straddle carriers, office clerical
work, maintenance technicians, and others (WCNYH 2012; WCNYH 2013c; NYSA 2015).
Longshore labor, specifically loading and offloading vessels, requires special skills training, and
today’s longshore workers are not only more educated than previous generations, they are also
well compensated for their skilled labor (Mongelluzo 2015c). The key question in this sector is
what are the conditions that create vulnerability to criminal network exploitation?
Access and time sensitive work
Longshore workers have privileged access to secure parts of the seaport. This is the key
aspect of the sector and which separates it from other historically vulnerable labor sectors in the
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New York region (Raab 1998). Despite being subject to multiple levels of access control and
security through the TWIC, the Waterfront Commission ID and registration process, Port
Authority SWAC card there are still numerous instances of longshore workers assisting criminal
networks with illicit trafficking at the port (Southern District of NY 2010). Similar to other
economic sectors where criminal networks operate, the time sensitive nature of the shipping
industry creates a vulnerable space for criminal networks to exploit the labor force (Albanese
2003; Shelley 2003; WCNYH 2010). Longshore labor has the ability to impede cargo, and ILA
management has used that power to enforce work stoppages at the PNYNJ, most recently in
January 2016 (Mongelluzzo Bonney 2016). The confluence of privileged access in a time
sensitive industry creates the underlying condition of vulnerability in this labor sector.
Longshore worker as victim
The twin conditions described in the previous section also create a condition where
longshore workers are a key access point for criminal networks to ports. At the PNYNJ,
dockworkers are also victims of organized crime. Historically workers are subject to extortion
by ILA union leaders through a long standing practice of demanding payment of Christmas time
bonuses, averaging $15,500 a year (Obel 2012; USMX 2013; Department of Justice 2014).
Sector size
As a sector that is affected directly by the amount of cargo that passes through the port,
the labor sector displays the tensions between atomization and massification on a local scale.
The Waterfront Commission regulates the longshore register and determines how many
longshore workers can vie for work on a given day (Johnson 2005) to decrease labor oversupply.
Coupled with employment scarcity, this can lead to organized crime exploitation (Obel 2012;
Department of Justice 2014).
Vulnerability analysis
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The size of the sector is not a contributing factor to vulnerability to criminal networks,
since the sector displays a relatively fixed labor pool regulated at the federal (through the TWIC)
and state level (through the Waterfront Commission). In fact, the overarching conditions of
access and time sensitive work creates such overwhelming utility for criminal networks that
criminal networks continue to try to infiltrate the sector (Southern District of New York 2010).
As the labor force at the PNYNJ diversifies, the sector’s vulnerability will likely change as new
workers come into the industry. Furthermore, as automation decreases the number of longshore
labor required for essential operations, vulnerability may shift from the longshore labor operating
the cranes to the technically skilled employees who will operate the automated machinery.
Drayage Drivers
Vulnerability conditions
Like longshore workers, drayage drivers are subject to security oversight, through TWIC
and Sea Link, the PANYNJ’s trucker ID (PANYNJ 2014 H). However, despite formal oversight
mechanisms, working conditions in this sector increase the vulnerability of the sector to criminal
network use. The primary labor vulnerability conditions are that workers lack certainty of
continuous employment and have increasingly poor working conditions. Prior to the 1980s,
regulatory frameworks created conditions of stable employment and rising wages for many
workers in the trucking industry (Belzer 2000; Belzer and Swan 2011). Following the passage of
the 1980 Motor Carrier Act, the drayage sector fragmented and become increasingly competitive
(Jaffee 2010b). The deregulation of the trucking industry then led to increased numbers of
owner-operators or independent contractors, who are now the dominant type of drayage worker
at U.S. ports. This change freed trucking companies from financial and legal obligations
inherent in a formal employment of a trucker (Jaffee 2010b). This places owner operators at the
bottom of the truck labor hierarchy with few legal protections or benefits, and salaries as low as
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$6 an hour (Prince 2005). At the PNYNJ, drayage drivers may average $35,000 a year with 58
hours a week of work, including significant waiting time while containers are loaded and
inspected by ILA checkers (Bensman and Bromberg 2008). As one study participant notes:
With the advent of the owner operator, there’s no loyalty. They cut each other’s
throat in terms of pricing...By going to that end of the labor market you don’t
have this career driver, instead you have this poor guy scraping together…He’s
got to make five moves a day to break even…They’re absolutely a vulnerability.
(Former Police Chief WCNYH, 10/1/2012)
At the PNYNJ, one of the unique conditions which increases the vulnerability and
possible targeting of drayage drivers is a specific contractual section in the master ILA contract,
called the Trailer Interchange Report (TIR). TIR allows ILA workers to inspect containers for
damage before they exit the port, and if damage is found, the containers must be repaired in that
port by maintenance workers. The identification of damage and repair is conducted by ILA local
1804-1, one with a long history of organized crime influence over both leadership and rank and
file (U.S. Attorney’s Office 2004; Jacobs 2007; Director of Legal and Licensing WCNYH
10/12/2012; Strunsky 2013). This uniquely PNYNJ vulnerability is at its core a confluence
where a labor conflict of interest in a time sensitive field of work takes advantage of the poor
working conditions of another labor group. As the amount of time trucker wait at the port to
pick up a container have been very high (Bonney 2015b), the checking process creates
conditions where ILA checkers can exploit their position to hold up traffic at the port and target
drayage drivers to extricate or insert cargo (Law Fellow, Waterfront Commission of New York
Harbor 10/24/2012).
Sector size
The atomization of shipping traffic and the increase in truck owner operators creates a
large sector of drivers who operate at the PNYNJ. At the port, 169 drayage firms are listed as
operating entities and contract out to independent truck owner operators, with an estimated
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16,000 truckers (PANYNJ 2012; PANYNJ 2014b; PANYNJc) using the port on a daily basis.
The size of the sector increases the opportunity for criminal networks to seek access to the port.
Moreover, increased work uncertainty may make some more inclined to participate in illicit
schemes.
While the formal security structure for drayage drivers is strong, the working conditions
and contractual vulnerability through the TIR scheme creates increased vulnerability in the
sector.
Freight Forwarders
Forwarders are a key sector with privileged access to the port but lack significant
regulatory oversight. There are no special qualifications for someone to be a freight forwarder,
and the primary level of oversight is the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) license, which is
required if a forwarder will issue their own house bill of lading, file their own manifest with U.S.
Customs and issue their own delivery order to the consignee. FMC oversight entails an initial
application and does not include a more intensive background check (WCNYH Director of
Licensing, 10/1/2012). In addition, FMC oversight over licensed forwarders has been lax, as
FMC audit rates from 2011 show that the FMC Bureau of Investigation, responsible for auditing
registered freight forwarders, audited five out of 1048 licensed freight forwarders (Office of
Inspector General 2012). Considering that many more forwarders handle maritime cargo than
are registered with the FMC, forwarders lack the level of oversight that should be commensurate
with their key role in the transportation supply chain.
Sector size
In section 7.10d, the analysis focused on the size of the freight forwarding sector as a
ratio of monthly traffic to identify whether there many peripheral companies accessing the port
on a periodic basis. This section focuses on examining the absolute number of forwarders in the
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sector and the effect of shipping atomization at the PNYNJ.65 While there are differing estimates
of the number of freight forwarders operating in the port region, based on FMC records, there are
between 442 and 568 forwarders either within 25 or 75 miles of the Statue of Liberty66,
respectively (standard radius measurements for port region or hinterland radius). The full FMC
count of 568 is comparable to the standard industry-wide listing of 692 forwarders in the overall
New York and New Jersey region67 and indicates a large number of freight forwarders that can
be used to move cargo in the port region. At the Waterfront Commission which conducts many
of the primary investigations of illicit activity at the PNYNJ, the complexity of the shipping
industry, especially when cargo movement shift hands across multiple forwarders creates
conditions that make investigations difficult.
With all the freight forwarders and stuff it’s hard to keep track of where things go
and where they come from. Our police have trouble figuring out where a
container goes. They have to figure out where a container came from, where it
was broken apart and so on, it definitely does hinder. I’ve seen our police do the
tracking but sometimes without success. (Associate Counsel, WCNYH
11/27/2012).
There are many more smaller forwarders than the NVOs. A lot of these are ‘fly
by nights.’ A lot of Asian (companies). The motivation for them is just money.
Always money, money laundering. They would collect money or get illegal money
and just funnel it through (by shipping cargo or assisting in the importation of
illicit cargo). (Director of Auditing, WCNYH, 10/1/2012).
Vulnerability analysis
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While it is true that some of the largest ports in the country also have a large forwarder presence, reflecting the
atomization principle, some ports that have large throughput such as Hampton Roads and Savannah, do not have a
commensurately large forwarding presence which decreased their vulnerability score. The conditions that lead to a
larger forwarding sector are not solely the amount of cargo shipped through a port, but also include such
characteristics as the diversity of diaspora and emigrant groups in the port region, including but not limited to Asian
diaspora groups and Latin American groups. These tend to participate in import/export businesses and require the
services of forwarders to ship products and cargo to/from destinations in those areas. This in part, explains why
south Florida ports score so high in this vulnerability but do not have commensurately high levels of cargo
throughput.
66
The Statue of Liberty is used as the primary geographic reference point in the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey compact and is used here as the primary geographic reference point to determine port region and
hinterland extent to measure the number of forwarders operating in the region and hinterland.
67
www.forwarders.com.
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Similar to the longshore sector, access to shipping is the key component of this sector’s
vulnerability; however freight forwarders have a different type of access than longshore workers.
While longshore workers have physical access to the port, freight forwarders have a better
understanding of trade patterns and vessel movements, how cargo is dispersed across multiple
layers in the supply chain, and, consequently, where and how to ship cargo (Former Customs
Broker, 10/1/2012; Lantsman 2013). While longshore workers and drayage drivers handle the
manual labor of either extricating or inserting illicit cargo, a forwarder colluding with a criminal
network provides the administrative knowledge that can assist a network to evade notice by
authorities (Trace 2009).
For freight forwarders, the lack of oversight and the size of the sector in the New York
and New Jersey port region create the conditions of vulnerability.
Ancillary Services
Ancillary services refer to the services necessary to run terminal operations and assist in
the day to day operations at a port, such as sanitation, cleaning services, and maintenance and
repair. Ancillary services such as container repair and maintenance are, from the perspective of
the Waterfront Commission, operated by associates of local organized crime groups. For
example, internal investigations note that the container repairs, mechanical repair, landscaping,
paving, and garbage removal are often controlled by associates of local organized crime groups
(WCNYH Executive Director, 9/28/2012).
The primary vulnerability conditions of this sector is the longstanding presence of
organized crime operatives in entities operating in this sector and the privileged access afforded
to employees working in one of these companies. The example of American Maritime Services
at Red Hook Container Terminal which had been using workers that had not been registered with
Commission and had circumvented the Commission’s background check and hired organized
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crime associates workers highlights how organized crime figures control or pursue control of
companies in the ancillary services sector (WCNYH 2012b; Rooney 2013).
The vulnerability of this sector is also a result of the financial benefit control of this
sector is deemed to have to organized crime groups. The quote below is from a wiretapped
investigation where in discussion with a Genovese family associate, two members of an ILA
longshore union highlight how they control the sector and extract money from companies
operating in the sector (Demeri 2012).
CAFARO: I told our friend...‘[W]e got to do the repair, container repair, chassis
repair, store them and charge a rent and the trucking.’
D’URSO: And what did he say?
CAFARO: ‘You're right.’
DURSO: What happens if legitimate guys come in and do it? Then what?
CAFARO: They give them a hard time with the union. You know what I mean?
DURSO: They'll sick them on them
CAFARO: Yeah, they'll give them a hard time with the union.
Sector size
The problematic companies in this sector are those in container maintenance and repair
(Director of Licensing, WCNYH, 10/12/2012; Executive Director, WCNYH 9/28/2012). Since
these companies are staffed by employees who are regulated by the Waterfront Commission, the
latest worker registration data suggests that the number of workers who operate in this sector is
roughly 25% of all Waterfront Commission licensed workers at the port or roughly 1000 out of
4500 registered longshore workers in the register (Bonney 2015). The number of companies
operating at the port in this sector is difficult to determine exactly, but based on the Port
Authority directory (PANYNJ I), there are three. The larger number of workers is likely
reflective of terminal operations with in house container repair and maintenance yards. While
the number of entities operating in this sector is significantly lower than in other sectors, it
displays characteristics of vulnerability because the low level of entities and coupled with the
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TIR scheme allows companies that have an organized crime connection to make money off of
repair of containers through collusion with corrupt checkers working the TIR shifts.
The real issue now is container repair. That’s where there’s money to be made.
That’s the maintenance local, D….s local, you know D…. is part of this civil
RICO. The federal scheme that requires TIR reports, it’s a federal scheme for
highway safety, but if you look at it, it puts an awful lot of power into the hands of
the individuals who are doing these reports, it allows for anything from bribery
right there at the point of doing the report, it allows basically the people who are
doing the repairs, the same locals who do the repairs, are doing the TIR reports
which send containers for repairs. (Director of Licensing, WCNYH,
10/12/2012).
Sector analysis
In these four primary sectors, vulnerability is dependent on sector size and working
conditions. Sectors that are bound by spatial reasons to work within the area of the port have a
fixed or low level of workers or entities, and their vulnerability less affected by the size of the
workforce or number of entities. These sectors are valuable targets for criminal networks
because of the access they can afford a group. Moreover, because of few entities in a sector, port
operations have no recourse but to work with the available companies regardless of suspected or
known affiliation with criminal networks. Sectors that can operate anywhere and are not
spatially bound to the confines of port have a larger number of entities and therefore create a
greater number of targets for criminal networks groups to exploit, including freight forwarder
and drayage sectors. See Table 10 below.

Table 10: Structural conditions of labor sectors and vulnerability
Structural conditions
Conditions of vulnerability
Sector
Regulated supply
Port access
Longshore labor
Decreasing sector
Control over time sensitive
operations
Specialized port knowledge
Free market supply
Port access
Drayage truckers
Large sector size
Low wages
Uncertainty of work
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Freight forwarders

Free market supply
Large sector size

Ancillary services

Fixed supply
Stationary sector size

Sector size
Port access
Specialized transportation
knowledge
Sector size
Historical organized crime
involvement
Port access
Control over time sensitive
operations

7.10E Historical presence of criminal networks
At the PNYNJ, corruption in the unions, port labor force, or other economic sectors is
often ascribed to the custom and practice that has developed at the port (WCNYH 2012; NYSA
2012). This encompasses the wide range of labor inefficiencies built into the labor structure, the
known historical associations with organized crime families in different port operations, and the
interconnectivity between labor, management, and organized crime. Typical media accounts
note the presence of organized crime at the port in the following terms:
Local 1588 was historically so corrupt that mob enforcers were unnecessary,
according to one veteran investigator. Kickbacks, extortion and fraud became as
routine as a Labor Day picnic at the local, long a lucrative outpost for the
Genovese crime family. (McShane 2004)
The primary question this section attempts to answer is how the historical presence of
organized crime manifests itself in operations at the port and does that provide access to criminal
networks for illicit transportation of cargo.
“Traditional” organized crime
At the PNYNJ, traditional, Italian-American organized crime groups continue to exercise
various degrees of control over labor in certain aspects of port operations (Herszenhorn 1998;
Demeri 2012). The history of organized crime at the PNYNJ can be traced to the Prohibition
era. Rum running groups used the shipping industry to ship illicit liquor into New York and sold
to bootleg establishments in the city (Stewart 2012). After prohibition, longshore workers whose
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life was an “unending parade of drudgery and the closest thing to being a peon in America at the
time,” began to be exploited by organized crime groups that Malcolm Johnson detailed in his
series of articles for the New York Sun in the late 1940s (Johnson 2005):
Once they got into labor racketeering in the trucking and the shipping industries,
any industry that had time sensitive constraints was vulnerable. You have this
culture, where the old guys were all originally from the bootlegging and they
passed that on to what they were doing in labor racketeering, and that culture
was passed on to the younger generation. By the 1970s all of those Irishmen
passed on or were quietly replaced by mafia people, and some who wouldn’t
move over got killed. And to some degree that dynamic has persisted today.
(Former Deputy Director Local 1588 12/8/2012)
Historically, the New Jersey and Manhattan docks are the area of operations for the
Genovese crime family (Herszenhorn 1998; Demeri 2012; NJ Attorney General 2014) and the
Brooklyn and Staten Island docks, considerably less important than they once were, are covered
by the Gambino crime family (McShane 2004; Demeri 2012). To a certain extent, the
DeCavalcante family also has some smaller loan sharking operations as well, operating through
the ILA locals in New Jersey (Executive Director, WCNYH 9/28/2012). As discussed in
previous sections, organized crime groups do not take hold of entire sectors, instead they plant
operatives in companies in the ancillary services sector, or as longshore workers. This activity
continues to the present day as RICO investigations (Blakey and Goldstock 1980) by federal and
state authorities over the past twenty years make clear that there is a continued presence of
corrupt activity by both the Genovese and Gambino families at the Port of New York and New
Jersey (WCNYH 2011b; WCNYH 2012c; WCNYH 2014; New Jersey Attorney General 2014;
WCNYH 2015).
Almost all of the investigations, arrests, and sentences again traditional organized crime
groups at the PNYNJ are focused on some aspect of racketeering, whether through collusion to
exploit longshore workers (WCNYH 2011b; WCNYH 2012c; WCNYH 2014; New Jersey
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Attorney General 2014; WCNYH 2015), running gambling operations (WCNYH 2009), or
extortion of port employees (Rashbaum 2005). In addition, two unions were placed under
federal consent decrees after investigations by the Waterfront Commission and federal
authorities found that they were rife with organized crime associates forcing rank and file to
unfair hiring practices and extortion (McShane 2004; Union Democracy Review 2005; New
Jersey Attorney General 2011; Former Deputy Director Local 1588 12/8/2012; Demeri 2012).
However, there is almost no evidence of a relationship between traditional organized
crime operations at the port and the import or export of illicit cargo. Two primary illicit
import/export products, drugs and stolen vehicles, rarely involve traditional New York region
organized crime (New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services 2015), and primarily are
conducted by loose networks of local New York region gangs and overseas facilitators (National
Drug Intelligence Center 2009c; ONDCP 2015b). For example, vehicles stolen for export are
often ordered by overseas associates and, in the most high profile cases in the New York region,
West African diaspora network members work with local gangs to facilitate thefts, chop up
vehicles to mask their stolen origins, and then ship them overseas through a variety of masking
methods (New Jersey Attorney General 2007; NYPD 2012; Lantsman 2013; DHS ICE 2015). In
some cases, these groups will set up legitimate companies to assist in illicit import/export
schemes but those are likely to be in the freight forwarding sector and not in actual port
operations. However, smuggling groups do attempt to gain access to individual longshore
workers to use them to facilitate illicit transport (Southern District of New York 2010).
As a result, while the PNYNJ does have a higher level of vulnerability as a result of the
long term presence of organized crime groups, their activities are not related to the import/export
of illicit cargo. Instead, their focus on exploiting port workers contributes to poor working
conditions for drayage drivers and rank and file longshore workers, which can make workers in
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those sectors more susceptible to criminal network overtures to participate in illicit schemes. In
some cases, traditional organized crime groups do have direct linkages to overseas organized
crime groups such as the N’Drangheta (U.S. Attorney’s Office Eastern District of New York
2015), which transport drugs into the NY region. But generally traditional organized crime at
the PNYNJ straddles an intermediary position where they are not directly involved in smuggling
operations but can force union members into participation or insert associates into positions with
specialized access to container operations. Instead, the historical presence of organized crime at
the PNYNJ is most visible in manifestations of organizational corruption, where entire
companies or union locals are controlled by individuals that use them for illicit trafficking or to
exploit employees.
7.10F Organizational corruption
The analysis focuses on whether there are companies or entities that knowingly support
and assist criminal networks in illicit activities and have some level of ownership or management
by criminal groups. At the port, longshore union locals display the greatest level of vulnerability
due to the historical presence of organized crime, as discussed in the previous section, but in
varying degrees, there are corrupt practices in other types of organizations at the port. The
analysis in this section also focuses not only on corrupt entities that facilitate illicit movements
but on other types of corruption. To measure the vulnerability level, I use the operational
definition in Chapter 5.68

68

A port with a high level of organizational corruption has three different entities with more than two publicly
documented instances of corrupt public or private employees in the past five years and is coded as 9. A port with a
medium level of organizational corruption has two different entities with more than two publicly documented
instances of corrupt public or private employees, or one entity with more than two documented instances of public
employee corruption in the past five years and is coded as 6. A port with a low level of corruption has no
documented instances of public employee corruption and one entity with more than two instances of private
employee corruption in the past five years and is coded as 3. A port without any incidents of private or public
corruption is coded as 0.
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By that standard of measurement, the PNYNJ has a high level of vulnerability for
organizational corruption as evidenced across multiple levels of analysis from the port district
down to individual companies operating within their economic sectors, including the Port
Authority (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP 2014; Dwyer 2015); freight forwarding entities (State
of New Jersey Commission of Investigation 2004; Lantsman 2013); customs brokers (US DOJ
2007; Courthouse News 2009); drayage entities (US DOJ 2007; Milosheff 2014); and throughout
the labor sector. In all of these sectors, management employees or company owners participated
in corrupt practices and in several instances, assisted criminal networks with shipping illicit
cargo.
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
U.S. ports rarely display the style of corruption where public seaport agencies are used
for political purposes with most recent investigations uncovering port authority corruption in
Mozambique (Sequeria), Liberia (Butty 2015), Nigeria (MACN 2014), and Kuwait (Fattahova
2015). The only port agency in the U.S. that has displayed that style of corruption is the Port
Authority which has been embroiled in a political corruption scandal involving the closure of
roadways into a city with a political opponent of the New Jersey Governor (Strunsky 2013b;
Gibson, Dunn, and Crutcher LLP 2014). The PANYNJ’s portfolio (Moss and O’Neill 2014),
with marine cargo composing 5% of revenue, means that operations are more insulated from the
lane closing scandal, which was focused on using the transit control authority for political gain or
retribution. However, evidence of corruption in the Port Authority management would be
especially impactful on the decisions on port tenants. And in that aspect of port operations, the
Port Authority has shown that it is willing to resort to questionable practices to rid itself of
unwanted tenants (Robbins 2007; American Stevedoring against Defendants 2013).
Terminal operators
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Of the five terminals at the PNYNJ, two have operations across multiple countries.
While the transport and shipping sector is recognized as a sector highly susceptible to corruption
(PWC 2014), multi-nationals such as APM Terminals, which has 62 operating port and terminal
facilities in 38 countries, have robust anti-corruption policy that enforce and develops anticorruption risk models in all of the countries where it operates (APM 2014). Nonetheless, at the
PNYNJ there have been incidents of corruption at terminal operators where a local manager at
Maher Terminals solicited bribes to provide favorable contractual terms (FBI 2011b).
Freight forwarders
Criminal network control or ownership of a freight forwarder allows for a “no questions
asked” policy when shipping cargo. Federal and local authorities note that criminal networks
specifically establish companies in the New York and New Jersey region to import illicit cargo.
First, they begin their business by shipping licit cargo with no regulatory or legal concerns.
After a period of time, once the business practice has been established, they facilitate the
shipment of illicit cargo (State of New Jersey Commission of Investigation 2004; Former
Customs Broker, 10/1/2012). At least one freight forwarding firm has assisted illicit narcotics
imports as part of a Panamanian drug trafficking organization’s shipments (Southern District of
New York 2010). In addition to drug smuggling, freight forwarders at the PNYNJ participate in
illicit export of stolen vehicles. In these large export operations, freight forwarders knowingly
arranged for the vehicles to be loaded into containers and then completed false bills of lading
mislabeling the container contents (DHS ICE 2014c; DHS ICE 2015).
Drayage companies
There is little evidence that the 149 drayage companies operating at the port have
displayed corrupt activity. However, owner-operators have been known to participate in the
transport of illicit cargo at the port, specifically related to counterfeit goods and to thefts of
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containers (US DOJ 2007; Milosheff 2014). It is more likely, though, that drayage drivers are
not witting participants in illicit transport or smuggling schemes, and their vulnerability to
exploitation is theoretical without a strong pattern of evidence to support active participation.
Union locals
There is significant evidence that unions at the port have been, in the past, under the
control of members or associates of local organized crime groups. Public sources (WCNYH
2009; WCNYH 2010; WCNYH 2011; WCNYH 2012; New Jersey Attorney General 2011; New
Jersey Attorney General 2014) note that associates of organized crime have been in positions of
power at local unions at the port. Focusing on the primary unions operating at the port, there are
numerous examples of significant administrative influence by members of organized crime in
most of the unions that provide labor to the terminals.
At the PNYNJ, nine different locals provide different labor services with specializations
in different type of work and at different terminals. Certain locals have historically had less
control by organized crime members, such as Local 920 in Staten Island or Local 824 covering
the docks in Manhattan. However, others, such as Local 1233, which provides labor for Port
Newark and Port Elizabeth, has had top leadership associated with members of organized crime
and with actual direct membership in the Genovese family (U.S. v. Stephen Depiro 2010;
WCNYH 2014b; FBI 2015). Other locals, such as 1804-1, responsible for maintenance and TIR
duties, also has had significant organizational corruption (U.S. Attorney’s Office 2004; Jacobs
2007; Strunsky 2013) exacerbating the contractual vulnerability that provides it significant
power over drayage drivers and by extension port operations.
However, there has been no evidence that traditional organized crime associates at the
port are associated with the illicit transport of cargo either into or out of the port. In almost all
instances where leadership has been charged, convicted, or sentenced, the charges have been
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related to extortion and embezzlement of workers in the unions where they had positions of
power (U.S. Attorney’s Office 2004; Jacobs 2007; U.S. v. Stephen Depiro 2010; Strunsky 2013;
WCNYH 2014b; FBI 2015 .
Vulnerability analysis
Across the five sectors examined in this section, organizational corruption manifests itself
in two primary areas for differing reasons. In the freight forwarding sector, organizational
corruption is present as a result of the underlying structural conditions of the sector, which
include specialized knowledge and the large size of the sector in the PNYNJ region. In addition,
they lack of oversight, other than FMC licensing for some forwarders, and it is not difficult to set
up a forwarding firm, establish a pattern of legitimate shipments, and then assist the illicit
transport of cargo (State of New Jersey Commission of Investigation 2004). Conversely,
organizational corruption at PNYNJ union locals is much more a factor of the historical presence
of organized crime despite long standing efforts to prosecute and convict union leadership
associated with organized crime groups (U.S. V. Stephen Depiro 2010; WCNYH 2014b; FBI
2015). No other port in the United States has this level of corrupt activity at management levels,
and this significantly increases the overall vulnerability of the PNYNJ. Even without entirely
corrupt entities or management level corruption, criminal networks can transport cargo through
individual corrupt employees in legitimate companies.
7.10G Employee corruption
The port displays numerous instances of employee corruption, creating an environment of
deep vulnerability in the primary economic sectors facilitating the movement of cargo through
the port. At the PNYNJ, longshore workers have been identified as collaborators with criminal
networks to facilitate transport of illicit cargo, almost exclusively narcotics, and primarily
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cocaine (WCNYH 2010c; Southern District of New York 2010; Southern District of New York
2011; WCNYH 2012d). This section focuses on detailing a specific incident of longshore
worker collusion to display how access interacts with other categories to create increased multi
sectoral vulnerability.
Longshore worker access
In 2010, eight PNYNJ longshore workers were indicted and convicted for narcotics
trafficking (Southern District of New York 2010). The investigation identified how and where
access to the port provides a criminal network with strong benefits if they can identify a willing
port employee as a conspirator. The employee’s knowledge of where and how to ship the illicit
cargo, where to place cargo in the yard, and ultimately how to extricate cargo from the yard is
the incredibly valuable to those importing or exporting illicit goods (Southern District of New
York 2010).One of the longshore workers, and a confidential witness, were the main recipients
of cocaine hidden in duffels bags placed in containers. The primary conspirator identified
associates of his who he would pay $50,000 to $100,000 to take a duffel bag out of a specific
container.69 One of the co-conspirators, a pier superintendent with supervisory authority over
100 longshore workers, had specific access to a computer system that would allow him to
identify where the containers were on the yard. However, signaling the level of training that he
had received in the use of the system, during the wiretapped investigation he disclosed:
I gotta figure but how I’m going to get the shit, this information out the
computer….figure out where that m***r is at, where that container, is at…I got a
computer in my office, I just don't know [how to] work the f****g program. I got
the m***g program. (Southern District of New York 2010)

69

Considering that each bag could have up to 50-100 kilograms of product and each kilo was estimated at a
conservative value of $25,000, the total value of the cocaine in each bag would be between $1.25- 2.5 million.
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In a later incident, once that individual had identified which container had a hidden duffel
bag, he asked his brother, another longshore worker, to move the container to a different part of
the yard where there would be less law enforcement visibility:
‘Yo Greek (brother of the conspirator, or BC), listen, on the computer, after they
take it off, it gives the location where it's put.’ (BC) responded, ‘Yeah, I know
that. You place that number and it'll tell you where it be.’ (conspirator) stated,
‘Not even with that just point, right-click it on the crane. That work in that
bay…the container. It gives you the location right, there. I was f***g with the
computer. But…f***g get to it down below.’ (BC) responded, ‘No. You watch it
around the pier. Are you watching? They're not getting to it 'cause they're slow
fucking s**t stains.’ (conspirator) then stated, ‘Yeah, they're just f***g slow.
You're f***d up.’ (BC) then asked, ‘You see anything around? You see any cops,
Port Authority, do you see any Customs?’ (conspirator) then answered, ‘No. I'm
gonna take a ride down now. I took a ride before.’ BC then stated, ‘We're clear.
We're pretty clear on it. Just that when it comes off, punch it in the computer.’
(Southern District of New York 2010)
The knowledge and access of the longshore workers allowed them to identify containers,
move containers to specific locations on the port, and inform criminal network operatives as to
when and how to ship the drugs. However, what the case demonstrates is a successful trafficking
operation, networks need to have access to either a group of individuals with privileged positions
in multiple stages of cargo shipments or have a trusted insider who is willing to support illicit
movements through the entire life cycle of the movement through the port. Ultimately,
vulnerability at a port may be dependent on one individual who has privileged access. But while
this may be enough in certain ports, there are other vulnerabilities which augment the effect of
having a privileged informant. These include physical vulnerabilities created through poor
lighting, allowing individuals on or off a port facility, to the increased vulnerability created
through logistical movements where vessels offload of a large number of containers in a short
period of time, placing pressure on the customs officers conducting inspections.

170

The last category of vulnerabilities at the PNYNJ, highlight the overall logistical
vulnerability created by the shipment of large numbers of containers at the port, and how that
assists networks with inserting illicit cargo into the maritime transportation system.
7.11 Logistical vulnerabilities
7.11A Cargo throughput
The PNYNJ is the largest container port on the East and Gulf Coasts with significant
growth over the past fifteen years, from 3,050,006 TEUs in 2000 to 5,772,303 in 2014 (PANYNJ
2014d). This nearly doubling in cargo reflects in part growing global trade but also the strength
and attraction of the port as for import and export cargo. While the absolute amount of cargo
that moves through port increases vulnerability of the port by creating the impression that
authorities cannot screen that amount of cargo (Zaitch 2002), the multi-terminal nature of any
port, and in particular the PNYNJ, masks a more interesting observation.
In the case described in the previous section, at least one longshore worker complained
that container had been searched in a ship with only “a hundred moves” (Southern District of
New York 2010). He was referring to the 100 containers which were to be offloaded in Port
Newark/Elizabeth and that, therefore, according to the conspirator, were more likely to be
searched by CBP. As vessels are built to house a greater capacity of containers (massification)
unloading the vessels and having containers offloaded in a timely manner increases the pressure
on customs officials to inspect the cargo. Because companies stock goods based on just in time
principles, and as the cargo capacity of a vessel grows, companies do not adjust their schedules
to account for greater wait times due to customs inspections when a higher volume of cargo has
to pass through in the same, short period of time. Therefore, the vulnerability that the
conspirator highlights supports using cargo throughput as a measure of vulnerability.
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7.11B Export cargo vulnerability
Cargo volumes at the PNYNJ have increased significantly over the past several years,
however the percentage of export cargo has remained relatively stable at around 30% of all cargo
volumes (Port Authority 2014D). In 2015 (Port Authority 2015), there were 3,214,338 import
TEUs and 1,391,625 exported containers, not counting containers marked as empty which
constitute a greater portion than filled export containers. Exports at the PNYNJ place the port in
a medium level of vulnerability. Though the level of exports as a percentage is in the
medium/low range, the absolute number of export containers, and the high number of empty
exported containers (1.7 million) create a large level of export container shipping which can
serve to mask illicit shipments.
7.11C Vessel traffic
At the PNYNJ, container vessels constitute 41% of all vessels, which is above the
average of 33% for the top 30 U.S. seaports (MARAD 2013). The port scores low for the
vulnerability combined with an above average presence of container vessels and the high level of
cargo at the port.
7.12 Discussion
When coded using the SVF categories in the comparative port analysis, the PNYNJ codes
a 52 out of 63 with the highest level of vulnerability of the top 30 U.S. seaports. The analysis in
this chapter provides further detail of vulnerability across all 21 vulnerability categories to show
how a confluence of vulnerability has led the PNYNJ to have such a heightened level of
vulnerability to criminal networks.
The basis of this dissertation is that any individual vulnerability, whether an individual
employee assisting a network or heightened vulnerability through a disproportionate amount of
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cargo traffic does not alone create higher vulnerability at a port. Instead, through a confluence of
vulnerability, a port will have heightened vulnerability due to a combination of physical,
administrative, and logistical vulnerabilities. The PNYNJ presents a worst case scenario with
organized crime influence in port operations and labor, a large amount of cargo throughput, a
large peripheral sector with little regulation, and numerous incidents of employees in companies
operating at the port and providing port labor participating in illicit trafficking. What the
preceding analysis shows is that anecdotal evidence when put to the test in combination with
primary data sources, public sources, and through qualitative analysis of interviews with
stakeholders produces a picture turning the anecdotal into the empirical.
7.12A PNYNJ seaport vulnerability model
The SVF analysis provides a method to identify how the physical, administrative, and
logistical structural conditions at the PNYNJ increase vulnerability. This can be visualized
through a model that displays the level of vulnerability at the PNYNJ according to the
vulnerability categories and their relative weight. See Figure 6. The model indicates that:
1. The highest weighted categories at the PNYNJ display maximum vulnerability.
2. Only five categories display a low level of vulnerability, and only one displays a medium
level of vulnerability.
3. Categories which have federal or international standards for security procedures such as
interagency cooperation, through AMSCs, and physical/administrative procedures,
through MTSA and SAFE Act standards, display a low level of vulnerability.
4. Categories have to be considered from the broad level of vulnerability created, such as
container throughput, to those which cause acute levels of vulnerability, such as
employee or organization corruption. Specific port vulnerability assessments will have to
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qualitatively identify which categories cause the greatest vulnerability to prioritize
security resources accordingly.
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Figure 1: Port of NY/NJ Vulnerability Model
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7.13B Confluence of vulnerability
The key determination that can be made from this analysis of the port is that any activity
that requires the use of a port will take advantage of multiple sets of vulnerabilities. The case
described in 7.10G Employee Corruption (Southern District of New York 2010) showed clearly
how physical, administrative, and logistical vulnerability all contribute to a determination of
whether a network chooses to use a port. However, what that case also clearly demonstrates is
that privileged access through personal connections can also be a heavy determinant of whether a
port is used for illicit transfers. The different types of vulnerability serve to make that initial
decision to use the port a less risky venture for a network and contribute to the “port shopping”
phenomena described by Shane (2010). Vulnerabilities in that sense are clearly situated within
the SCP literature which notes that an individual or group that wants to a commit crime will seek
opportunities with the least risk and the greatest reward. Ports at the high end of the
vulnerability spectrum come closest to the platonic ideal of opportunity for network - low risk
and a way point in acquiring high rewards.
At the PNYNJ, a confluence of physical, administrative, and logistical vulnerabilities
create the conditions that make the port a lower risk and higher reward port for exploitation by
criminal networks. Physical vulnerabilities such as the large open access yards and the multiple
entry and exit points are exploited by networks to insert vehicles or extricate cargo (Southern
District of New York 2010). The size of the port itself across two states, multiple municipalities
and jurisdictions, and the generally low presence of police at the port at any given time allow
networks to exploit opportunities for physical movement (Former Police Chief WCNYH,
10/1/2012). The significant presence of vehicle traffic also contributes as an exacerbating
vulnerability that criminal elements can and have used (Lantsman 2013). Administrative
vulnerability at the port is more nuanced since ports in the United States are subject to
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requirements under the MTSA for interagency cooperation. There is an increasing record of
multi-stakeholder operations (Demeri 2012; Waterfront Commission 2012d; Waterfront
Commission 2013e; Waterfront Commission 2015). Relationships which once were poor and
under-utilized are now stronger and more institutionalized through cooperative mechanisms such
as the mandatory establishment of AMSCs.
While official channels for cooperation are undergirded by local and national
frameworks, other types of vulnerability, particularly through the influence of traditional
organized crime groups in unions covering waterfront labor, continue to persist despite repeated
attempts by law enforcement to enforce changes in the labor force (Waterfront Commission
2014b). Furthermore, key economic sectors that perform the actual labor for maritime cargo
shipments display evidence of organized crime and criminal network use for illicit purposes. In
some cases, employees are victims with an increased potential for blackmail, and in other cases,
entities are controlled or co-opted by networks to assist with illicit cargo movements. Finally,
the amount of throughput creates the conditions of logistical vulnerability that has been cited by
networks themselves whether it is in the PNYNJ (Southern District of New York 2010) or other
high volume ports (Zaitch 2002).
This analysis examines past evidence of vulnerability, but ports are constantly changing
in response to economic push and pull factors, complicating factors in the distribution of labor
and hardware to move cargo, and a host of other factors not least of which is a changing
workforce. Those changing conditions will affect the vulnerability of the port and bear a closer
examination at how the vulnerability of the port may change in coming years.
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7.12C Vulnerability interactivity
This analysis focuses on detailed examinations of how the PNYNJ rates on 21 categories
of vulnerability, but one of the key determinations is that vulnerability at a port is not a function
of a confluence of individual vulnerabilities but also the interaction between them which
heightens or lowers the vulnerability of the port.
At the PNYNJ, the epicenter of vulnerability is the historical presence of criminal
networks functioning in various areas of port operations. From this epicenter, incidents of
employee corruption and companies with ownership associated with criminal networks are more
likely to be present at the port. In fact, it is possible to make a hypothetical argument that a port
with a historical presence of criminal networks in port operations will display increased
administrative vulnerability because this creates the environment in which criminal activity or
low level corruption becomes associated with certain port sectors. Actors in those sectors act
then according to certain prescribed customs and practices, most of which are benign but some of
which may support illicit activity at the port.
The confluence of vulnerability is further heightened by the presence of a large peripheral
company sector, as measured by the size of the freight forwarding sector. In a shallow freight
forwarding sector with few companies, the historical presence of criminal networks will likely
have less effect than a port with both heightened vulnerability and a large forwarder sector. A
large freight forwarder sector creates more opportunities for criminal groups to gain
organizational control, either through cooptation of a legitimate company or by creating their
own wholly controlled entity. A large forwarder sector also decreases the chance that regulatory
agencies will identify the leadership and organizational associations with criminal networks. For
example, the regulatory oversight authority of the Waterfront Commission at the PNYNJ is
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geographically limited, and at the federal level, the Federal Maritime Commission is limited by a
lack of resources for oversight (Office of Inspector General 2012).
Conversely, the lack of vulnerability in certain sectors will likely decrease the likelihood
of vulnerability in others. Using the same central vulnerability of historical criminal network
presence, the lack of that vulnerability will likely reduce the severity of incidents of corruption
both at the organizational level and at the employee level. This can be seen at the Port of Los
Angeles and Long Beach where a lack of historical criminal network involvement in port
operations likely contributed to the lack of port corruption incidents at the organization and
employee level (see Section 6.4C Port of LA/LB Vulnerability Assessment). While the port does
score high on the SVF, what this demonstrates is that a comparative analysis must be followed
by a detailed case study to determine the exact level and scope of vulnerability.
7.12D Changing environment at the PNYNJ
In recent years, the Waterfront Commission has tried to diversify the longshore
workforce at the port by recruiting outside of the main channels of hiring (WCNYH 2014c).
There are practical positive implications for a more diverse workforce, not least of which will be
that local communities which bear the brunt of the industrial and environmental impact of port
operations will share in the financial benefits from longshore work. However, there is also an
implicit understanding that by disrupting the traditional source of labor at the port, diversifying
the labor force to include those with no background of influence from traditional organized crime
groups will assist in breaking the still evident influence that traditional organized crime groups in
New York have on certain aspects of the unionized labor force (Executive Director, WCNYH
9/28/2012). Labor force diversification will likely have strong implications for the determination
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of vulnerability in the employee and organizational corruption areas and requires close
observation in the coming years.
While labor force diversification has strong implications in the area of administrative
vulnerability, broad changes in the shipping industry will have implications for vulnerability
across all areas of the port. The processes of atomization and massification means that larger
vessels will be waiting at port for longer periods of time and disgorging larger quantities of
containers (Notteboom and Rodrigue 2012). Both of these processes are already evident in the
greater size of vessels and the large peripheral company sector such as freight forwarders at the
PNYNJ. It is possible that those vulnerabilities that are affected by atomization will likely
increase as greater amounts of cargo flow through the port in short time clusters. Delays are
already more evident at U.S. ports (Campo-Flores and McWhirter 2015), and enforcement
agencies may not be able to adapt to regulate a larger amount of traffic with the expectation that
it will make it to consignees in a reasonable period of time.
7.13 Conclusion
Seaport vulnerability is complex and multifaceted, and the PNYNJ is a key example of
how even U.S. ports are subject to a confluence of vulnerability. While some vulnerabilities are
useful for the import of illicit cargo, particularly those in the labor sector, others in the freight
forwarding sector create opportunities for criminal networks to export illicit cargo. Conducting a
case study analysis following a shorter analysis using the 15 categories analyzed in Chapter 6 is
crucial to truly understand which vulnerabilities create the greatest opportunities for networks.
At the PNYNJ, administrative vulnerability in specific labor and economic sectors creates
those opportunities and which are exacerbated by physical vulnerabilities created by open
structures and large numbers of trucks and peripheral companies. As the labor landscape shifts,
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this may change in coming years, and the port will require an updated vulnerability profile. This
approach mirrors that taken by federal law enforcement agencies. This dissertation provides a
parallel method of examining vulnerability but does not discount the vulnerability of the port to
infrastructure disruption. In fact, some of the issues that are identified in U.S. Coast Guard and
CBP vulnerability assessments overlap with those identified in this assessment. These
vulnerability assessments are discussed in the following chapter and show how the SVF provides
a complementary method of assessing port vulnerability in the U.S. and abroad.
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Chapter 8 – Policy implications
In the United States, port security is primarily the mandate of the U.S. Coast Guard with
support from other federal agencies such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection, state and local
agencies. With a disparate set of port security agencies, the methods to assess vulnerability at
U.S. seaports focus on a wide variety of threats. The primary port security assessment
methodology in the United States was developed by the U.S. Coast Guard and focuses on
infrastructure destruction and terrorism risks at U.S. ports. To supplement this assessment
framework, I demonstrate how an applied integrated theoretical Seaport Vulnerability
Framework can be used to a theoretical model of criminological vulnerability at a port. The
policy implications of an additional tool to determine vulnerability allow stakeholders to focus
attention on the everyday vulnerability of ports to criminal networks.
This chapter examines primary assessment frameworks including the U.S. Coast Guard
Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) framework and CBP’s container targeting,
the limitations of those frameworks, and the policy implications of the SVF for domestic and
international port security assessment.
8.1 Port security assessments
As the previous analysis showed, port security is an interconnected inter-agency process
with responsibilities spread across numerous organizations with different types of jurisdiction.
Risk analysis and assessment responsibilities are appropriated similarly to various agencies
operating in the port security sector. Assessment is conducted based on multiple levels of
oversight depending on the country where the port is located.
At the international level, those countries which are party to the International Ship and
Port Security Code (ISPS Code), are mandated to conduct port security facility assessments,
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based on the concept of risk=threat X vulnerability X consequences (ISPS Code). While ports
and facilities are subject to port security assessment through the ISPS Code, most countries in
customs agencies use various forms of risk analysis to target suspect containers in transit (WCO
2011; WCO 2012).
8.1A Maritime security policy
At the highest level of maritime security policy in the United States, federal mandates for
port security are determined by the U.S. Congress, with input from relevant maritime security
agencies (GAO 2008; 2009; 2010; 2012; 2012b; 2015). Agencies then develop port security
rules through internal determinations which are subject to input from the public. These internal
rules can have a significant impact on what entails risk and vulnerability in the maritime
transportation system (GAO 2012c). As a result the focus of assessments and the primary risks
focus have a significant impact on national level policy directives and strategic guidance which
has in past years focused on addressing threats primarily to counter attacks on infrastructure
which can lead to loss of life, such as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Small Vessel
Security Strategy (DHS 2008) and the National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security
(White House 2012).
Strategic guidance in the area of crime at U.S. ports is a vestige of the pre-9/11
environment when law enforcement concerns at ports were broadly addressed in the President’s
Commission on Crime at U.S. Seaports (Interagency Commission on Crime and Security at U.S.
Seaports 2000). That document broadly outlined the type of criminal activity at U.S. ports and
provided recommendations, which were quickly overshadowed by the 9/11 attacks. The attacks
directed attention away from the daily criminal activity at U.S. ports and towards the terrorist
black swan events which have yet to occur at any U.S. port.
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8.1B Funding for port security
The implications of current Coast Guard and CBP assessment structures for security
funding cannot be overstated. Simply put, assessments determine which port districts receive
funding to use towards port security (U.S. DHS 2008b). The U.S. Coast Guard’s Office of Port
and Facility compliance in concert with the DHS mandated Maritime Security Risk Analysis
Model (MSRAM) tool determine the risk and vulnerability of facilities at Coast Guard districts
and sectors. This is one of the primary tools used to determine which ports are included in the
Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) guidelines. In the latest iteration of the PSGP for fiscal
year 201570, the MSRAM tool is used to determine the highest risk ports, and those ports are the
only ones eligible to receive PSGP funding (FEMA 2014). Ports that MSRAM determines to not
be vulnerable to terrorist attacks receive less funding, even though they may actually have a
higher level of vulnerability to criminal networks.
8.2 U.S. Assessment structures
The two port security assessment structures in the U.S. take a micro-perspective with a
focus on identifying risk, whether risk of a facility being targeted for attack or a container used
for illicit smuggling. While this micro-focus allows both entities that utilize the risk analyses,
U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection, to make operational decisions it defocuses attention from the structural underlying conditions at seaports that make them more
likely to be used by criminal networks.

70

Fiscal years refer to the time period October 1- September 31. FY2015 therefore refers to October 1, 2014
through September 31, 2015.
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8.2A U.S. Coast Guard port security assessment
At U.S. seaports, the Coast Guard uses the Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model
(MSRAM) to assess the vulnerability of U.S. seaports. MSRAM was developed in 2006 from an
earlier iteration of the Port Security Risk Assessment Tool (PSRAT), which primarily focused on
developing a risk analysis model to identify ports vulnerable to terrorist attacks (GAO 2011).
Like PSRAT, MSRAM is a tool to understand and identify the vulnerability of U.S. seaports to
terrorist attacks. The components of MSRAM vulnerability focus on different attack modes on
regulated port facilities. As an example of the scale of MSRAM vulnerability analysis across the
United States, there are more than 30,000 different facilities (Keating, Howard, and Arimoto
2014), which are defined as targets under the MSRAM, and each targets receives a vulnerability
analysis to determine vulnerability to an attack (GAO 2011).
As MSRAM is the primary tool used to determine risk weights for ports, which then are
classified on a high to low scale in the Port Security Grant Program, the assessment has
significant financial impacts on the level of port security funding ports receive (GAO 2011).
Since the MSRAM measures risk as a function of Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence, the
most risky facilities are those which have the highest vulnerability and on which an attack will
have the highest level of consequence (USCG). Consequences are therefore weighed in favor of
physical and infrastructure destruction. This produces a “risk index number” assessment profile
of port and their regulated facilities that favor mitigation and financial outlays to reduce the
supposed impact of terrorist attacks or attacks against physical infrastructure (Cooper 2009). As
a result, this form of assessment does not fully capture the vulnerability of the port to criminal
networks as their activities aim to exploit the system, not to cause damage or loss of life.
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8.2B CBP cargo risk analysis
Since 9/11, CBP has instituted numerous safeguards to identify suspect cargo entering
and exiting the United States. CBP conducts container security through a multi-layered
approach, which focuses on targeting containers before they reach the United States through
trusted company initiatives such as the Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism program
(O’Connell 2009; U.S. General Accounting Office 2012) or stationing CBP officers at large U.S.
export ports overseas through the Container Security Initiative (Department of Homeland
Security Office of Inspector General 2010). Therefore, the primary method of vulnerability
assessment is through individual risk targeting of container shipments through U.S. ports of
entry. To conduct these risk analysis, CBP uses the Automated Targeting System (ATS) that
incorporates data from multiple systems to develop a risk summary for inbound and outboard
cargo. To assist in targeting, CBP instituted the Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier
Requirements (known as the 10+2 rule), which is a summary of specific information that must be
included on a shipping manifest and entered into the ATS (Importer Security Filing and
Additional Carrier Requirements). In addition to data requirements, CBP mandates the 24 hour
rule, which states that maritime shipment data must be entered more than 24 hours before cargo
is scheduled to arrive in the United States (Congressional Budget Office 2016).
However, while the risk targeting system creates sorting conditions to identify high risk
shipments, an analysis conducted in 2015 by the Government Accountability Office found that
less than one percent of all shipments between 2009 and 2013 were identified as high risk and of
those, CBP could not even provide disposition data on the outcomes of the inspection of high
risk cargo (GAO 2015). In addition, CBP’s targeting units apply waiver criteria inconsistently
and in other cases, incorrectly document the reasons for waivers (GAO 2015).
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The ATS is considered a premier risk analysis methodology and is used as the basis for
CBP assessments (Grover 2016). The issues highlighted above underscore that even risk
methodologies at the individual container level are not fool-proof if the agencies carrying them
out do not have procedures in place to disseminate data and track outcomes (Grover 2016).
8.2C Limitations of current structures
Despite the significant policy focus on port security in the United States, the current
assessment structures that provide the framework for determining vulnerability have two primary
limitations, a lack of interagency coordination and an over focus on physical threats to
infrastructure.
8.3A Lack of interagency coordination
Interagency coordination is a key component of port security and has repeatedly been
highlighted in policy documents from the Interagency Commission on Crime at U.S. Seaports
(2000) to the SAFE Port Act through the National Strategy on Global Supply Chain Security
(White House 2012). However, the determination of risk at U.S. ports, through the primary
security funding opportunity (PSGP) does not take into consideration CBP’s perspective on
container cargo security and targeting strategy (FEMA 2015). When ports submit projects for
review and approval the process provides space for interagency coordination to identify projects
for funding but the agencies involved in that process are noted only as the U.S. Maritime
Administration, Transportation Security Agency (which administers the TWIC program), and
FEMA. CBP which has a clearer understanding of which ports in the U.S. are destinations for
illicit cargo is not part of the overall federal review structure (FEMA 2015). This is further
indication that the assessment methodology for the PSGP is not focused on cargo security and
specifically identifying how U.S. ports are utilized by networks for illicit trafficking. However,
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as the smuggling networks that use the PNYNJ make clear, considerations of vessel size, the
number of cargo shipments, and the physical security at the port itself are considerations that a
group will take into account when determining how to use the port for illicit movement.
In addition, Department of Homeland Security and Homeland Security Investigations
(HSI), which undertakes investigations of illicit trafficking networks is likewise not included in
the review process. While CBP can provide perspective on trafficking methodologies, HSI’s
focus on network structures is a key addition to identify which networks how use ports,
informing mitigation procedures for the physical and administrative security.
By excluding these two key agencies in the determination of port security funding in the
PSGP process, key insights and considerations are left out of the determination process. Ports
with physical threats skew greater in the receipt of security funding, while ports with greater
administrative vulnerability may not receive increased funds required to address those
vulnerabilities.
8.3B Focus on physical threats
The majority of threat scenarios examined under the MSRAM assessment structure are
heavily skewed towards threats to physical infrastructure where the consequences, vulnerabilities
and mitigation strategies are better understood and more easily quantifiable (Keating, Howard,
and Arimoto 2014). Likewise, in the ISPS Code assessment structure because of the emphasis
placed on immediate consequences, loss of human life, and the national and symbolic value of a
threat scenario, the more commonplace occurrence of criminal network use of port facilities does
not rate as high. However, this is most unfortunate in consideration that the types of scenarios
that receive high scores and high vulnerability of facilities to impacts are black swan events that
rarely occur and have not occurred in the U.S. in recent memory.
188

8.4 Policy recommendations
Under the MSRAM assessment structure, the SVF provides a framework for what would
likely constitute only a handful of threat scenarios in the overall MSRAM structure, which has an
estimated 100,000 attack scenarios (Keating, Howard, and Arimoto 2014). This is purposeful
considering the impact of the movement of illicit trade worldwide, most recently was estimated
at between 8% and 15% of global gross domestic product (Buchanan and Chavarria 2015) with
narcotics trafficking at roughly $750 billion to $1 trillion, counterfeit goods at $650 billion, and
environmental crime at $20-40 billion. If this figure is to include money laundering, then it rises
to an astonishing $3 trillion compared with a legitimate global trade figure of about $10-12
trillion (Organization of American States 2012).
The SVF is designed to provide an alternative set of vulnerability categories to examine
seaports and to augment the current assessment structures that view port security through the lens
of counterterrorism. By developing a seaport vulnerability model, port security stakeholders can
identify additional areas of vulnerability in their port and target security resources accordingly.
This will hopefully refocus the attention to the daily vulnerabilities at ports that make them
attractive not as targets for infrastructure destruction, but rather as conduits for illicit trade.
While not all of the vulnerability categories in the SVF may be applicable to current assessment
structures, performing an SVF vulnerability assessment may provide an alternative picture of
port vulnerability. When used in concert with MSRAM assessments, the SVF provides a more
holistic view of seaport vulnerability. For example, ports which score high in the SVF may not
be those with significant physical assets or targets but which may function as significant conduits
of illicit cargo. The Port of Apra in Guam, a port that has received almost no PSGP funding in
previous years, has a heightened level of SVF vulnerability. Even small increased investment in
port security at Apra may have significant positive impacts. On the other hand, one of the most
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vulnerable ports based on MSRAM assessments and the SVF, the PNYNJ, has had high levels of
investment through PSGP funding and yet continues to display the multi-faceted confluence of
vulnerability described in detail in Chapter 7. This is in part due to the complexity of the port
structure, the ingrained use of port and maritime entities by criminal networks, and the
exploitation of some of those entities by organized crime, which exposes the somewhat narrow
focus of current port security policy.
The SVF can assist not only port security stakeholders in understanding the comparative
vulnerability of their own relative to other ports in the U.S., and around the world, but also assist
U.S. government agencies in determining which seaports to work with on port security foreign
assistance projects. The State Department, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL) has a wide ranging partnership program which works with domestic
U.S. criminal justice agencies and port security agencies to assist U.S. foreign partner agencies
(U.S. Department of State/Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
2015). The State Department currently partners with the PortMiami (U.S. Department of State
2013), Port of San Diego (U.S. Department of State 2015) and the Port of Long Beach (U.S.
Department of State 2015a). Port security agencies at these ports, including their law
enforcement organizations, such as the Port of San Diego Harbor Police Department, PortMiami
security division and Miami-Dade County Seaport Operations Bureau, and the City of Long
Beach Police Department port security division have provided trainings for U.S. partners from
countries as varied as Jamaica, Pakistan, the Bahamas, and Trinidad and Tobago.
While the foreign assistance requirements of the State Department are varied, by
developing partnerships with domestic U.S. ports, the Department can project best practices at
U.S. seaports to countries overseas. The SVF can assist the State Department to determine
which seaports to work with, and the disaggregation of the SVF provides a method to identify
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which port security agencies may have greater experience dealing with issues of concern. For
example, if the U.S. receives a request to support an overseas port that has a cargo theft problem,
the SVF can be used to identify which seaports in the U.S. have the same problem to engage with
law enforcement agencies at the port to identify how they address the problem. Likewise, the
Department can proactively use the SVF to conduct vetting of seaports before deciding which
ports to develop partnerships with.
8.4A International comparative assessment
Though the SVF provides an additional method to assess vulnerability at U.S. ports it is
also relevant for international comparative port security analysis. It is designed to be able to
provide a baseline measurement of vulnerability using public sources, either through media
accounts or through data from aggregator institutions at the national or international level, such
as the UN Comtrade database which compiles international trade data. The SVF can be used to
build a comparative measure of port vulnerability across ports from multiple countries on a
regional or international basis. This has already been conducted for ports of convenience for
IUU (Petrossian, Marteache, and Viollaz 2014), but by using the SVF, researchers can create
baseline vulnerability assessments to inform detailed studies of crimes which occur at or use port
facilities.
8.6 Conclusion
The current port security assessment structures, the USCG MSRAM and CBP’s ATS, do
not pay sufficient attention to the use of seaports by criminal networks. The Seaport
Vulnerability Framework developed in this dissertation and applied to the top 30 container ports
in the United States and in a case study at the PNYNJ provides an additional assessment
structure that when used in concert with other assessment tools, contributes to a holistic view of
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seaport vulnerability. In addition, the SVF can be used to assist the Department of State Bureau
of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement in identifying which U.S. seaports to work with
to provide international foreign assistance to. overseas port security partner agencies.
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Chapter 9 Limitations and future directions for research
There are several primary limitations in this dissertation which affect the conclusions
gained from the comparative port analysis and case study analysis of the Port of New York and
New Jersey (PNYNJ). Detailed discussion of data quality and limitations for each vulnerability
category are in Chapter 3, while this final section focuses on the broader limitations of the study.
9.1 Sample size
The sample size of the comparative port analysis, while attempting to capture the primary
set of container shipping ports in the United States, does not factor in other characteristics which
may be important for understanding seaport vulnerability. For example, a different sample set
could focus on the largest cruise ship ports in the United States and would have to factor into the
analysis other vulnerability measures such as the quantity of passengers passing through the port,
the average level of passengers per vessel, and others which would have to be developed from a
pilot study at a large cruise ship port.
9.2 Data reliability
The number of data sources used in the Seaport Vulnerability Framework is a significant
limitation. Where possible, I used the same data source to measure baseline levels of
vulnerabilities to provide a level of reliability. However, a number of vulnerabilities use
disparate data for measurement. A key example of this is the vehicle traffic vulnerability, using
daily truck traffic as a proxy. There is no single repository for this type of data and widely
disparate data sources were used to identify that statistic. In some cases, it was impossible to
identify that information required, and ports do not publish this type of data as it can be used in
economic determinations of port productivity or efficiency by competitors. Also, in some ports,
truck traffic may not be an adequate full proxy for vehicle traffic to the port, particularly those
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which are embarkation ports for cruise ships which often have a large amount of private vehicle
traffic not captured in the truck traffic daily measure, such as Port of Miami.
9.3 Port crime data
As with certain ports where it was not possible to identify daily truck traffic, the dark
figure of crime at ports, a general concern in criminological research, must be considered a
general limitation of the study. The only figures which I was able to obtain to provide a measure
of illicit activity across ports were CBP narcotics seizures at U.S. maritime ports of entry;
however this is highly sensitive data not released for publication and cannot be referenced in this
study. Even with this data, seizures do not provide a true picture of the criminal network use of
the maritime transportation system (Werb et al. 2011; Willis et al. 2011; Wern et al. 2013), since
differing levels of interagency resources at seaports and informant networks have a great impact
on the level seizures. Ports without that may be significant conduit points of illicit cargo yet
have no official seizures.
In other cases, research identified other tantalizing leads which could not be fully
examined due to a lack of data. For example, during research at the PNYNJ, an interesting
relationship between daily container shipping and criminal network choice structuring was
highlighted by a criminal conspirator in wiretap transcripts. Clusters of container offloads on a
yearly, monthly, daily, terminal and vessel basis all become valid measures of determining
vulnerability from the broad (annual) to the granular (vessel) level. Unfortunately shipping
terminals consider TEU data proprietary information since it can be used in negotiations with
port authorities for subsidies and other economic incentives, and data at the vessel level, such as
average number of offloads per vessel, is not available.
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9.4 Data quality
Both the comparative vulnerability analysis and the PNYNJ case study uses data that is
not recent. This was most often the case with the vehicle traffic vulnerability. But in some
cases, this was also present in the measurement for illicit import/export market where part of the
factor for that vulnerability included suspect vehicle data from 2003 to 2008. Vulnerability
measurements in this study relied on public data sources to identify evidence of vulnerability,
triangulated across multiple sources where possible. However, in some ports data was dated, and
this necessitates updating of the SVF on a periodic basis. This is consistent with other
vulnerability assessment frameworks such as MSRAM, which require re-assessment every few
years. In addition, even in ports with current public sources, as described in detail in Chapter 3,
the limitations of using public sources are manifold and have to be weighed carefully in the
determination of vulnerability in a port.
9.5 Considerations for further research
Despite the limitations highlighted above following the comparative analysis, a number
of propositions of heightened vulnerability bear further discussion for refinement in future
comparative analyses.
Container vessel calls: Not only did the top ten most vulnerable ports not receive a high score
on this vulnerability, they displayed an average score that was lower than the remaining 20 ports,
with an average of .9 for the top ten ports and 1.9 for the remaining 20. The proposition states
that ports which do not have a have a high level of container ship traffic will be more vulnerable
due to less experience in managing container vessel security. Instead, it appears that ports with
high levels of container ship traffic are more vulnerable when measured across the other
vulnerability categories. It may be that the ports in the top ten as some of the highest container
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shipping ports in the country are more vulnerable because they have so much container shipping,
the experience of their law enforcement agencies be damned, something implied by drug
traffickers interviewed by Zaitch (2002). However this does not explain why other high
container shipping ports such as Houston or Savannah do not score in the top ten. One of the
factors, which may explain this is that ports which have high levels of container shipping, as
opposed to bulk or other vessels, are serving larger consumer regions, which has implications on
the size of the illicit market in the region as well. Further research should examine in further
detail the relationship between the types of vessels that call at ports and their vulnerability to
criminal networks.
Interagency cooperation: While this is a key vulnerability to measure in port regions, U.S.
ports do not register heightened vulnerability in this area due to the mandated federal law for
AMSCs. In other ports around the world, this is likely of greater concern, but for the
measurement schema under the SVF, it registered no score for any port in the sample. From
experience working in federal agencies, interagency cooperation is a strong area of concern, but
to develop comparative measures across specific units of analysis such as seaports, is beyond the
scope of this study. Case study analysis at a specific seaport should be conducted to identify
more granular levels of vulnerability in this category.
Vehicle traffic: While the level of vehicle traffic is an important consideration of vulnerability,
most ports in the United States registered for a high level of vulnerability. Further research
could identify where heightened levels of vehicle traffic are a vulnerability because of interaction
with other vulnerabilities, such as decreased levels of physical or administrative security
procedures.
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Appendix A: Port security initiatives
Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT)
One of the primary container security programs, C-TPAT creates expedited relationships
between private companies and CBP. Containers from companies and agents in the C-TPAT
program are generally exempt from in-depth screening and are expedited through the supply
chain. This program is designed to create institutional cultures that incorporate security concerns
directly into their business operations71. However, critics have noted that its success has been
measured by the number of companies in the program and not by its security effectiveness
(O’Connell 2009; U.S. General Accounting Office 2012).
Container Security Initiative (CSI)
Another key program, the CSI operates in up to 53 seaports worldwide (U.S. CBP 2009),
and was implemented to inspect containers for suspicious material before they reach U.S. ports
(Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General 2010). Despite its broad
geographic reach, standard operating procedures differ widely across participating seaports and
contribute to decreased security effectiveness (Department of Homeland Security Office of
Inspector General 2010).
Safe Freight Initiative (SFI)
SFI is a CBP program which was designed following recommendations from the 9-11
Commission. The SFI attempts to screen 100% of outbound cargo from a few select international
ports for radiological and nuclear material (U.S. General Accounting Office 2012). As of 2009,
these included two phases of deployment. One set of ports deployed scanning equipment to
capture data on all containers bound to the United States72. Three other ports have an initial
deployment to learn how to integrate the new technology with port operations and commerce
flow73: Port Salalah in Oman, Port of Singapore, and Port Busan in Korea (Gamman Terminal).
However, following a CBP review which noted that at Singapore and Busan, South
Korea a maximum of only 5% U.S.-bound containers were screened, the 100% screening
requirement has been pushed back to July 2014 (U.S. General Accounting Office 2012).
SAFE Framework74
Concurrent with the U.S. led container security initiatives discussed above, worldwide
container and port security initiatives have also been developed post 9-11. One of the largest and
most comprehensive efforts was led by the WCO beginning in 2007 and is known as the SAFE
Framework (WCO 2012). It consists of four primary directives (WCO 2011; 2012): (1)
harmonizing advance electronic cargo information requirements; (2) employing risk
management approaches to security; (3) at the request of one nation the sending nation's
Customs administration will perform an outbound inspection of high-risk containers and cargo;
(4) and the SAFE Framework defines benefits that Customs agencies will provide to businesses
that meet minimal supply chain security standards and best practices. However physical security
at ports is not fully addressed under this framework.
International Ship and Port Facilities Security Code (ISPS Code)
71

However, the program is open to mainly U.S. and Mexican companies and does not fully incorporate overseas
entities that may be the origin of greater amounts of suspicious goods (Thibault et al. 2006).
72
Port Qasim, Pakistan; Puerto Cortes, Honduras; and Southampton, United Kingdom
73
Port Salalah, Oman; Port of Singapore; and Port Busan (Gamman Terminal), South Korea
74
See Appendix A for participating countries
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To address security at seaports, in 2004 the member states of the Safety of Law at Sea
convention (SOLAS) adopted the ISPS code (Goulielmos&Anastasakos 2005). The code set
mandatory security requirements (Part A) for port authorities, governments and shipping
companies75, in addition to providing non-mandatory best practices recommendations (Part B).
As a result of this double faceted implementation approach there are varied levels of compliance
at seaports worldwide (Goulielmos and Anastasakos 2005). In some developed economies such
as Sweden, implementation of Part A of the code has been sporadic and difficult due to weak
links in the transportation system and the complexity of even those seaports (Wengelin 2006). In
the developing world, efforts have been made by countries in Africa, the Black Sea area and
Latin America to invest resources to achieve ISPS compliant seaports, and benefits have been
realized from these investments, including reduced theft and pilferage and increased customs
revenues (Kruk and Donner 2008).
In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) operates the International Port Security
Program, where USCG officers visit foreign ports to determine whether their security practices
meet ISPS standards and provide advice and assistance on security best practices (GAO 2010).

75

These recommendations including creating port security plans; training staff to carry out drills and exercises;
identifying security related technology; creating effective measures to monitor and control access to facilities; and
implementing security communication systems.
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Appendix B: Small vessel (panga) interceptions

Table 11: Panga interceptions

Date

# of
Vessels

Type of
Cargo

Quantity
(pounds, bales,
individuals)

1/16/2014

1

Migrants

18

3/12/2014

1

Migrants

7

3/26/2014

1

Migrants

10

12/26/201
4

1

drugs

1/15/2014

1

Migrants

11/21/201
1

1

Marijuana

n/a

11

4500

Location

Nearest port

Reference

Manalapan

Fort Lauderdale

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-01-16000000/smuggler-lands-migrants-then-flees-bahamas

fort Lauderdale

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-03-12-000000/usborder-patrol-arrests-human-smugglers-florida-1

Dania Beach
Station

Fort Lauderdale

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-03-26000000/smuggling-event-under-investigation-fort-lauderdale

Hutchinson
Island

Fort Lauderdale

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-12-15-000000/borderpatrol-agents-encounter-maritime-smuggling

Palm Beach

Fort Lauderdale,
Miami

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-01-15-000000/borderpatrol-arrests-bahamian-smuggler-11-migrants

Gulfport, MS

Gulfport, New
Orleans

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-11-24-050000/gulfcoast-taskforce-seizes-sailboat-4500-pounds
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1/4/2012

3/9/2010

1/31/2012

1

1

1

Marijuana

Marijuana

Marijuana

2,500 pounds

Deer Creek
road beach

Hueneme, Los
Angeles, Long
Beach

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-01-04-050000/cbp-usborder-patrol-agents-arrest-ten-following

2448 pounds

Santa Rosa
Island

Los Angeles,
Long Beach,
Hueneme

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-03-09-050000/cbpmarine-agents-seize-more-1-ton-marijuana-santa

2,575 pounds

Point Dume
State Beach

Los Angeles,
Long Beach,
Hueneme

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-01-31-050000/threemexican-nationals-arrested-following

Las Flores
Beach

Los Angeles,
Long Beach,
Hueneme

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-07-27-040000/usborder-patrol-agents-interdict-drug-smuggling-boat

7/27/2012

1

Marijuana

7/12/2012

1

Migrants

19

Boot key

Miami

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-07-12-040000/borderpatrol-agents-apprehend-19-cuban-migrants

2/26/2015

1

Migrants

10

west
ofBahamas

Miami

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2015-02-26-000000/cbp-airand-marine-apprehend-migrants-near-miami

5

west Palm
Beach, FL

Palm Beach, Fort
Lauderdale,
Miami

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-02-23-050000/miamisector-border-patrol-agents-intercept-migrants

12

west Palm
Beach, FL

Palm Beach, Fort
Lauderdale,
Miami

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-08-30-040000/cubansmuggler-us-citizen-boat-operator-sentenced

2

west Palm
Beach, FL

Palm Beach, Fort
Lauderdale,
Miami

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-09-11-040000/usborder-patrol-nabs-bahamian-smuggler-sentenced-36

2/23/2010

2/16/2012

200

3/30/2012

1

1

1

Migrants

Migrants

Migrants

6600

3/30/2012

4/11/2012

5/6/2012

6/30/2012

6/12/2013

1/14/2014

1/16/2014

3/12/2014

201

12/15/201
4

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Migrants

Marijuana

N/a

west Palm
Beach, FL

Palm Beach, Fort
Lauderdale,
Miami

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-03-30-040000/cbpjacksonville-air-branch-foils-maritime-human

423 pounds

west Palm
Beach, FL

Palm Beach, Fort
Lauderdale,
Miami

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-08-28040000/bahamian-sentenced-18-months-incarceration

14

west Palm
Beach, FL

Palm Beach, Fort
Lauderdale,
Miami

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-11-14050000/bahamian-national-sentenced-7-years-alien-smuggling

2

west Palm
Beach, FL

Palm Beach, Fort
Lauderdale,
Miami

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-11-07050000/bahamian-sentenced-three-years-after-smuggling-two

11

west Palm
Beach, FL

Palm Beach, Fort
Lauderdale,
Miami

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2013-06-12-040000/haitianaggravated-felon-sentenced-6-months-prison

11

west Palm
Beach, FL

Palm Beach, Fort
Lauderdale,
Miami

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-01-15-000000/borderpatrol-arrests-bahamian-smuggler-11-migrants

17

west Palm
Beach, FL

Palm Beach, Fort
Lauderdale,
Miami

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-01-16000000/smuggler-lands-migrants-then-flees-bahamas

7

west Palm
Beach, FL

Palm Beach, Fort
Lauderdale,
Miami

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-03-12-000000/usborder-patrol-arrests-human-smugglers-florida-1

West Palm
Beach, FL

Palm Beach, Fort
Lauderdale,
Miami

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-12-15-000000/borderpatrol-agents-encounter-maritime-smuggling

Migrants

Migrants

Migrants

Migrants

Migrants

Migrants

Migrants

N/a

10/11/201
2

1

cocaine

202

1452

south coast
PR

ponce

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-10-11-040000/cbpand-coast-guard-intercept-go-fast-vessel-1452

12/3/2013

1

Marijuana

723

south coast
PR

ponce

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2013-12-03-000000/cbpseizes-10-bales-cocaine-reaching-southern-puerto

3/5/2014

1

Marijuana

2432

south coast
PR

Ponce

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-03-05-000000/cbpintercepts-go-fast-vessel-38-bales-cocaine

5/26/2009

1

Migrants

24

Encinitas

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2009-05-26-040000/24arrested-early-morning-maritime-smuggling-attempt

6/9/2009

1

Migrants

22

Del Mar

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2009-06-09-040000/borderpatrol-nabs-22-illegal-immigrants-california

7/18/2009

1

Migrants

11

Torrey Pines
State Park

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2009-06-18-040000/borderpatrol-thwarts-3-smuggling-schemes-arrest-44

7/19/2009

1

Migrants

20

south Ponto
Beach

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2009-07-17-040000/20mexican-nationals-arriving-smuggling-boat-nabbed

8/21/2009

1

Migrants

23

Carlsbad State
Beach

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2009-08-21-040000/borderpatrol-agents-intercept-23-illegal-aliens

10/2/2009

1

Migrants

21

Carlsbad State
Beach

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2009-10-02-040000/borderpatrol-arrests-21-carlsbad-state-beach

10/13/200
9

1

Migrants

6

La Jolla

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2009-10-13-040000/2suspected-smugglers-nabbed-sea-la-jolla-coast

11/10/200
9

1

Migrants

24

Cardiff By the
Sea

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2009-11-10-050000/borderpatrol-air-and-marine-coordinated-effort

12/2/2009

1

Migrants

22

Leucadia

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2009-12-02-050000/cbpstops-boat-calif-coast-22-illegal-immigrants

1/19/2010

1

Migrants

15

Torrey Pines
State Park

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-01-19-050000/cbphalts-deadly-illegal-immigration-attempt-torrey

3/3/2010

1

Marijuana

Mission Bay

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-03-03-050000/cbpstops-2-smuggling-sea-attempts

3/3/2010

1

Migrants

17

Leucadia

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-03-03-050000/cbpstops-2-smuggling-sea-attempts

4/11/2010

1

Migrants

8

Ocean Beach

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-04-15-040000/sandiego-cbp-agents-thwart-fifth-maritime-smuggling

4/12/2010

1

Migrants

5

Mission Bay

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-04-15-040000/sandiego-cbp-agents-thwart-fifth-maritime-smuggling

11

San Onfore
Nuclear
Generating
Station

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-04-15-040000/sandiego-cbp-agents-thwart-fifth-maritime-smuggling

4/13/2010

1

Migrants

997 pounds

203

4/14/2010

1

Migrants

23

Marine
Beach, Camp
Pendleton

4/15/2010

1

Migrants

8

Swami Beach

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-04-15-040000/sandiego-cbp-agents-thwart-fifth-maritime-smuggling

4/19/2010

1

Migrants

20

Ponto Beach

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-04-19-040000/jointmaritime-enforcement-efforts-stops-smuggling

6/2/2010

1

Migrants

12

Dog Beach

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-06-02-040000/boat14-million-marijuana-nabbed-us-border-patrol

7/5/2010

1

Marijuana

San Diego

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-07-06-040000/threefailed-smuggling-attempts-sea-yield-34-illegal

7/6/2010

1

Migrants

15

Oceanside
Harbor

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-07-06-040000/threefailed-smuggling-attempts-sea-yield-34-illegal

7/6/2010

1

Migrants

13

Pendleton
Beach

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-07-06-040000/threefailed-smuggling-attempts-sea-yield-34-illegal

7/19/2010

1

Migrants

22

Oceanside
Harbor

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-07-19040000/smuggling-attempt-thwarted-calif-coast

7/31/2010

1

Migrants

23

La Jolla

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-08-04-040000/cbpmarine-interdiction-agents-stop-2-illegal

1398 pounds

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-04-15-040000/sandiego-cbp-agents-thwart-fifth-maritime-smuggling

204

Carlsbad State
Beach

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-09-01-040000/cbparrests-20-maritime-smuggling-attempt-carlsbad

Point Loma

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-08-04-040000/cbpmarine-interdiction-agents-stop-2-illegal

21

San Luis
Obispo Place

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-10-05-040000/cbp-usborder-patrol-agents-spoil-maritime-smuggling

Carlsbad State
Beach

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/mediareleases/all?field_date_release_value[min][date]=&field_date_release_value[ma
x][date]=&field_newsroom_type_tid_1=All&body_value=panga&page=1

9/1/2010

1

Migrants

20

9/1/2010

1

Migrants

4

10/5/2010

1

Migrants

205

10/15/201
0

1

Migrants

21

10/18/201
0

1

Migrants

7

n/a

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-10-18-040000/uscustoms-and-border-protection-cbp-agents-disrupt

10/18/201
0

2

Migrants

4

Imperial
Beach

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-10-18-040000/uscustoms-and-border-protection-cbp-agents-disrupt

10/18/201
0

1

Migrants

13

Torrey Pines
State Park

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-10-18-040000/uscustoms-and-border-protection-cbp-agents-disrupt

2/8/2011

1

Migrants

17

Camp
Pendleton

San diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-02-08-050000/borderpatrol-disrupts-maritime-smuggling-attempts

2/14/2011

1

Migrants

18

San Onofre
State Park

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-02-14-050000/cbp-usborder-patrol-stops-north-county-maritime

206

Pendleton
Beach

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-02-23-050000/cbp-usborder-patrol-stops-maritime-smuggling-attempt

Del Mar
beach

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-03-01-050000/borderpatrol-nets-boatload-drugs-north-county

6

Black's Beach

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-04-07-040000/sandiego-maritime-unified-command-foils-several

Migrants

15

Solana Beach

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-04-07-040000/sandiego-maritime-unified-command-foils-several

1

Marijuana

740

Dana Point

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-04-07-040000/sandiego-maritime-unified-command-foils-several

4/4/2011

1

Migrants

4

Shelter Island

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-04-07-040000/sandiego-maritime-unified-command-foils-several

4/5/2011

1

Migrants

16

La Jolla, 20
miles west

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-04-07-040000/sandiego-maritime-unified-command-foils-several

6/13/2011

1

Marijuana

1543.04

Near Camp
Pendleton

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-06-13-040000/agentsstop-925k-marijuana-calif-maritime-smuggling

8/12/2011

1

Marijuana

741

Near Camp
Pendleton

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-08-12040000/maritime-law-enforcement-partners-foil-drug-smuggling

2/23/2011

1

Migrants

11

3/1/2011

1

Marijuana

399

4/1/2011

1

Migrants

4/4/2011

1

4/4/2011

11/15/201
1

1

Marijuana

6/13/2012

1

Marijuana

7/12/2012

1

Migrants

7/15/2012

1

7/16/2012

Carlsbad State
Beach

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-11-15-050000/usborder-patrol-agents-thwart-maritime-drug

Deer Creek
Beach

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-06-13-040000/usborder-patrol-agents-seize-24m-narcotics-land-and

6

Point Loma

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-07-17040000/multiple-dhs-agencies-san-diego-collaborate-intercept

Migrants

21

Torrey Pines
State Park

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-07-17040000/multiple-dhs-agencies-san-diego-collaborate-intercept

migrants

1

Imperial
Beach

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-07-16-040000/usborder-patrol-agents-intercept-maritime-smuggling

1460

4087 pounds

207

8/14/2012

1

Migrants

15

Ocean Beach

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-08-14-040000/usborder-patrol-agents-arrest-15-failed-maritime

9/4/2012

1

Migrants

12

Oceanside
Harbor

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-09-04-040000/usborder-patrol-agents-arrest-12-mexican-nationals

2/5/2013

1

Marijuana

1196.8 pounds

Crystal Cove
State Park

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2013-02-05-050000/usborder-patrol-prevents-two-drug-smuggling-attempts

2/12/2013

1

Marijuana

2938 pounds

Ponto State
Beach

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2013-02-12-050000/usborder-patrol-agents-seize-more-4-million-worth

6/13/2013

1

Migrants

8/7/2013

1

Marijuana

11/14/201
3

1

Marijuana

11/22/201
3

4

Marijuana

12/20/201
3

1

Marijuana

2/24/2014

1

Methamphe
tamine-

5/2/2014

1

Migrants

208

6/13/2014

2

Marijuana

8/27/2014

1

Migrants

Newport
Beach

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2013-06-13-040000/usborder-patrol-agents-thwart-smuggling-attempts

La Jolla

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2013-08-07-040000/cbpstops-panga-more-4-million-marijuana-california

878

Del Mar

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2013-11-14-000000/cbpsan-diego-stop-maritime-drug-smuggling-event

297

Imperial
Beach

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2013-11-22-000000/cbpstops-several-kayaks-california-coast-loaded

1500 pounds

95 miles SW
of SD

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2013-12-20-000000/cbpand-coast-guard-stop-1500-pound-marijuana

540.5 pounds

Oceanside
Harbor

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-02-24-000000/cbpmarine-interdiction-agents-stop-boat-oceanside

Imperial
Beach

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-05-02-000000/illegalaliens-rescued-open-water-after-abandoned-jet

International
waters- 160
miles SW of
SD

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-06-13-000000/cbpand-uscg-net-more-ton-marijuana-southern

Del Mar

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-08-27-000000/cbpoffice-air-and-marine-nets-20-illegal-aliens

20

38 bales

2

130 bales

20

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-09-26-000000/cbpsan-diego-nets-15-illegal-aliens-southern

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2015-02-09-000000/fourillegal-aliens-jet-skis-intercepted

Windandsea
beach

San diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-06-02-040000/boat14-million-marijuana-nabbed-us-border-patrol

Tijuana River

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-02-08-050000/borderpatrol-disrupts-maritime-smuggling-attempts

n/a

Ponto Beach

San Diego

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-05-02-040000/federalagents-thwart-maritime-alien-smuggling

2357 pounds

Catalina
Island

San Diego, Long
Beach, Los
Angeles

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-08-24-040000/sevencharged-after-cbp-stops-attempt-smuggle-more

Santa Catalina
Island

San Diego, Long
Beach, Los
Angeles

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-05-20-000000/agentsfoil-human-smuggling-event-near-catalina

Santa Catalina
Island

San Diego, Long
Beach, Los
Angeles

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2015-01-19-000000/cbphelicopter-deploys-warning-shots-stop-panga-boat

Calafia State
Beach

San Diego, Los
Angeles, Long
Beach

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-02-01-050000/usborder-patrol-foils-maritime-smuggling-attempt

9/24/2014

1

Migrants

15

2/9/2015

2

Migrants

4

6/2/2010

1

Marijuana

2/8/2011

1

Migrants

5/2/2011

1

Migrants

8/24/2012

5/20/2014

1/19/2015

2/1/2011

1

1

1

1

Marijuana

N/a

14

Migrants

Marijuana

Migrants

17

n/a

8

Mission
Beach, CA
Coronado
Silver Strand
State Beach

209

Torrey Pines
State Park

San Digo

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2009-08-10-040000/22mexican-nationals-boat-nabbed-san-diego-coast

339.5

dorado pr

San Juan

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-05-07-040000/cbigccsf-law-enforcement-authorities-seize-154-kilos

Marijuana

3912

n/a

San Juan

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-04-02-000000/cbphsi-seize-3912-pounds-cocaine-north-coast-puerto

1

Marijuana

3373

n/a

San Juan

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-04-04-000000/cbphsi-seize-428-million-cocaine-shipment-southern

1

Marijuana

132

Bellingham
WA

seattle, Tacoma

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2009-08-22-040000/cbpmarine-unit-halts-smuggling-attempt-canadians

8/10/2009

1

Migrants

5/7/2012

1

cocaine

4/2/2014

1

4/14/2014

8/22/2009

22

210

211

Appendix C- Vessel calls
Developed from U.S. Maritime Administration statistics on vessel calls at U.S. seaports
(MARAD 2013)
Figure 7: Vessel calls by port and type of vessel
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213

214

215

216

217
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Appendix D: Seaport study sample
Developed from 2013 NAFTA Regional Container Traffic Survey
Table 12: Seaport study sample (AAPA 2013)
Port (State/Province)
Container Traffic 2013
Los Angeles/Long Beach
14,599,145
New York/New Jersey
5,467,345
Savannah
3,034,010
Oakland
2,346,460
Hampton Roads
2,223,532
Houston
1,950,071
Tacoma
1,886,678
Charleston
1,601,366
Seattle
1,574,994
San Juan (Fiscal Year)
1,269,902
Honolulu (Fiscal Year)
1,078,341
Port Everglades (Fiscal Year)
927,544
Jacksonville (Fiscal Year)
926,810
Miami (Fiscal Year)
901,454
Anchorage
705,230
Baltimore
705,230
New Orleans
451,058
Philadelphia
367,499
Wilmington (DE)
329,200
Wilmington (NC)
260,363
Palm Beach (Fiscal Year)
254,664
Mobile
224,614
Gulfport
209,665
Boston
195,303
Portland (OR)
178,451
Apra (Guam)
169,816
Freeport
107,394
Hueneme
99,334
San Diego
98,651
Kahului (Fiscal Year)
82,785
Top 30 ports capture 99.3% of
total U.S. container traffic

44,226,909

2013 Total U.S. Container
traffic

44,532,000
219

Appendix E: Seaport Vulnerability Framework Dataset (10 most vulnerable ports)
Table 13: Seaport Vulnerability Framework Dataset (10 most vulnerable ports)
SVF Data
Port Security
Open structure (Google Maps)
Spatial Concentration of CRAVED goods
Matrix
Container
Dollars
285327103/1459 Both ports features multiple access points CES location is within 5 minutes of the Port of
LA/LB
9155= $19.54
for multiple terminals, and port
LA/Long Beach within 3 miles
per 2013
warehouse areas
(http://www.pricetransfer.com/centralizedcontainer
(GoogleMaps)
examination-station.html)

220

NY/NJ

292384478/5,52
9,908 = $52.87
per 2013
container

a) multiple entrances. Some terminals are
essentially open access, such as PNCT
GoogleMaps)
b) major roads are near almost every
terminal- i.e. the I-95 borders the three
major terminals in Elizabeth and Jersey
City
c)every terminal has an open container
yards -physical observation of the Port of
NY/NJ, 4 separate trips as part of
WCNYH work

a) Four CES centralized CES locations at the
port that handle high value cargo.
B) Several CES locations are within the port
C) numerous warehouse companies in the port
region house high value goods
http://www.panynj.gov/port/centralizedexamination-stations.html
within 3 miles

Hampton
RoadsNorfolk

52466462/22235
32 = $23.59 per
2013 container

Multiple entry/exit points in both Norfolk
International Terminals and Newport
News Marine Terminal (GoogleMaps)

Charleston

55829741/16013
66= $34.86

Port of Charleston is composed of 5
terminals (Wando Welch, North
Charleston, Columbus Street, Union Pier,
and Veterans) , within one mile of large
public access highways, and with the
container serving terminals with open

The Newport News Marine Terminal facility is a
U.S. Customs-designated port of entry, and the
full range of customs functions is available to
customers, including bonded storage areas.
(http://www.portofvirginia.com/facilities/newpo
rt-news-marine-terminal-nnmt/)
CES location is not on the port. High value
goods may be stored at warehouses on the port
(http://www.port-ofcharleston.com/Cargo/Logistics/WarehouseData
basePDF.pdf)

Peripheral companies
(forwarders.com)
694 forwarders in LA/Long
Beach area= 7,868,582 (LA
2013) + 6,730,573 (Long
Beach 2013)= 14599155
694/14599155 X 10000=
.47
Forwarders
487 forwarders listed in
NY
135 in NJ.
622 total
460,825 Avg. TEUs per
month
NYNJ score for freight
forwarders= 13.49
149 drayage companies
servicing NYNJ
NYNJ score for drayage
companies= 3.23
(16/185294) X 10000= .8

87/133447 X 10000= 6.5

San Juan

25971259/12699
02= $20.45 per
2013 container

221

Port
Everglades

26073293/92754
4= $28.11 per
2013 container

Miami

42410430/90921
7= $46.64 per
2013 container

Baltimore

47131517/67785
6= $69.53 per
2013 container

yards. (http://www.port-ofcharleston.com/Cargo/Facilities/charlesto
n/terminals/terminals.asp
Five of the Port of San Juan's eight cargo
terminals are located in the Puerto Nuevo
district, and three are located in the
Guaynabo municipality. (GoogleMaps)
To reach the five terminals at Puerto
Nuevo there are multiple entry points,
with a main entrance and at least two
other side entrance. A major expressway
JFK 2 is directly adjacent to the port.
The main terminal Port Everglades
Terminal has one entrance.
The two smaller terminals including Holt
breakbulk terminal have multiple entry
/exit points directly into Ft. Lauderdale
(GoogleMaps)
http://www.hostterminals.com/port/porteverglades-dry-bulk-yachts-projectcontainerized-cargo-shipping-fortlauderdale-fl/
http://www.fitpev.com/aboutus.php
PortMiami is located on an island, with
one primary overland entrance. Recently a
tunnel was built but is heavily monitored
with CCTV. (GoogleMaps)
http://www.shiplilly.com/whitepapers/PortMiami-Tunnel-The-NewStandard-in-TransportationInfrastructure.pdf)
1a) Multiple entry/exit points due to
multi-terminal set up throughput the
Baltimore harbor 1b) ports are near
multiple public access roads including I95 c) containers at Dundalk and SeaGirt
terminals 1c) containers out in the open
(GoogleMaps)

ATS Logistics. is the CES located 14 miles from
the port
http://scbiznews.com/news/automotive/48702
N/A

CES station is located with IWS 3400
Macintosh street directly near the port within 3
miles

46/105285 X 10000=4.36

697/ 77295 X 10000= 90

CES Location at the port within 3 miles
http://www.cipsmiami.com
1500 Port Blvd
Miami, FL 33132

697 forwarders/75768 avg.
monthly teu X 10,000=91

The Port of Baltimore has a CES location
operated by a private warehousing firms, Banks,
within 3 miles of the main container terminal
http://beltslogistics.com/warehouse%20locations
.htm

92/56488 X 10000=39

New Orleans

135445306/451,
058 = $300.28

Apra

8292047/169816
= $48.82 per
2013 container

SVF Data Matrix
LA/LB

1) Primary section has numerous entry
exist points along the Clarence Henry
Truckway, with numerous unguarded
entry points along the railway entrances
along the wharfs.
Port of NOLA is OPEN STRUCTURE
(GoogleMaps)
Only container terminal has one access
road in. Containers are kept in open
access yard.
(GoogleMaps)

There is one CES facility directly located on the
seaport facility at Napoleon Avenue

54 forwarders/ 299869 X
10^3= 1.8

No public record of a CES. In the 2012 Annual
Plan a Customs Inspection Station is noted as
something that would be ideal for future
construction. However as Apra is the only
container port in the territory it likely does
contain a variety of valuable CRAVED products
due to lack of space elsewhere on the island for
storage.

19/14151 X 10000=13
http://www.cargoyellowpa
ges.com/guam_freight_for
warders_cargo_agents.html

Truck traffic

Intermodal connections

SCP techniques

Throughput

22,466 daily truck trips/ 39997=
56.7http://www.polb.com/econo
mics/stats/yearly_teus.asp;
http://www.portoflosangeles.org/
maritime/stats.asp;
http://www.polb.com/civica/file
bank/blobdload.asp?BlobID=337
1

a) Multiple railway connections,
through on-dock rail, and the
Intermodal Container Transfer
Facility (ICTF) (Near-dock)
b) Half of TEUs are moved by
rail, due to heavy hinterland
movement of cargo
c) Burbank Airport, LAX
d) and a heavy short haul
trucking presence (56.7)
http://www.portoflosangeles.org/
facilities/rail_intermodal_yards.a
sp
http://www.polb100.com/publica
tions/railguide/index.html

Target Hardening: yes
Access Control: yes TWIC
Screen exits: no
Extend guardianship: no
Natural Surveillance: yes
Reduce anonymity: yes
Use of place managers: no
Formal surveillance: yes
Conceal targets: yes
Remove targets: yes

14599155

222

Port of LA-Implements the security
infrastructure plan to guide the development
and integration of security systems
throughout the port, including waterside
surveillance, closed-circuit television and
camera systems, radar and sonar sensors,
geographic information systems, accesscontrol card readers, and coordinates the

AAPA 2013
NAFTA Regional
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NY/NJ

Drayage sector
16000 estimated truck drivers
enter the PNYNJ
Avg. Daily TEU (2012)= 15,150
NYNJ score for drayage
drivers= 105
(PANYNJ 2012; PANYNJ 2014
B; PANYNJ 2014 C)
http://www.panynj.gov/pressroom/pressitem.cfm?headLine_id=1640
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Hampton RoadsNorfolk

4000/6091 X 100= 65
http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinep
ubs/sr/sr298bronzini.pdf
SPECIAL REPORT 298:

a)3 railroads service PNYNJ
b)2012 railway lifts= 433,481
(7.8% of all import/export
TEUs); excising empty
containers the total railway lifts
is 10.09%
c) Three major international
airports (LaGuardia, JFK,
Newark)
d) Large trucking industry
confirmed
http://www.panynj.gov/port/inter
modal-rail.cfm

a) 2 railway connections,
Norfolk Southern and CSX
b) 28 percent of the cargo
leaving the port does so by rail,
68 percent by truck
and 4 percent by barge

vehicle radio-frequency identification
program.
http://2013.nationaluasi.com/files/pdf/Auto
matic%20License%20Plate%20Reader%20
6.6.13.pdf
https://www.portoflosangeles.org/DOC/DR
AFT%20POLA%20EMAP_July%202014.pdf
https://www.portoflosangeles.org/Board/200
7/October/101807_item1.pdf
(Pate et al. 2008)
Absence of:
(1) Natural Surveillance: (a) adequate
lighting is available for all sections of the
seaport (b) employees who come forward
with information are protected from
retaliation by management and other parties.
(2) Use of place managers: reward programs
for employees
(3) Formal surveillance: CCTV

5,529,908
AAPA 2013
NAFTA Regional
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1) Observation at the port, and case file
evidence of car thefts from the port support
the lack of adequate lighting in all areas of
the port
2) rewards program is through the WCNYH
which is not viewed as a neutral arbiter by
the majority of the labor work force
3) In several instances of vehicle theft from
off of the port, the CCTV was inoperable
and not monitored by the security workforce
(Lantsman 2013)

Target Hardening: yes (seals)
Access Control: yes TWIC
Screen exits: no
Extend guardianship: yes (police tipline)
Natural Surveillance: yes
Reduce anonymity: yes (TWIC)

2223532
AAPA 2013
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DRIVING AND THE BUILT
ENVIRONMENT:
THE EFFECTS OF COMPACT
DEVELOPMENT ON
MOTORIZED TRAVEL,
ENERGY USE, AND CO2
EMISSIONS
Relationships Between Land Use
and Freight and
Commercial Truck Traffic in
Metropolitan Areas
Michael S. Bronzini
George Mason University

c) Norfolk International Airport

10920/ 4387 X 100=248
South Carolina DHEC Draft
Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) for the Proposed Marine
Container Terminal at the
Charleston Naval Complex
Appendix J Existing Roadway
Traffic Study for North
Charleston Study Area, Section.
2005;5:42. [10920 daily trips,
63%trucks(6879)]
http://www.porteis.com/informat
ion/articles/2005_10_16.htm.

a) CSX and Norfolk Southern
both have service to the Port of
Charleston;
b) About 25 percent of
Charleston’s port containers
arrive/depart by rail.
c Large presence of trucks at the
port as evidenced by quantity of
visiting vehicles
http://sccommerce.com/sites/def
ault/files/document_directory/Po
rt_of_Charleston__Container_Movements_and_Tr
affic_Mitigation_Measures_Wil
bur_Smith_Associates_2002.pdf

http://www.vtrans.org/resources/
On-Dock_Rail.pdf
http://operations.usace.army.mil/
nav/11OctWEDA/12_Oct_2011
_Greg_Edwards.pdf

Use of place managers: yes (Police have a
tip line)
Formal surveillance: yes
Conceal targets: yes
Remove targets: yes (bonded warehouses)
http://www.securityinfowatch.com/news/10
554251/va-port-authority-to-impove-cctvaccess-control
http://www.portofvirginia.com/stewardship/
community/virginia-port-authority-policeforce/
(Pate et al. 2008)

Charleston

Svendson et al. (2014)
Assessment of Particulate Matter
Levels in Vulnerable
Communities in North
Charleston, South Carolina prior
to Port Expansion. Environ
Health Insights. 2014; 8: 5–14.

1601366
Target Hardening: yes
Access Control: yes TWIC
Screen exits: yes, random searches (Pate et
al. 2008)
Extend guardianship: yes
Natural Surveillance: yes
Reduce anonymity: yes TWIC
Use of place managers: yes (see Port
security training course on SCPS website)
Formal surveillance: yes
Conceal targets: yes
Remove targets: yes
Identify property: yes
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YMS provides real-time data on the location
of each piece of equipment—where a
chassis is, which box goes on the chassis,
which
boxes are booked to each ship scheduled,
where each box is, and all the data
associated with the movement of that
equipment
Vehicles are randomly inspected to
determine if they have dangerous materials

AAPA 2013
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or unqualified persons. Also, longshoremen
are expected to park in a lot away from the
dock and take buses to their work area (see
more detailed discussion of shuttle buses).
SCPA was awarded over 25 million dollars
for physical security enhancements on the 7
grant rounds. The enhancements include:
Access
Control, Fencing, and Lighting, CCTV, a
Central Monitoring Center and a Marine
Patrol Boat
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/nlssa/portpo
lice.pdf
(Pate et al. 2008)

San Juan

3479
http://www.app.gobierno.pr/wpcontent/uploads/2010/05/Puerto_
Rico_Highway_Transportation_
Authority_Upcoming_P3_Projec
ts.pdf
http://www.marad.dot.gov/docu
ments/Marine_Highway_Corrid
ors13_Sep_10.pdf

No railway connections to the
port. There is an international
airport in San Juan.
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http://www.port-ofcharleston.com/Port_Police_Training/Port_
Police_Training_English/009_background_
cont.htm
Target Hardening: Yes
Access Control: yes- TWIC
Screen exits: no
Extend guardianship: N/A
Natural Surveillance: yes Bright Light
Systems’ recent projects included a retrofit
of 140 x 1,000W high-pressure sodium
fixtures with its BLP1000 LEP high mast
fixture for Horizon Lines at the Port of San
Juan, Puerto Rico. Horizon Lines has
reduced its lighting costs by 50% while
providing a superior quality light for
increased safety and security, says Mr
Chalmers.
http://www.portstrategy.com/news101/portoperations/planning-and-design/nolightbulb-moments
Reduce anonymity: yes- standard practice

1269902
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Use of place managers: yes- standard
practice
Formal surveillance: yes
Conceal targets:yes- standard practice
Remove targets:yes- standard practice
Identify property: yes
https://hbsmicrosites.honeywell.com/NR/rd
onlyres/011C8397-1F08-4C1F-83440415339ECA17/49809/PortofSanJuan.pdf;
http://caribbeanbusinesspr.com/prnt_ed/sanjuan-ports-100-percent-cargo-inspectionsexpensive-with-few-results-7577.html;
FEMA Environmental Assessment
Environmental Assessment
Horizon Monitoring and Surveillance
Facility
Puerto Nuevo Port Complex, San Juan,
Puerto Rico

Port Everglades

2000/2541=78
http://www.dot.state.fl.us/planni
ng/economicstimulus/ellerdrive/
ellerdrive-application.pdf

a) The intermodal center
connecting Florida east Coast
Railway was only completed
July 2014 and has yet to take a
significant portion of containers
b) n/a
c) Ft. Lauderdale International
Airport is in the port district
d) high presence of trucking at
the port
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http://www.porteverglades.net/e
xpansion/ship-to-rail/

(Pate et al. 2008)
Target Hardening: yes- standard practice
Access Control: yes TWIC
Screen exits: yes
http://www.porteverglades.net/aboutus/security/
Extend guardianship: no
Natural Surveillance:
yes.http://www.porteverglades.net/aboutus/security/
Reduce anonymity: yes TWIC
Use of place managers: NO
Formal surveillance: yeshttp://www.porteverglades.net/aboutus/security/
Conceal targets: yes- standard practice
Remove targets: yes- standard practice
Identify property: yes- standard practice

927544
AAPA 2013
NAFTA Regional
Container Survey

Miami

4,480 trucks daily/2491=179
http://www.portofmiamitunnel.c
om/project-overview/projectoverview-1/
High level of truck traffic
because PortMiami does not
have a fully functioning rail
connection yet.

PM is currently in the process of
developing a railway access to
the mainland. It will be one line,
the Florida East Coast railway.
http://www.miamidade.gov/port
miami/images/aerial-intermodalrail-map.pdf
http://www.miamidade.gov/port
miami/rail-restoration.asp

FEMA Environmental Assessment
Target Hardening: yes
Access Control: yes
http://www.miamidade.gov/portmiami/idcards.asp
Screen exits: no- because of heavy cruise
ship use of the port there are many more
daily private vehicle entries and no exit
searches
Extend guardianship: yes through Americas
Waterways Watch program
Natural Surveillance: yes
http://www.aimu.org/Port/miami2013.pdf
Reduce anonymity: no- many private
vehicles enter and exit port for cruise ship
boarding despite PORT SECURITY
STANDARDS - COMPLIANCE
PLAN F.S. 311.12 (2001)
Use of place managers: no
Formal surveillance:yes
http://www.miamidade.gov/portmiami/secur
ity-enhancements.asp
Conceal targets: yes
Remove targets: n/a. no warehousing on
port
Identify property: yes
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At the Port of Miami, officials reported on a
very useful awareness-raising program
called America’s Waterway Watch (AWW).
AWW is a combined effort of the Coast
Guard and its Reserve and Auxiliary
components, enlisting the active
participation of those who live,
work or play around America's waterfront
areas. Coast Guard Reserve personnel
concentrate on connecting with businesses
and government agencies, while Auxiliarists

909,217
AAPA 2013
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focus on building AWW awareness among
the recreational boating public. AWW is a
nationwide initiative similar to the wellknown and successful Neighborhood Watch
program that asks community
members to report suspicious activities to
local law enforcement agencies. AWW is a
public outreach program, encouraging
participants to simply report suspicious
activity to the Coast Guard (Pate et al 2008)
In Miami, fencing has been added to
separate cruise terminals from cargo
areas(Pate et al 2008)
In Miami, upon the arrival or departure of a
cruise ship, Metro-Dade Police officers
conduct a thorough search of the cruise
terminal and turn it over to private security
during the boarding process. In accordance
with Florida law, sworn officers maintain
perimeter security.
All provisions are scanned for explosives.
Also, Metro-Dade officers have intensified
their random patrols throughout the port,
have added more check points, and have
also intensified their attention to the entry
gates and beneath the bridge leading to the
port

Baltimore

2000/1857= 107
3,000 average daily/ 1857=161
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10,000 truck vehicles average
daily/1857 (avg, daily
containers)= 538

Multiple (2) Railway
connections ( CSV and Norfolk
Southern connections), and
between 10 and 25% of cargo is
moved by rail, BWI airport is
within the region
http://www.cbre.us/o/baltimore/t
eams/industrial-specialty-

(Pate et al. 2008)
Target Hardening: yes
Access Control: yes
Screen exits: yes
Extend guardianship: yes
Natural Surveillance: yes
Reduce anonymity: yes
Use of place managers: yes
Formal surveillance: yes
Conceal targets: yes

677856
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New Orleans

http://www.cbre.us/o/baltimore/t
eams/industrial-specialtycommercial-realestate/Pages/transportation.aspx;
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/
2011-07-17/news/bs-md-dirtytrucks-20110717_1_dirty-trucksnew-trucks-air-quality
2132/ 821 TEUs per day (2012)=
259 . Overvalued due to weight
of vast amount of bulk cargo
that comes in which requires
substantial truck movements for
the size of the port.
http://portno.com/trucks

commercial-realestate/Pages/transportation.aspx

Remove targets: yes
Identify property: yes
http://www.gohs.maryland.gov/trans_securit
y_accomplishments.html
(Pate et al. 2008)

a)
http://portsoflouisiana.org/docu
ments/port_profiles/NewOrleans
.pdf
b) 10,000 TEUs yearly ( 2007
estimate)/ 258,000 TEUs
(2007)= 3.8% of containers are
transported via rail

Access Control: yes
Screen exits: no evidence
Extend guardianship: no evidence
Natural Surveillance: yes
Reduce anonymity: yes
Use of place managers: yes (HPD Training
includes annual certifications:
http://0192200.netsolhost.com/HPD/Acaddi
v.htm)
Formal surveillance: yes
(http://portno.com/construction-projects)
Conceal targets: yes
Remove targets: yes
Identify property: yes

451,058
AAPA 2013
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http://portno.com/construction-projects
http://0192200.netsolhost.com/HPD/Acaddi
v.htm

Apra

N/A

No railway connection, but there
is an international airport in
Guam
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(Pate et al. 2008)
Target Hardening: yes- standard practice
Access Control: yes- security access gates
Screen exits: no
Extend guardianship: no evidence of this in
the public record
Natural Surveillance: no - See Annual 2013
Port report "The entire facility must have
lighting, to serve as a deterrent, improve
visibility of cameras, and aid security
officers. Lighting should be installed around
the exterior perimeter, interior perimeters,
and within the facility

169816
AAPA 2013
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Reduce anonymity: yes TWIC
Use of place managers: - no evidence in
public record
Formal surveillance: - no Port Annual
Report 2013 "The Port has video cameras
installed throughout the terminal facilities,
and they are not
maintained. Additionally, the existing
camera system does not provide complete
coverage of the terminal.
Conceal targets: yes- standard practice
Remove targets: yes- standard practice
Identify property: yes- standard practice
http://www.portguam.com/docs/newsreleases/2013/master-plan-update-2013.pdf

SVF Data
Matrix
LA/LB

Container
Vessel Calls
59% of all
vessels called
are container
vessels
(MARAD)
2013 Vessel
Calls in U.S.
Ports
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Interagency Cooperation
In Long Beach, the police department has
established a Harbor Unit that works closely
with non-commissioned security personnel
from the port. In Los Angeles, the Port Dive
Operations Group (PDOG), made up of
certified divers from the Coast Guard, the
FBI, the Los Angeles Port Police, the Los
Angeles Fire Department, the Los Angeles
Sheriff’s Office, and the Long Beach Fire
Department, is available to respond to critical
incidents. In addition, the group meets
quarterly to discuss training and operational
issues. And the Sea Marshals Unit at the Port
of Los Angeles (comprised of divers from the
Coast Guard and the Los Angeles Port Police)

Illicit import/export market
2003-2008 NICB Average 35.27%.
Seaports are already above the overall
average of 33.76%
Port NICB Average 20032008=37.41%
2003-2008 NCIC Average .87%
Seaports are above overall average
.65%
Port NCIC Average 20032008=.0.92%
Between March 2013 - March 2015
there have been 158 incidents of cargo
theft in the LA/LB hinterland area
defined as a 75 mile radius from the
ports.

Sectors with history of
criminal involvement
No documented records in
Lexis-Nexis
No cases in CBP media release
No cases in ICE news release

conducts joint dive operations to protect ships
in transit and inspect critical infrastructure.
Area Maritime Security Committee:
Broad Representation of Public & Private Port
Partners
Develop Area Maritime Security Plan
Conduct Security Exercises
Implement Port Risk Management &
Mitigation Plan
Vet Annual Port Security Grant
Applications
(Pate et al. 2008);
http://2013.nationaluasi.com/files/pdf/Securin
g%20the%20Largest%20Port%20Complex%2
0in%20the%20Nation%206.4.13.pdf;
http://polb.granicus.com/DocumentViewer.ph
p?file=polb_1af5da4d3d37131270ec31cb4f7c
620f.pdf;

Freight Watch International Route
Analysis March 2013-2015

Both ports are in an HIDTA county
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/d
mas/Los_Angeles_DMA-2011(U).pdf
Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP). (2015) High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
Program Counties 2015
In fiscal year 2011, CBP at Los
Angeles/Long Beach Seaport seized
61 vehicles and 49 engines heading
overseas. Of that total: 24 were stolen,
73 were undeclared, seven were
undervalued and six had fraudulent
documents. Total value of fiscal year
2011 seizures is $1.8 million.
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/08
/business/la-fi-port-smuggling20110408;
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2012-11-13050000/cbp-intercepts-144-tonsstolen-copper-headed-asia;
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/fed
eral-jury-convicts-los-angelesbusinessman-and-his-firm-role-majorcustoms-fraud;
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http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2012-04-03040000/cbp-officers-recover-20stolen-high-end-vehicles

NY/NJ

41% of all
vessels called
are container
vessels
(MARAD)
2013 Vessel
Calls in U.S.
Ports

New York / New Jersey Area Maritime
Security Committee;
Among many initiatives, the port authority
leads the area maritime security committee
effort in the development and implementation
of a port-wide risk management plan. This
plan focused on heightened collaboration,
particularly in interagency communications,
maritime domain awareness, waterborne risks,
resiliency and intelligence sharing.
The Port Authority also increased information
sharing on an international level through an
initiative to exchange ideas and enrich
relationships with foreign ports on security
and emergency management issues; some of
these relationships have matured into formal
sister port agreements.
http://coastguard.dodlive.mil/2014/10/securin
g-the-global-supply-chain/
https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg544/docs/AM
SC%20Report%2020DEC13.pdf
http://www.marinelink.com/news/homelandsecurity309891
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Hampton
Roads-Norfolk

52% of all
vessels called

a1)According to the National Drug
Threat Survey in 2013 45% of law
enforcement agencies in New York
and New Jersey report a high
availability of heroine; 27% report
cocaine availability; 0% report
methamphetamine availability; 72%
controlled prescription drugs
Furthermore DEA STRIDE statistics
for NY show 1122 seizures of cocaine
in 2007 with an average weight of
1.985 kilograms
2003-2008 NICB Average 35.27%.
Seaports are already above the overall
average of 33.76%
Port NICB Average 20032008=34.03%
2003-2008 NCIC Average .87%
Seaports are above overall average
.65%
Port NCIC Average 2003-2008=. 88%

a) A variety organized criminal
groups operate in the NY/NJ
area, including Italian
American groups, West Africa
DTOs, Caribbean DTOs,
Russian organized crime and
Balkan organized crime groups.
The longshore labor force
traditionally has been the
purview of Italian American
organized crime groups from
the five families. While the
labor force has declined in
recent years the longitudinal
control of the labor force
particularly for hiring
longshoreman for certain shifts
has continued.
(3) This level of influence has
been present for decades up
until the present.
See Port of NY/NJ for case
study and documented evidence

166 incidents Freight Watch
International Route Analysis March
2013-2015

Cooperation is significantly higher between
the Waterfront Commission and other relevant
port security agencies at the PNYNJ,
following 2009 WCNYH Executive Director,
9/28/2012

Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP). (2015) High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
Program Counties 2015

The MIRT is the first organization of its kind
in the United States, and unique to any port.
The concept of a coordinated maritime

Late Sunday night, special agents and
officers with U.S. Immigration and

No documented records in
Lexis-Nexis
No cases in CBP media release

are container
vessels
(MARAD)
2013 Vessel
Calls in U.S.
Ports

response team originated in 1984 when Bill
Burket, now MIRT Director, attended a Coast
Guard hosted Train-the-Trainer course for
marine fire fighting. Up to this point,
Hampton Roads had never seen a
collaborative response team capable of
responding to a fire or hazardous materials
release in a port environment. Combining
efforts with the Virginia Maritime
Association, Coast Guard Sector Hampton
Roads (then MSO Hampton Roads), and the
Navy Fire Fighting School, the Maritime
Incident Response Team was established.
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Virginia, the Joint Harbor Operations Center
involves representatives of the Coast Guard
and the Navy co-locating in one Coast Guard
facility, sharing intelligence information and
coordinating operations. Focus is on Naval
personnel but officers keep watch over ports,
roads, and rail in the port district.
Law enforcement services are provided by the
Virginia Port Authority Police Department.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's
(ICE) Homeland Security Investigations
(HSI), U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG),
Virginia Port Authority, and other federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies
today announced the launch of the Hampton
Roads Border Enforcement Security Task
Force (BEST), which is dedicated to security
at the Port of Virginia.
The Hampton Roads BEST is comprised of
officers and agents from 10 federal, state and
local agencies — responsible for identifying,
interdicting and investigating a wide variety of
maritime-related crime including trade fraud,
cargo theft, and the illegal smuggling of

Customs Enforcement's (ICE)
Homeland Security Investigations
(HSI), U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), the U.S. Coast
Guard's Investigative Service,
Chesapeake Region – all members of
the Hampton Roads BEST, boarded
the vessel, which originated from
Asia.
During the search, special agents and
officers discovered approximately the
two kilograms of cocaine and two
kilograms of heroin concealed within
the ceiling of a common lavatory.
The narcotics were seized by CBP. No
arrests have been made and no crew
members are suspected of being
involved. The investigation, which is
being conducted by BEST, is ongoing.
In the two weeks prior, BEST seized
approximately 35 kilograms of cocaine
at the Port of Norfolk in separate drug
smuggling ventures. On July 27, the
task force seized 32 kilograms of
cocaine off of a vessel arriving into the
Port of Norfolk. On Aug. 4, the task
force seized three kilograms of
cocaine from a container vessel that
was due into Hampton Roads.
April 2011 The first early success of
the BEST came in April 2011 with the
seizure of 55 kilograms of cocaine
found in a vessel that transited the
Panama Canal and docked at the Port
of Virginia.

No cases in ICE news release

drugs, persons, currency and weapons
smuggling.
In 2010 the Virginia Port Authority police cut
it's workforce to move from sworn law
enforcement police officers towards a
majority of contract non-sworn officers.
The port region also has a highly collaborative
AMSC.
http://samehr.com/images/downloads/Presenta
tions/coast_guard_hampton_roads.pdf
http://www.portofvirginia.com/stewardship/m
aritime-incident-response/;
http://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/824
66-virginia-port-authority-doing-away-withmost-of-police-force
http://dls.virginia.gov/GROUPS/ports/MEETI
NGS/092408/USCG.pdf
Charleston

64% of all
vessels called
are container
vessels
(MARAD)
2013 Vessel
Calls in U.S.
Ports
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The Port of Charleston has the Charleston
Harbor Operation Center (CHOC), commonly
known as Project SeaHawk. SeaHawk is a
multi-million–dollar, multi-agency,
coordinated pilot effort, under the auspices of
the U.S. Attorney. The purpose of SeaHawk is
to create a unified law enforcement and
intelligence operation to deter and prevent acts
of terrorism. This includes managing a joint
operations center to track maritime and other
transportation operations in the Port of
Charleston, establishing an interoperable
system for data sharing and intelligence
gathering, and providing a test bed for
innovative concepts, initiatives, and
equipment related to port security. All
SeaHawk members meet daily to allocate
resources to the most appropriate assignments.
An intelligence unit combines intermodal
transportation and harbor security data—

Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP). (2015) High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
Program Counties 2015
2 incidents of cargo theft March 20132015
Freight Watch International Route
Analysis March 2013-2015
2003-2008 NICB Average 35.27%.
Seaports are already above the overall
average of 33.76%
Port NICB Average 20032008=43.13%
2003-2008 NCIC Average .87%
Seaports are above overall average
.65%
Port NCIC Average 2003-2008= 1.1%
Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP). (2015) High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
Program Counties 2015
In 2005 border agents seized 2,038
pounds of illegal drugs at the Port of
Charleston. In 2006, the figure
dropped to 629 pounds. In 2007, it was
down to 1 pound, according to the S.C.
office of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection. (2007).
Mexican criminal groups smuggle
marijuana into South Carolina from
Mexico through the Southwest Border
area, using the interstate highway
system, mostly in private vehicles.
Interstate 40 is a major transit route for
Mexico-produced marijuana destined

No documented records in
Lexis-Nexis
No cases in CBP media release
No cases in ICE news release

including video camera feeds, radar, and
thermal imaging—along with information
about crews and cargo, to assess potential
threats. A marine unit is involved with
escorting vessels, providing security training,
reaching out to community members, and
boarding suspicious vessels.
The Port of Charleston has developed its Port
Emergency Information Center for collecting
and distributing information to port
stakeholders concerning status of emergencies
and what is required to reopen the shipping
channel. The Port of Charleston has a Port
Operations Emergency Center for working
with affected agencies to coordinate responses
to emergencies. The Port has also developed a
Marine Fire Fighting Protocol to train local
fire fighters on how to fight fires on the
waterfront.
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Charleston AMSC. This AMSC was created
by building up the Maritime Association of
the Port of Charleston, a trade association
created to promote the interests of the Port of
Charleston in 1926. The Captain of the Port
turned to this group to serve as the core of the
AMSC. Officials of the Coast Guard and other
federal and local agencies have joined the
association and use the regular meetings as
one way of sharing information with
stakeholders.
An important aspect of this particular AMSC
is that it has a separate intelligence
subcommittee made up of members who have
security clearances.
Charleston has Project Seahawk, which has
an intelligence unit that builds awareness of
threats to the port.All SeaHawk members

for South Carolina. Local distributors
also transport Mexico-produced and
Caribbean-produced marijuana into
South Carolina from Atlanta via
Interstates 85 and 20, and from Florida
via the I-95 corridor.
4 incidents of cargo theft
Freight Watch International Route
Analysis March 2013-2015
2003-2008 NICB Average 35.27%.
Seaports are already above the overall
average of 33.76%
Port NICB Average 20032008=29.24%
2003-2008 NCIC Average .87%
Seaports are above overall average
.65%
Port NCIC Average 2003-2008=
1.28%
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2010-06-12040000/cbp-and-uscg-interceptstowaways-charleston;
http://www.thestate.com/2007/04/15/3
6265/drug-trafficking-scs-mexicanconnection.html#storylink=cpy

meet daily to allocate resources to the most
appropriate assignments. An intelligence unit
combines intermodal transportation and
harbor security data— including video camera
feeds, radar, and thermal imaging—along with
information about crews and cargo, to assess
potential threats. A marine unit is involved
with escorting vessels, providing security
training, reaching out to community members,
and boarding suspicious vessels.
Law enforcement is provided by the South
Carolina Ports Authority Police Department.
Terminal leasees can hire their own private
security guards. The Port of Charleston is also
the location for Operation Seahawk, a
partnership of 47 federal, state, and local
agencies under the leadership of the U.S.
Attorney, which has received significant
funding to conduct joint anti-terrorism efforts.
(Pate et al. 2008)
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06933t.pdf
http://proceedings.ndia.org/7490/Beeson.pdf

San Juan

40% of all
vessels called
are container
vessels
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http://ocean.floridamarine.org/acp/chacp/Docu
ments/ACP/Charleston_ACP_Jan_2011_Revi
sion.pdf
The Coast Guard recognizes that providing
maritime security in the Caribbean region
requires the close coordination of area
responders. The scenario involved in this fullscale exercise will challenge participants to
make difficult decisions, carry out essential
functions and maintain a common operating
picture during a port security incident.
Interagency coordination and communication
will play key roles in the exercise’s success,

Law enforcement reporting, seizure
data, and price information all indicate
high levels of cocaine availability in
the region.19 The DEA San Juan
District Office reports that problems
attendant to high levels of cocaine
availability and trafficking include
violence, crime, and murder.
The PR/USVI HIDTA region is
located along established drug

October 2013 ten longshoremen
and the co-owner of a freight
forwarding company were
indicted for drug trafficking
through the Port of San Juan
over the course of several
years.
https://www.justice.gov/archive
/ndic/pubs27/27510/finance.ht
m

as well as enhance readiness for future
incidents.
Participating agencies and industry
organizations will include Department of
Homeland Security, Coast Guard Sector San
Juan, Coast Guard Atlantic Strike Team,
Federal Bureau of Investigations, Federal
Emergency Management Agency, Customs
and Border Protection, Puerto Rico National
Guard 22nd Civil Support Team, Puerto Rico
Center for Disease Control San Juan Station,
Transportation Security Administration,
Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands Area
Maritime Security Committee, US Virgin
Islands Territorial Emergency Management
Agency Fusion Center, North and South Coast
Harbor Safety and Security Committees,
Salvation Army, Puerto Rico Ports Authority,
Municipality of Ponce, Ponce Police
Department, Puerto Rico Fire Department,
Puerto Rico State Emergency and Disaster
Management Agency, Ponce Office of
Emergency Management, Luis Ayala Colon
Inc., Total Petroleum, Puma Energy, Sea Star,
Horizon Lines, Inc. and BT Asphalt.
There are significant law enforcement effort
ongoing in PR to deal with smuggling and
trafficking. These include:
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The Caribbean Air and Marine Branch
(CAMB) —
A combination of six aviation assets and 10
midnight express interceptors (law
enforcement fast boats) used to combat drug
smuggling in the field.
In Fiscal Year 2011, CAMB seized 10,250
pounds of narcotics and $2.1 million in
currency.

trafficking routes in the eastern
Caribbean between South America and
the CONUS. Most of the cocaine
smuggled into the HIDTA continues to
be transported from South America via
cargo in maritime vessels or by courier
aboard commercial aircraft into the
Dominican Republic.72 Dominican
DTOs, under the ultimate operational
control of Colombian DTOs,
coordinate drug shipments from the
Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico
using privately owned boats, such as
yolas, yachts, and other vessels longer
than 30 feet equipped with hidden
compartments, and noncommercial
aircraft.
Working jointly with the U.S. Coast
Guard and U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, HSI closed the fiscal year
with an unprecedented number of
seizures, including 21,831 pounds of
narcotics and 37,958 illegal weapons
and ammunition. This represents a two
percent increase in narcotics seizures
and a 118 percent increase in illegal
weapons and ammunition seizures
compared to the previous fiscal year.
The federal agencies seized 13,992
pounds of cocaine, 7,747 pounds of
marijuana and 86 pounds of heroin.
HSI seized 167,771 pieces of
counterfeit and pirated goods during
fiscal year, a 144 percent increase
compared to the 68,482 items seized
by HSI in fiscal year 2012. The total
manufacturer’s suggested retail price

http://www.ice.gov/news/releas
es/operation-waterfront-nets10-arrests-drug-trafficking
http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cg
i/viewcontent.cgi?article=2456
&context=ndlr

Caribbean Border Interagency Group (CBIG)
—
A union of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection’s (CBP) Caribbean Air and Marine
Branch, U.S. Coast Guard (USCG),
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) , the
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of
Puerto Rico, and the Puerto Rico Police Joint
Forces of Rapid Action (FURA) to disrupt the
flow of illegal aliens and contraband into the
Caribbean.
This effort effectively cut illegal immigration
in Puerto Rico by 80 percent
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Operation Sea Wall—
A joint USCG, CBP, Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) and the Dominican
Republic Navy counter drug operation
targeting primary flow into South Hispaniola
arrival zones and secondary flow from
Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico
Together, these agencies provide air
surveillance, offshore patrol, interdiction
forces and coastal surface interdiction.
Since May 2012, Operation Sea Wall has
resulted in the interdiction of more than 7000
kilograms of cocaine and the arrest of 29
suspected smugglers; a 300% increase over
the previous 12-month period.
In September 2012, the DHS Operation
Caribbean Guard (OCG) was implemented to
intercept illegal weapons, drugs and money,
flowing to and from Puerto Rico. There are
six separate efforts underway to support OCG,
which focus on the inspection of cargo, mail,
vessels and persons both traveling to and from
Puerto Rico.
CBP is currently reviewing flight operations,
including unmanned aircraft systems

of goods seized in fiscal year 2013 is
estimated to be more than $18 million.
FY2013 During this time, CBP
officers seized 20,339 pounds of
narcotics in PR and USVI area
FY2012 During this time, CBP
officers seized 18,083 pounds of
narcotics and arrested 21 people
wanted for crimes, including murder,
rape, assault, and robbery and denied
entry to more than 1,477 people
attempting to illegally enter the U.S.
through an air or sea port of entry in
our area;
FY 2011 8750 lbs of cocaine PR and
USVI ports
10/23/2013
During the inspection of containers
arriving on board the maritime vessel
M/V Hansa Regensburg from
Caucedo, Dominican Republic, CBP
officers selected a container for
secondary scrutiny. Inside CBP
officers found two bags, containing
brick shaped size objects that later
tested positive for cocaine and heroin,
respectively. The estimated value of
the seized cocaine is $1,240,800 and
the heroin is $192,500.
2/23/2015 Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) field operations
officers seized Sunday 222 pounds
(100.5 Kilos) of cocaine inside a
duffle bag concealed inside a container
arriving from Caucedo, Dominican
Republic.

deployments from stations in Florida to the
Puerto Rico region, to determine the most
effective use of flight hours to support OCG
efforts.
Operation Unified Resolve—U.S. Coast
Guard’s District 7 is allocating additional
resources and capabilities needed to deter,
detect and disrupt illicit maritime trafficking
in the region, targeting the flow of drugs,
weapons, money, and migrants.
High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
(HIDTA) —
This Office of National Drug Control
classification is a union of DHS components
(CBP, ICE, USCG, and USSS) that focuses on
disrupting drug trafficking on and around
Puerto Rico.
When combined with the Organized Crime
Drug Enforcement Security Taskforce
(OCDETF), this makes the Caribbean
Corridor Strike force, an initiative aimed at
stopping South American based drug
trafficking organizations that move multikilogram loads in the Caribbean.
Operation Community Shield —An ICE HSI
initiative that counters organized violent street
gangs, which are responsible for most violent
crime in Puerto Rico.
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Border Enforcement Security Taskforce
(BEST) — Collaboration between CBP,
USCG, ATF, Puerto Rico Police Department,
San Juan Police Department, Colombian
national police, Puerto Rico Ports Authority,
and Puerto Rican treasury focused on securing
the Puerto Rican border.

9/27/2013 U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) officers seized
Thursday 54 pounds (24.35 kilos) of
cocaine inside a container at the San
Juan seaport.
5/23/2013 Last Friday, during inbound
inspections of passenger vehicles
arriving from the Dominican Republic
onboard the M/V "Caribbean Fantasy"
ferry, a CBP canine alerted to the
potential presence of narcotics in a van
with Puerto Rico cargo license plates.
An x-ray of the vehicle confirmed the
alert to CBP officers.
After a thorough search, CBP officers
found 199 pellets of cocaine with a
weight of approximately 2.8 kilos (6.2
pounds) inside the vehicle.
12/13/2012 U.S. Customs and Border
Protection officers discovered a duffel
bag containing 9 bricks of cocaine
inside a container in the Port of San
Juan late Tuesday afternoon. The
bricks weighed 22.9 pounds with an
estimated street value of $249, 120.
8/31/2012 - U.S. Customs and Border
Protection officers seized last night
three duffel bags filled with 70 cocaine
bricks found inside a container
arriving to the Port of San Juan from
the Dominican Republic.
6/29/2012 U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) seized Thursday 73
kilograms (161 pounds) of cocaine and
six kilograms (13.23 pounds) of heroin

The Caribbean Air and Marine Operations
Center (CAMOC) — A state-of-the-art law
enforcement radar surveillance used to
counter airborne drug smuggling.
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/speec
hes/120621ayala.pdf;
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG112hhrg79507/html/CHRG112hhrg79507.htm

concealed within two bags inside a
container arriving from Caucedo,
Dominican Republic.
4/30/2012 Yesterday, while
performing inspectional duties on MV
CFS Paradero, arriving from Rio
Haina, Dominican Republic, CBP
officers assigned to the San Juan
Seaport selected various containers for
additional examination. Using
available technology, they detected
anomalies in two of the containers.
When the containers were physically
inspected, two bags, believed to
contain narcotics, were found inside
each container. On one of the
containers the two bags contained a
total of 32 packages that when field
tested proved positive for cocaine,
with an approximate weight of 35
kilograms (77 pounds).
On the second container, 60 packages,
with an approximate weight of 67
kilograms (148 pounds), also tested
positive for cocaine.
4/27/2012 U.S. Customs and Border
Protection officers seized last night
two gym bags with cocaine and heroin
inside a container arriving from the
Dominican Republic.
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2/23/2012 U.S. Customs and Border
Protection officers seized 240 pounds
of cocaine found inside four duffle
bags discovered within a container

arriving from a foreign destination last
night at the San Juan Port of entry.
During inbound inspection of
incoming containers on board the M/V
MAERSK RAVENA, arriving from
Caucedo, Dominican Republic, CBP
officers selected a container for
thorough inspection.
8/30/2011 In four different incidents
this weekend, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection seized 190.476 kilos
(419.93 pounds) of cocaine and 4.54
kilos of heroin (10.14 pounds).
In San Juan, during the inspection of
the vessel M/V Sydney Express
arriving from Caucedo, Dominican
Republic, CBP officers referred a
ship's container for secondary
inspection after noticing a discrepancy
in the arrival manifest and a container
seal.
10/15/2010 On Oct. 15, while
performing inspectional duties on a
vessel arriving from Caucedo,
Dominican Republic, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) officers
with the use of non-intrusive
inspection equipment discovered 55
kilos of cocaine in a cargo container.
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No cargo theft incidents found
Freight Watch International Route
Analysis March 2013-2015
2003-2008 NICB Average 35.27%.

Seaports are already above the overall
average of 33.76%
Port NICB Average 2003-2008= N/A
2003-2008 NCIC Average .87%
Seaports are above overall average
.65%
Port NCIC Average 2003-2008= N/A
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2014-01-14000000/cbp-seizes-78-poundscocaine-inside-container;
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2014-01-17000000/cbp-intercepts-cocaine-sanjuan-seaport;
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2014-01-28000000/cbp-puerto-rico-and-us-virginislands-fy2013-review;
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2013-10-23040000/cbp-seize-cocaine-and-heroinsan-juan-and-mayaguez;
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2015-02-24000000/san-juan-cbp-seizes-222pounds-cocaine-inside;
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http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2015-01-30000000/cbp-san-juan-field-operationsseize-325480-hidden;

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2013-09-27040000/cbp-seizes-54-poundscocaine-inside-container;
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2013-05-15040000/cbp-hsi-discover-narcoticssmuggling-ventures;
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2013-02-13050000/cbp-puerto-rico-and-us-virginislands-fy2012-review;
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2012-12-13050000/cbp-san-juan-discovers-duffelbag-containing-9-bricks;
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2012-08-31040000/san-juan-cbp-finds-3-cocainefilled-duffel-bags;
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2012-06-29040000/cbp-san-juan-finds-cocaineand-heroin-inside;
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2012-04-30040000/san-juan-cbp-seizes-102-kiloscocaine-two-separate;
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http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2012-04-27040000/san-juan-cbp-seizes-cocaineand-heroin-inside-vessel;

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2012-02-23050000/cbp-puerto-rico-seizes-240pounds-cocaine-inside;
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2011-12-27050000/cbp-integrated-puerto-ricoand-us-virgin-islands-2011;
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2011-08-30040000/cbp-seizes-cocaine-heroinand-currency-mayaguez-and;

Port Everglades

59% of all
vessels called
are container
vessels
(MARAD)
2013 Vessel
Calls in U.S.
Ports

Port Everglades--Daily security meeting. A
daily meeting is convened involving
representatives of the Broward County
Sheriff’s Office, the port authority
management, the Coast Guard, the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement, and others
concerned about port security to discuss
potential security threats and to coordinate
responses.
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In Port Everglades the Broward County
Sheriff’s Office created a Harbor Unit to focus
on the port, and the number of officers
assigned to this unit has been greatly
increased. The Sheriff’s Office has also
created a Domestic Preparedness Unit and a
Terrorism Unit, both of which are available to
the port. Also available to Port Everglades is a
“Trident Team” of divers
from the Coast Guard, the Broward County
Sheriff’s Office, the Broward County Fire

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2010-10-15040000/san-juan-seaport-cbp-officersseize-55-kilos-cocaine
Miami has high levels of seizures of
narcotics due to its role as a heavy
importation port for narcotics. In 2010
the Miami Border Enforcement
Security Taskforce has led or taken
part in investigations resulting in over
140 other arrests and the seizure of
more than 11,000 pounds of cocaine,
more than 8,000 pounds of marijuana,
more than 3,000 ecstasy pills, more
than $175,000 in cash, 19 vehicles, 16
weapons, and more than 1,400 rounds
of ammunition.
Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP). (2015) High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
Program Counties 2015

" To date, the investigation has
resulted in the indictment and
conviction of nearly a dozen
former King Ocean Services
employees who worked at Port
Everglades and numerous drug
traffickers who received the
narcotics from the port that
were being smuggled aboard
cargo ships owned or operated
by King Ocean Services"
In 1997 longshoreman at Port
Everglades many had criminal
records
1999 14 port workers indicted
for drug smuggling
In 2000, a former
longshoreman union local

Department, the Fish and Wildlife
Commission, and the Department of
Homeland Security. The Trident Team has
been created to inspect risk-prone ships and
facilities.
The Broward County Sheriff’s Office (BCSO)
has a contract to provide law enforcement
services on the port premises. In addition, the
BCSO has recently contracted to provide
broader security services, including access
control, taking the place of a private security
firm. Tenants contract with their own private
security firms to provide security within their
designated areas.
In Port Everglades the Broward County
Sheriff’s Office created a Harbor Unit to focus
K8 on the port, and the number of officers
assigned to this unit has been greatly
increased. The Sheriff’s Office has also
created a Domestic Preparedness Unit and a
Terrorism Unit, both of which are available to
the port. Also available to Port Everglades is a
“Trident Team” of divers from the Coast
Guard, the Broward County Sheriff’s Office,
the Broward County Fire Department, the Fish
and Wildlife Commission, and the Department
of Homeland Security. The Trident Team has
been created to inspect risk-prone ships and
facilities.

For stolen vehicles, between 20032008 the NICB registered an average
of 30.9% of vehicles per year as non
confirming with their registry. The
NCIC registered just over 1% on
average per year (the general rate
across most seaports).
93 incidents of cargo theft March
2013-2015
Freight Watch International Route
Analysis March 2013-2015
2003-2008 NICB Average 35.27%.
Seaports are already above the overall
average of 33.76%
Port NICB Average 2003-2008=
40.77%
2003-2008 NCIC Average .87%
Seaports are above overall average
.65%
Port NCIC Average 2003-2008=
0.83%

leader was sentenced for a drug
importation scheme running
since 1985.
http://articles.chicagotribune.co
m/2000-1107/news/0011070095_1_drugsmuggling-teamsters-millionin-drug-proceeds
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/
08/26/us/at-us-ports-drugsmuggling-is-fast-becomingan-inside-job.html
http://articles.sunsentinel.com/1998-0307/news/9803060569_1_comm
issioners-and-port-port-sproblems-port-everglades
http://www.justice.gov/usao/fls/
PressReleases/140124-01.html

Port Everglades experiences multiple
seizures evidencing its role as an
importation port for illicit narcotics:
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/cbp-officers-porteverglades-seize-154-pounds-cocaine

(Pate et al. 2008)
https://www.uscg.mil/d7/SectMiami/planning.
asp
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Miami

69% of all
vessels called
are container
vessels

Interagency operational center for port
security in Miami. Joint Harbor Operations
Center (JHOC) involves representatives of the
U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy co-

Miami has high levels of seizures of
narcotics due to its role as a heavy
importation port for narcotics. In 2010
the Miami Border Enforcement

No evidence of criminal
network presence in port
operations, however cargo theft
at the port is considered

(MARAD)
2013 Vessel
Calls in U.S.
Ports

locating in one Coast Guard facility, sharing
intelligence
information, and coordinating operations.
Port of Miami/Port of Everglades (Project
Hawkeye).
Ex. of interagency cooperation:
The Miami Division of the FBI has been
actively participating in the Area Maritime
Security Committee and holds a seat on the
Executive Steering Committee. This
committee is a United States Coast Guard
initiative, which brings together members of
the law enforcement community with
executives of the various maritime industries.
One of the pilot projects being worked on by
the Miami Joint Terrorism Task Force is the
"Manning Agency Screening Initiative" which
provides limited database checks on the
agencies providing the staff members to cruise
lines operating globally. At present the
"manning agencies" providing the staff for the
various cruise lines are not screened by any
United States law enforcement agency and are
merely licensed to do business in their
respective countries
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Miami has a Maritime Safety and Security
Team
Each MSST has about 75 active-duty
personnel. Each MSST unit has six trailerable
boats, making them capable of deploying by
ground, air and sea. They also have three
Physical Security Teams along with two
canine handling teams. The MSSTs are able to
augment local Sea Marshal operations with
their unique training and capabilities. Each
unit consists of two teams which can be

Security Taskforce has led or taken
part in investigations resulting in over
140 other arrests and the seizure of
more than 11,000 pounds of cocaine,
more than 8,000 pounds of marijuana,
more than 3,000 ecstasy pills, more
than $175,000 in cash, 19 vehicles, 16
weapons, and more than 1,400 rounds
of ammunition.
Officers discovered more than 178
pounds of cocaine during an
enforcement boarding on Nov. 1.
2014 The street value of the narcotics
is approximately $2,424,000.
A total of 40 sacks of marijuana were
found. The drugs have a street value of
approximately $4 million, making it
the largest find for the Miami seaport.
CBP officers have intercepted
shipments of about 3,800 pounds
during previous seizures.
On May 29 2013 , Customs and
Border Protection officers at the
Miami Seaport discovered
approximately 459 pounds of cocaine
hidden in a container at the Port of
Miami. While inspecting containers at
the Miami seaport CBP officers
identified suspect suspicious boxes in
a container which a CBP canine
subsequently alerted to for the
presence of narcotics
May 2010, During routine
examinations, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection officers at the
Miami Seaport discovered and seized

organized. The Longshore
sector displays evidence of
historical criminal network
influence.
http://www.aimu.org/Port/mia
mi2013.pdf
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/182
e70f0-271d-11e0-80d700144feab49a.html#axzz4JCz
WWWM0
http://articles.sunsentinel.com/1986-0626/news/8602070510_1_portcommissioner-port-evergladescriminal-activity
https://www.justice.gov/archive
/usao/nye/pr/2005/2005jul6.htm
l

deployed separately or together and are
capable of being deployed within 12 hours of
notification and can be operationally ready
within four hours upon arrival in any given
point(Pate t al 2008)
NOTE: FS 311.12 establishes minimum
standards for training and certification of
contract security guards performing security
duties at Florida's seaports.
Conflict/Inefficiency: The state standards for
training and certification of Class D or
Class G guards serving on commercial
seaports does not include the subjects required
for training of personnel with specific security
duties identified in the federal
regulation. (Transworld 2010)
FLorida ports are in effect over-regulated due
to the presence of FS 311.12 and the MTSA
2004 which have complementary and double
regulations in a variety of areas such as
transportation cards, security officer training
and other areas (Transworld 2010).
http://www2.fbi.gov/congress/congress04/bald
012704.htm;
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW109publ347/pdf/PLAW-109publ347.pdf;
http://chsdemocrats.house.gov/SiteDocuments
/20071128132421-56346.pdf
https://www.uscg.mil/d7/SectMiami/planning.
asp

92 cartons of counterfeit merchandise
on Monday, March 8. The cartons
contained belts and sunglasses, which
infringed on trademarks recorded with
CBP and were estimated to have a
MSRP value of $5,233,200. The
shipment originated in China and was
destined for central Florida.
2009, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection officers seized 598 pounds
of cocaine that had been concealed
within a hydraulic cylinder that
weighed more than 11,000 pounds.
The container had been selected for a
routine examination by a CBP officer.
2009 U.S. Customs and Border
Protection officers at the Miami
seaport on Friday seized 97 parcels
containing sunglasses and reading
glasses with infringing trademarks of
brands such as Christian Dior, XOXO,
Chanel, D&G and Burberry.
Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP). (2015) High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
Program Counties 2015
93 incidents of cargo theft
Freight Watch International Route
Analysis March 2013-2015
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2003-2008 NICB Average 35.27%.
Seaports are already above the overall
average of 33.76%
Port NICB Average 2003-2008=
30.94%
2003-2008 NCIC Average .87%

Seaports are above overall average
.65%
Port NCIC Average 2003-2008=
0.95%
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/101
2/101201miami.htm;
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2014-11-03000000/cbp-seizes-24-million-worthcocaine-miami;
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2013-03-07050000/customs-and-borderprotection-officers-seize-4300;
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2012-06-13-040000/uscustoms-and-border-protection-seizes73-million;
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2010-03-24040000/miami-cbp-seizes-counterfeitdesigner-merchandise;
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2009-12-23050000/cbp-miami-airport-interceptscocaine-hidden-hydraulic;
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Baltimore

20% of all
vessels

Baltimore’s Maritime Tactical Operations
Group

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/localmedia-release/2009-10-28040000/cbp-miami-seizes-fakesunglasses-worth-77-million
According to the HIDTA 2009 report
for the Baltimore/Washington region,
seizures of MDMA, Crack Cocaine

At least two cases of warehouse
owners scheming to steal
imported expensive metals.

container
vessels.
(MARAD)
2013 Vessel
Calls in U.S.
Ports
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(MTOG)- The continued engagement and
activity of AMSC
Baltimore’s MTOG has fostered significant
improvements in local law enforcement
agency cooperation. Efforts to improve joint
tactics, training, equipment and
communications have paid off in planning and
executing maritime security operations for the
frequent NSSE occurring in the National
Capital Region.

and Heroin are increasing and the Port
of Baltimore is a known entry point.

Completed the Maryland Maritime Strategic
Security Plan (MMSSP) to coordinate
protective efforts of Maryland’s maritime
environments. This plan is the result of an
unprecedented collaboration between federal,
State, local maritime law enforcement
agencies and private sector partners. In
August 2010, the State, Coast Guard, and
Charles County produced the MMSSP to
coordinate and improve responses to natural
and man-made disasters and terrorist attacks.
Partners are continuing to build out and
implement shared security goals. The model
for the plan may be applied to other
environments with similar over- and underlapping jurisdictional issues (e.g. rail,
highways, etc.).
Since 2007, the Maritime Tactical Operations
Group (MTOG) has secured at least $2.6
million in federal Port Security grants to
purchase five response/patrol vessels,
nighttime infrared detection, gamma ray page
radiation detection and additional maritime
tactical equipment for state and local patrol
agencies. The MTOG was created in 2005 to
coordinate state and local first responders in
maritime incidents, develop common training
protocols, and standardize equipment across
departments. Seventeen agencies currently

20 cargo thefts March 2013-2015
Freight Watch International Route
Analysis March 2013-2015

https://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/p
ubs27/27486/transprt.htm#Figure2
Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP). (2015) High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
Program Counties 2015

According to CBP officers in the Port
of Baltimore seized less than one
pound of cocaine in fiscal year 2012,
and nearly 22 pounds in 2011 (1
seizure only). During 2007, CBP
officers seized a combined 526 pounds
of cocaine in three incidents, the last
year of significant CBP cocaine
seizures in Baltimore.
2013 seized 386 lbs cocaine
Counterfeit goods investigations target
Baltimore area and port for
importation. According to their guilty
pleas, from 2008 to 2010 the
defendants conspired to smuggle
counterfeit Coach handbags
manufactured in China and elsewhere
into the United States for sale. Part of
the sales proceeds were returned to
manufacturers and middlemen in
China to pay for additional counterfeit
goods.

According to their plea
agreements, Purbaugh and
Trainum opened Bear Creek
Warehouse Company in 2006.
Their primary customer was an
international mining company
that shipped cargo containers of
nickel to the Port of Baltimore
from its mines outside the
United States, then stored the
nickel in the Bear Creek
Warehouse. Beginning in 2006,
Purbaugh and Trainum began
removing the mining
company's nickel from the
warehouse, setting it aside to
sell later. In June 2006,
Purbaugh approached a coconspirator to sell the nickel in
Pittsburgh, Pa. The coconspirator contacted the owner
of a Pittsburgh scrap metal
company who agreed to
purchase the nickel from the
co-conspirator.
From 2006 through 2011,
Purbaugh sold the coconspirator a total of 80,000
pounds of nickel worth
approximately $1 million.
Purbaugh arranged the delivery
of the nickel with the coconspirator and the scrap metal
dealer. Purbaugh then arranged
for his driver, who lives near
Pittsburgh, to drive a truck to
the warehouse, which Trainum
then loaded with the stolen

participate, including MSP, MDTA, NRP, and
marine units from a number of local and
federal entities. MTOG members completed
their fifth Basic Maritime Operations Course
in 2010 and to date have trained 125 officers
in standardized training, which helps create a
more prepared and efficient patrol force to
prevent and respond to security incidents.
https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg544/docs/AM
SC%20Report%2020DEC13.pdf
http://www.mpa.maryland.gov/content/portsecurity.php
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Schools/GSB
PP/docs/CDMR/MIST_Port_of_Baltimore1.p
df

According to the 72 count indictment,
the defendants contacted individuals,
who unbeknownst to them were ICE
undercover agents, to import and clear
shipments of counterfeit products into
the United States without payment of
the required federal taxes and customs
duties. The defendants acted as
manufacturers, brokers, middlemen
and distributors of counterfeit Nike,
Coach and Gucci shoes, Cartier wrist
watches and Coach handbags,
typically manufactured in Malaysia
and China. These goods were shipped
to the Port of Baltimore to be "cleared"
through U.S. Customs for sale in the
United States.
More recently the port has had an
increased number of narcotics
seizures:
http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2011/02/
13/another-major-drug-bust-at-port-ofbaltimore/
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/201312-24/news/bs-md-port-cocaineseizure-20131224_1_cocaine-seizurecustoms-agents-steve-sapp
http://www.wbaltv.com/news/fedsseize-147-pounds-of-cocaine-at-portof-baltimore/34721070
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2003-2008 NICB Average 35.27%.
Seaports are already above the overall
average of 33.76%
Port NICB Average 2003-2008=
33.18%

nickel. Each load typically
contained 6,000 pounds of
nickel and the shipments took
place at least twice a year. The
co-conspirator paid Purbaugh in
cash, which he divided with
Trainum.
In another case, The indictment
alleges that from Sept. 7 to 10,
2010, Alan Verschleisser
attempted to sell the stolen
nickel by contacting various
buyers, including
representatives in Australia and
New York, and on Sept. 8,
2010, had his administrative
assistant send an email, using
her personal Google "gmail"
account, to an individual in an
effort to sell approximately 20
tons of the stolen nickel.
https://www.ice.gov/news/relea
ses/final-co-conspiratorsentenced-prison-stealing-26million-metal-imported-port
https://www.ice.gov/news/relea
ses/indictment-charges-2baltimore-men-theft-metalworth-over-26-million
https://www.ice.gov/news/relea
ses/baltimore-warehouseowners-plead-guilty-schemesteal-1-million-nickelimported-port

New Orleans

6% of all
vessels called
are container
vessels
(MARAD)
2013 Vessel
Calls in U.S.
Ports

Sector NOLA COTP used HSIN as the
primary method of communicating with port
partners and stakeholders during the War of
1812 Celebration, Hurricane Isaac, Super
Bowl XLVII as well as multiple Type II and
III oil spill responses. Because port partners
have HSIN
accounts and special permissions to access
protected event sites, security information is
well protected. HSIN allows each event
participant to post their individual plans and
documents. Sharing information in this
manner helps promote a common operating
picture. HSIN also provides interactive video
conferencing and streaming, facilitating
maritime domain awareness for port partners.
Port of NOLA Harbor Police. Port police
force of 56 officers, Access control is the
responsibility of private security hired by the
port. Tenants hire their own private security
firms to maintain security in their leased
spaces (Pate et al 2007)
Labor is not regulated by any specific entities.
There is lack of communication purely based
on lack of interoperability of communication
systems between CBP and other entities
(Pate et al. 2008)
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https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg544/docs/AM
SC%20Report%2020DEC13.pdf

2003-2008 NCIC Average .87%
Seaports are above overall average
.65%
Port NCIC Average 2003-2008=
0.74%
a1) Cocaine seized through Gulf Coast
HIDTA initiatives in 2010 totaled
1,339 kilograms—a 58 percent
increase from the more than 846
kilograms seized in 2009
For example, in July 2009, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection
officers seized 994 pounds of powder
cocaine commingled with bags of
Colombian coffee aboard a cargo
vessel in the Port of New Orleans. The
vessel was laded in Panama.
Vessels traveling from source
countries on a weekly basis with cargo
to the Port of New Orleans are another
major threat. In the past, these vessels
have had parasitic containers attached
to the exterior hull, where narcotics
are harbored. The advantage of
smuggling narcotics in containerized
shipments lies
within the volume of cargo arriving at
the port every day and the current
capacity of CBP inspectors to inspect
only a small percentage.
Gulf Coast HIDTA 2014 Threat
Assessment- http://arcassociates.net/yahoo_site_admin/asset
s/docs/2014_Threat_Assessment_Final
.35124838.pdf

Lexis-Nexis searches of
organized crime, maritime, and
port relationships in the NOLA
does not have a history of OC
involvement in port labor
sectors, nor is it a significant
longitudinal market for illicit
goods. Narcotics are primarily
supplied through land based
routes (Gulf Coast HIDTA
2011)

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/20
07/09/25/E7-18886/area-maritime-securitycommittee-new-orleans-vacancies
http://infragardlouisiana.com/officersdirectors/
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-494R

Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP). (2015) High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
Program Counties 2015
a2) NICB hits at the Port of NOLA are
a signficant portion of all inputted
entries, 39.8% however in 2008 only
211 vehicles were entered through the
NICB check system, as NOLA is an
insignificant vehicle throughput port.
Furthermore Louisiana and NOLA
have a theft rate near the national
average.
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pu
bs40/40386/product.htm#Transportati
on
3 cargo thefts March 2013-2015
Freight Watch International Route
Analysis March 2013-2015
2003-2008 NICB Average 35.27%.
Seaports are already above the overall
average of 33.76%
Port NICB Average 2003-2008=
24.92%
2003-2008 NCIC Average .87%
Seaports are above overall average
.65%
Port NCIC Average 2003-2008=
0.92%
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https://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/d
mas/Gulf_Coast_DMA-2011(U).pdf
Apra

42% of all
vessels are

Does have Area Maritime Security Committe
Present and Guam was designated a Strategic
Port in 2009:

According to the Guam FY 2009 –
2012 Drug Control, Violent Crime and

No evidence of this in the
public record

container
vessels.
(MARAD)
2013 Vessel
Calls in U.S.
Ports

The designation of strategic port brings with it
many challenges not only for the Coast Guard,
but also for all those with a stake in port
operations. For this reason each strategic port
is mandated to form a Port Readiness
Committee which brings together
representatives of the 10 federal agencies and
local port stakeholders. The PRC was
established formally this past January when
stakeholders met for the first time to begin
dialogue on strategic concerns associated with
facilitate both defense and commercial
supplies through the same port. The
committee is chaired by the captain of the port
and includes more than 40 local, federal, and
Department of Defense agencies.
in 2013 After thorough multi agency planning,
a $1.5M Port Security Grant was awarded to
AMSC Guam to purchase mobile X-ray
screening vehicles. This equipment will
increase the capacity to screen in-bound
containers in the commercial port of Guam by
90%
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The Port of Apra 2013 Annual Report notes
"The PAG security staff lacks enough officers
and asks security staff to work additional
hours to meet the security needs of the Port.
Finally, retention of security staff is difficult.
The PAG offers a good package of training
programs; however, often the trained officers
move to other security/law enforcement
positions (outside of the Port). "
Retaining officers is a key vulnerability is a
self described need for more officers.
http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doc/4007/1444
903/Sector-Guam-establishes-Port-Readiness-

Criminal Justice Systems
Improvement Strategy
"Drugs are smuggled and transported
into Guam through the airport, mail,
and seaports. The majority of the
drugs being seized continue to be
transported through the Guam
International Air Terminal (GIAT) and
seized from passengers, air freight
cargo and baggage. Of all drugs
seized, crystal methamphetamine is
the most prevalent intercepted drug.
Guam is a destination for illicit
products such as drugs, but most
appear to be transported via Air not by
maritime methods. Guam is not a
significant entry point for other types
of narcotics.
http://www.guamlegislature.com/Mess
_Comms_30th/Doc.%2030GL-090670%20From%20Bureau%20of%20
Statistics%20&%20Plans%20submitti
ng%20the%20FY%202009%20Edwar
d%20Byrne%20Mem.%20Justice%20
Assistance%20Grant%20Program..pdf
NO cargo theft incidents identified
2003-2008 NICB Average 35.27%.
Seaports are already above the overall
average of 33.76%
Port NICB Average 2003-2008= N/A
2003-2008 NCIC Average .87%
Seaports are above overall average
.65%
Port NCIC Average 2003-2008= N/A

However "Guam enforces its
own Customs, Excise and
Quarantine laws and
coordinates with the US
Customs, Immigration and
Border Enforcement
authorities. There is a
jurisdictional coordination issue
here, as no export license is
required for exports to the
USA, but these are required for
exports to or imports from other
destinations. This permits
possible staging via Guam or
the CNMI of goods to be
moved to Asia, with reduced
risk of detection prior to export.
This is the ‘low risk port of
origin’ gambit. Guam is not
recognized as a high risk
destination for exports from the
USA. Neither is it recognized
as a high risk origin for goods
imported into Asian
jurisdictions."
http://www.asiapacificdefencer
eporter.com/articles/159/Border
-security-Transnational-Crimein-Micronesia-Part-1

Committee-in-response-to-strategic-portdesignation-;
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg544/docs/AMS
C%20Report%2020DEC13.pdf
http://www.portguam.com/docs/newsreleases/2013/master-plan-update-2013.pdf

SVF Data Matrix
LA/LB

Organizational Corruption
San Diego Customs Brokers Association and his corporation have
been sentenced for their role in a multimillion dollar commercial
fraud scheme to evade paying import duties on goods they imported
into the United States.
The sentencing is the result of a four-month wiretap investigation led
by special agents with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's
(ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI); the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration's (FDA) Office of Criminal Investigations
(OCI); and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CPB).

254

According to the court records, Chavez and other co-conspirators
procured foreign goods, such as Chinese-made apparel and cigarettes
manufactured in India, that were transported via ship to the Port of
Long Beach. Before the goods entered the U.S., Chavez directed other
members of the conspiracy to prepare fraudulent paperwork and make
erroneous entries into a government database so it appeared the goods
were being transshipped to Mexico and not subject to customs duties.
However, instead of transshipping the goods to Mexico, the
merchandise was delivered to warehouses in Southern California and
eventually sold in the U.S. for less than similar items offered by their
law-abiding competitors.

Employee Corruption
3 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for corruption,
including a supervisory officer arrested in 2012 on charges of
accepting bribes to allow others, including his ex-wife, to
smuggle goods into the United States so they could avoid paying
duties and taxes.
Port of LA Port Police Chief, Ronald Boyd, was arrested and
indicted for corruption in April 2015
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1210/121025losangeles.htm;
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/254967-arellanoletter-regarding-sentencing.html;
https://www.fbi.gov/losangeles/press-releases/2015/chief-of-losangeles-port-police-named-in-federal-corruption-case

3 CBP officers were convicted of corruption

NY/NJ

Hampton RoadsNorfolk

https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ex-head-san-diego-customsbrokers-association-sentenced-evading-duties-millions-worth
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/head-san-diego-customs-brokersassociation-pleads-guilty-running-100-million-customs
a)From July 2011- July 2012 according to the WCNYH reports there
were 34 instances of documented corruption and illicit activites on the
part of PNYNJ employees, and related individuals (i.e. drayage
industry and other tangential industries)
b) July 2010-July 2011= 33 instances of documented corruption and
illicit activities on the part of PNYNJ employees, and related
individuals (i.e. drayage industry and other tangential industries)
1)
http://www.waterfrontcommission.org/docs/WCNYH_2012_Annual_
Report.pdf;
http://www.waterfrontcommission.org/docs/WCNYH_2011_Annual_
Report.pdf
See case study for more in depth analysis

In 2007 a 54-count indictment identified longshoremen Vernon
Brooks, 34, and David Jones, 51, both of Chesapeake. They are
accused of assisting in the off loading of drugs - both cocaine and
heroin - at local port terminals.
Also named in the indictment is truck driver Ronald Evans, 40, of
Elizabeth City, who had access to the port. He is accused of driving
other suspects in and out of the port as they retrieved the drugs.

a) In 2012 at least 8 individuals were indicted in a case relating to
racketeering and theft of intra state commerce originating at the
PNYNJ. In 2011 8 individuals, longshoremen, were arrested for
conspiring and moving narcotics through the PNYNJ.
3 CBP officers arrested or reprimanded for corruption at the Port
of NY/NJ, airport included. One aided a freight forwarding
company to circumvent procedures to import cargo
1)
http://www.waterfrontcommission.org/docs/WCNYH_2012_Ann
ual_Report.pdf;
http://www.waterfrontcommission.org/docs/WCNYH_2011_Ann
ual_Report.pdf;
http://bordercorruption.apps.cironline.org/person/location/state/ny
/#all
See case study for more in depth analysis
In 2007 a 54-count indictment identified longshoremen Vernon
Brooks, 34, and David Jones, 51, both of Chesapeake. They are
accused of assisting in the off loading of drugs - both cocaine and
heroin - at local port terminals.
Also named in the indictment is truck driver Ronald Evans, 40, of
Elizabeth City, who had access to the port. He is accused of
driving other suspects in and out of the port as they retrieved the
drugs.

http://hamptonroads.com/node/213521
http://hamptonroads.com/node/213521
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http://pilotonline.com/news/local/crime/drug-ring-called-biggestever-at-local-terminals/article_ce5ecade-175e-5285-b119bf785973a358.html

Charleston

In 2010 2 CBP officers at the Port of Charleston were sanctioned for
the use of government computer systems to illicitly check on
coworkers, neighbors and other unauthorized usage.

In 2010 2 CBP officers at the Port of Charleston were sanctioned
for the use of government computer systems to illicitly check on
coworkers, neighbors and other unauthorized usage.

http://bordercorruption.apps.cironline.org/person/location/station/port

In 2007 a 54-count indictment identified longshoremen Vernon
Brooks, 34, and David Jones, 51, both of Chesapeake. They are
accused of assisting in the off loading of drugs - both cocaine and
heroin - at local port terminals in Hampton Roads Virginia. The
same drug conspiracy was also charged with moving narcotics
through the Port of Charleston.
Oscar “Dread” Baptiste of East Hartford, Conn., is charged with
importing more than 500 grams of cocaine, according to a news
release from the U.S. Attorney’s Office. Baptiste, a Panamanian
emigrant, faces a maximum prison sentence of 40 years and fine
of $5 million.
Baptiste was arrested July 28 in Connecticut, according to court
documents.
In 2010, an informant told authorities that Baptiste asked him
about smuggling drugs through the Port of Charleston, according
to a criminal complaint filed in the case. Baptiste told the
informant he needed help “ripping” cocaine from containers
coming from Panama.
From August 2010 until February 2011, the informant and
Baptiste arranged the details through an email account created by
law enforcement, according to the complaint.
Scored 6 because narcotics were moved through Charleston but
no evidence of longshoreman involvement at Port of Charleston.
Except for attempted longshore collusion which was disrupted by
law enforcement in the Baptiste case.
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http://scbiznews.com/news/government/37526/.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Unpublished/134223.U.pd
f

http://www.postandcourier.com/archives/port-drug-smugglergets-years-in-prison/article_66ef6b44-9e06-57f3-ad9097d2ff21d204.html

San Juan

October 2013 ten longshoremen and the co-owner of a freight
forwarding company were indicted for drug trafficking through the
Port of San Juan over the course of several years.
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/operation-waterfront-nets-10arrests-drug-trafficking
http://www.justice.gov/usao/pr/news/2013/10252013.html
https://www.justice.gov/usao-pr/pr/drug-trafficking-organizationoperating-san-juan-seaport-indicted-conspiracy-import

http://bordercorruption.apps.cironline.org/person/location/station/
port-charleston/#all
October 2013 ten longshoremen and the co-owner of a freight
forwarding company were indicted for drug trafficking through
the Port of San Juan.
The individuals charged conspired and coordinated the purchase
of kilogram quantities of cocaine and heroin from sources in
Colombia and Dominican Republic. The drugs were placed inside
containerized cargo vessels that were scheduled to arrive in the
seaport in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Once in Puerto Rico,
longshoremen and other individuals working for private
companies, providing services at the San Juan port, would use
their employment credentials and privileges to gain access inside
the containerized cargo vessels and secure areas inside the seaport
to retrieve the controlled substances and deliver them to others
waiting outside the seaport. Some of the drugs smuggled were
distributed in Puerto Rico and some were further transported to
the continental United States for eventual resale.
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/operation-waterfront-nets-10arrests-drug-trafficking
http://www.justice.gov/usao/pr/news/2013/10252013.html Juan
over the course of several years.

Port Everglades
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To date up to 2011, the investigation has resulted in the indictment
and conviction of nearly a dozen former King Ocean Services
employees who worked at Port Everglades and numerous drug
traffickers who received the narcotics from the port that were being
smuggled aboard cargo ships owned or operated by King Ocean
Services"
http://www.dea.gov/divisions/mia/2014/mia012414a.shtml

https://www.justice.gov/usao-pr/pr/drug-trafficking-organizationoperating-san-juan-seaport-indicted-conspiracy-import
Port Everglades employees are named in an indictment of
Colombian drug smugglers who utilized Port Everglades to
offload cocaine loaded on to vessels that offloaded at the port
" To date, the investigation has resulted in the indictment and
conviction of nearly a dozen former King Ocean Services
employees who worked at Port Everglades and numerous drug
traffickers who received the narcotics from the port that were

In an earlier incident in 2003, a company falsified documentation to
hire security guards for Port Everglades.
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2003-0325/news/0303250185_1_port-everglades-victor-lauderdale

being smuggled aboard cargo ships owned or operated by King
Ocean Services"
In 2015 a port worker conspired in a federal sting operation to
assist in extricating narcotics from a container.
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/crime/fl-port-everglades-drugarrests-20150501-story.html
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/broward/fl-port-evergladescocaine-santeria-20151130-story.html
http://www.justice.gov/usao/fls/PressReleases/140124-01.html

Miami

Baltimore

2 port security officers arrested for theft (2013)
7 longshoreman arrested for facilitating drug transfers (2010)
Between 2005-2012 8 CBP officers in Miami, were arrested for
various charges, primarily drug trafficking

In 2010 ICE agents arrested 10 individuals in a 3 year long
operation in which ILA Longshoreman assisted in the important
of cocaine from Panama, Colombia and Jamaica. 7 longshoreman
were involved.

http://www.nbcmiami.com/news/PortMiami-Security-Officers-StolePassengers-iPads-Sold-Them-on-Craigslist-Police-223627831.html
https://ijis.gettraction.com/traction#/single&proj=Public&rec=4444&brief=n

http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1012/101201miami.htm

http://bordercorruption.apps.cironline.org/
Milton Tillman, Jr. and Milton “Moe” Tillman, III were arrested by
the FBI for no show jobs at the Port of Baltimore, 2010
two different warehousing firms had corrupt practices including
organizing thefts of metals and other material from customers

http://www.fbi.gov/baltimore/press-releases/2010/ba031710.htm

7 longshoreman arrested for facilitating drug transfers (2010)

CBP officers in the Port of Baltimore seized less than one pound
of cocaine in fiscal year 2012, and nearly 22 pounds in 2011.
During 2007, CBP officers seized a combined 526 pounds of
cocaine in three incidents, the last year of significant CBP
cocaine seizures in Baltimore. 2005 was 155 kgs
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https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/final-co-conspirator-sentencedprison-stealing-26-million-metal-imported-port

On Dec. 18, 2010, CBP was involved in the arrest of three
crewmen from the Royal Caribbean ship Enchantment of the
Seas, who attempted to smuggle more than 2.2 pounds of heroin
and more than one pound of cocaine into the United States.

https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/indictment-charges-2-baltimoremen-theft-metal-worth-over-26-million

On Jan. 8, 2011, a CBP narcotics detector dog sniffed out 1
pound, 8 ounces of cocaine and 14 ounces of heroin hidden in an

https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/baltimore-warehouse-ownersplead-guilty-scheme-steal-1-million-nickel-imported-port

New Orleans

Apra

equipment locker on board the Royal Caribbean ship
Enchantment of the Seas. No arrests were made in the case.
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No documented records in Lexis-Nexis
No cases in CBP media release
No cases in ICE news release

http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/local/2012
_news_releases/december_2012/12032012_2.xml;
http://www.wtop.com/index.php?sid=174021&nid=25
No documented records in Lexis-Nexis
No cases in CBP media release
No cases in ICE news release

Six Port Authority of Guam employees were fired in 2012 for abuse
of office and corruption.

2 cases of CBP corruption
Wanda Hopkins, 47, was sentenced in February 2006 to nearly
eight years in prison for selling cocaine and using a gun while
trafficking drugs. She and her husband were arrested for selling
cocaine and using a gun while trafficking drugs. They were
caught transporting more than 250 grams of cocaine to Louisiana
from Texas. She flashed her badge to arresting officers, who
found a marijuana cigarette and tracts of cocaine in her
credentials.
Former Customs and Border Protection Officer Marian Riley
pleaded guilty to criminal information related to fraud against the
Department of Housing and Urban Development. At sentencing,
she was ordered to pay $30,676.72 in restitution. Riley
participated in the department's Good Neighbor Next Door
program, which allows law enforcement officers to purchase
eligible homes in revitalization areas for a 50 percent discount on
the list price. Program participants were required to occupy the
property as their sole residence for three years. Riley purchased a
home through the program, but during a three-year period, she
falsely certified that she occupied the home as her sole residence.
Six Port Authority of Guam employees were fired in 2012 for
abuse of office and corruption.

http://www.pacificnewscenter.com/index.php?option=com_content&
view=article&id=40595:video-1-year-later-still-no-findings-inalleged-port-scam&catid=45:guam-news&Itemid=156;

http://www.pacificnewscenter.com/index.php?option=com_conte
nt&view=article&id=40595:video-1-year-later-still-no-findingsin-alleged-port-scam&catid=45:guam-news&Itemid=156;

http://www.kuam.com/story/20376084/2012/12/18/six-port-authorityof-guam-employees-terminated;

http://www.kuam.com/story/20376084/2012/12/18/six-portauthority-of-guam-employees-terminated;

http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2012/may/05-17-14.htm

http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2012/may/05-17-14.htm
No cases in CBP media release
No cases in ICE news release
No incidents of CBP corruption identified
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Appendix F: 2015 High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Counties
Red circles highlight ports which are in HIDTA counties. Charleston is not located in an HIDTA county and is green.
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Figure 8: 2015 High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Counties

Appendix G: Analyses of low vulnerability seaports (bottom 67th percentile)
Port of Jacksonville (JAXPORT) – 27
The Jacksonville Port Authority (JAXPORT) is an independent state government agency
(Pate et al. 2008). The port has three primary terminals (the Blount Island Marine Terminal, the
Talleyrand Marine Terminal, and the Dames Point Marine Terminal) and the JAXPORT Cruise
Terminal and rates 13th in the U.S. for container throughput. JAXPORT is a landlord port and
rents its facilities to private tenants. The port has a contract with the Jacksonville Sheriff s
Office for law enforcement but has its own security department that provides access control and
non-law enforcement security services (Port of Jacksonville). As with other landlord ports,
tenants hire their own security services to provide services for leased properties.
Physical
JAXPORT scores at mid-level for the open structure of the port with two terminals with
island access, and one of those terminals with nearby public road access and multiple entry/exit
points. At JAXPORT terminals employees must park outside and take a bus to the port itself as
no personal vehicles are allowed on the pier in the JAXPORT, reducing vulnerability. The port
does not have an on-site CES nor is there evidence of warehousing on-site holding CRAVED
cargo. The port does display a significant amount of vehicular traffic and scores high in this
vulnerability and despite a low presence of rail traffic with one railway utilizing the port, the port
scores high for intermodal connectivity because of the high level of truck use at the port.
Administrative
The port registers a score for an illicit import/export market and for jurisdictional gaps.
The port region displays 31 cargo thefts in the period of March 2013-2015, and is identified by
the ONDCP as being located in a HIDTA county (2015). In addition, the port is responsible for
70% of Puerto Rico’s import and export traffic, which is not subject to the same inspection
procedures as non-domestic cargo, however Puerto Rico is a significant transshipment point for
illicit narcotics including cocaine and heroin. However, paradoxically despite being an identified
export vehicle port used by criminal networks (Lantsman 2013), the port does not register an
above average NICB or NCIC hit rate. The port does register on employee corruption, with the
former director of the port arrested and sentenced for corruption charges in 2011 (Federal Bureau
of Investigation 2013).
Logistical
The port has scores low for vulnerability due to cargo throughput of 926,000 TEUs in
2013.
Port of Savannah - 26.5
The Georgia Ports Authority (GPA), a quasi-state agency, operates the Port of Savannah
as an operating port. The POS has the largest single-terminal container facility in the U.S. and
has capitalized on this to become the third largest container port in the U.S. and a major port for
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imports from South and Central America and the Caribbean and exports to Asian countries
(Georgia Ports Authority). Law enforcement is provided by a standalone GPA Port Police.
Previously to 1988 the GPA did not have sworn law enforcement component but the extra
security costs were passed along to the users of the port through surcharges on cargo throughput.
Port Police Officers are certified through the Georgia Peace Officers Standards & Training
(POST) Council as Certified Law Enforcement Professionals and are empowered with the same
authority and arrest powers as any other police officer in the State of Georgia (Pate et al. 2008).
Physical
The Port of Savannah primarily displays physical vulnerabilities of open structure,
CRAVED goods presence, and a large vehicular daily presence, though a low presence of freight
forwarders in the local area. As one of the largest ports in the United States, and the second
largest on the East Coast, ports of this size are often spread out over a large number of facilities
and display the open structure that increases vulnerability in this area. The port also has an onsite CES at the primary container terminal, Garden City Container Terminal. However this
significant container throughput does not manifest itself in an overly large presence of freight
forwarders, but there is a heavy intermodal presence, again presented as a benefit for efficient
cargo movements.
Administrative
The port’s primary administrative vulnerability is the presence of a large illicit
import/export market. Atlanta is a major hub for transshipment of a variety of narcotics to the
northeast coast markets, and for onward shipment to Europe. The Port of Savannah (in addition
to Charleston and Wilmington NC) are identified as a possible transshipment point for cocaine
from Colombia by the DEA and recent significant CBP seizures indicate that this is still likely
the case (DEA 2005; US CBP 2014 May 8), though the port is not located in an HIDTA
(ONDCP 2015). The port displays an above average level of both NICB and NCIC hits
reflecting in part the significant vehicle exports through the port for onward travel to Africa and
the Middle East. In addition, the port has a low but significant enough level of cargo thefts to
score for this vulnerability (10 incidents identified since March 2013).
Logistical
As the fourth largest port in the U.S. the Port of Savannah scores high for logistical
vulnerability due to the heavy throughput, with 3.3 million TEUs in 2013.
Port of Palm Beach (FL) – 26
The Port of Palm Beach is landlord port governed by a Board of Commissioners composed of
five members elected at large by the voters within the Port of Palm Beach District for
overlapping four-year terms of office (Port of Palm Beach A; Port of Palm Beach B). The port
has a non-unionized labor force and is a significant distribution point for commodities to the
Caribbean for containerized, dry bulk, liquid bulk, breakbulk, roll on/roll off and heavylift/project cargoes and ranks 21st in container throughput. The Port relies on contract security
for gate and access control and contracts with the Riviera Beach Police Department for law
enforcement services (Port of Palm Beach District 2015).
Physical
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The port displays an open structure with two access roads, from the north and south side
of the port while containers held in open access yards. The port has CRAVED cargo with a
warehouse on-site functioning as the CES and a heavy presence of daily vehicular traffic
(U.S.CBP 2012 October 3). The location of the port in South Florida places it in the midst of a
heavy freight forwarder community and leads to a high vulnerability score for peripheral
companies, especially for the level of container throughput at the port.
Administrative
The two primary administrative vulnerabilities for the port are the presence of an illicit
import/export market as evidenced through the ports location in an HIDTA county (ONDCP
2015) and a high level of cargo theft in the port hinterland region, with 99 thefts since March
2013 (FreightWatch International). The port also rates higher than average for jurisdictional
vulnerability as the port does not have a sworn police force and must rely on local law
enforcement for port security enforcement, the Riviera Beach Police Department which provides
two uniformed officers (Corcoran 2013).
Logistical
The port is rated low with a relatively low throughput, however the port does provide
60% of all cargo for The Bahamas, and significant issues with illicit exported firearms indicate a
heightened vulnerability for the port to be an export point for illicitly trafficked firearms (Port of
Palm Beach; U.S. State Department 2014).
Port of Houston – 24
The Port of Houston is the sixth largest container port in the U.S. and carries significant
bulk cargo such as grain, steel, petroleum products, and finished goods. The port is a limited
operating port with terminal operations operated by the Port of Houston Authority which
manages the port’s public facilities, and through partnerships with private companies that operate
along the Houston Ship Channel which is 26 miles in length from Houston to Galveston Bay.
This is one of the most significant areas in the U.S. for petroleum production and chemical
processing and considered a significant safety hazard. As a result of the number of security
targets in this area, the port receives significant funding to secure these areas reflected in the
PSGP outlays for the port district. The primary container terminals are Barbours Cut and
Bayport with six general cargo terminals for bulk materials.
The port has its own police department though access control is performed by a private
security contractor, while tenants also have to hire their own private security firms (Pate et al.
2008). All the Port Police Officers are certified Peace Officers in the State of Texas, requiring
ongoing training and certifications (Port of Houston). Furthermore, the port has the Houston
Ship Channel Security District (HSCSD), a public/private partnership of the major facilities that
make up the port terminals and industry in the area of the Houston Ship Channel. It undertakes
assessments of the public and private facilities along Houston Ship Channel facilities and
supports funding of security initiatives on behalf of its constituent stakeholders (Deepening Port
of Houston).
Physical
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The port’s primary vulnerabilities are physical with a large open structure considering the
spread out structure of the port along the Houston River channel, however the CES is not located
on the terminal or the port (World Trade Distribution Inc.). The port does have a heightened
level of peripheral companies for the level of traffic, but not in the highest category of
vulnerability, though there is a high level of daily vehicular traffic at the port (Port of Houston
Authority).
Administrative
The port scores in two administrative vulnerability categories. The port displays the
presence of an illicit import/export market. The Houston area HIDTA identifies the Port of
Houston as a possible transit point for illicit cargo, primarily narcotics, and poses a viable threat
to the HIDTA region--a threat that has increased since the development of the Bayport Container
Terminal which increased the ports container handling operations. Like many large ports, the
Port of Houston links the city and region with 1,053 ports in 203 countries; these links make the
port vulnerable to drug smuggling (NDIC 2009; The Guardian 2009). However, as with most
ports, the scope of maritime smuggling is a significant intelligence gap. In the Port of Houston
region this is in part, because of the numerous remote locations along the Houston HIDTA
coastline in which drug smugglers can conduct their activities with little risk of detection. The
port is considered to be a possible point of smuggling but there is little public evidence of the
port being utilized more than other more easily and less visible areas in the region, such as along
the Inter-coastal Waterway and the coastline. Paradoxically the proximity of the port to the land
border with Mexico, means that the port is less likely to be utilized for illicit inbound shipments,
though it has been used an export port for illicit narcotics bound for Europe and Asia (The
Guardian 2009). In addition, to its recognition as an HIDTA county (ONDCP 2015), the port
region also has significant cargo thefts with 36 reported thefts March 2013-2015 (FreightWatch
International).
The port does not display significant organization or employee corruption, with one
incident of corruption in a Houston stationed CBP officer, slightly raising its vulnerability in this
area (United States of America v. Rizman Saeed 2008).
Logistical
The Port of Houston is one of the largest ports in the U.S. and in this category is rated
with the highest level of vulnerability.
Port of Oakland - 23.5
The Port of Oakland is the 4th largest container terminal in the U.S. and the 3rd largest in
California and is the primary import/export port for northern California with 99 percent of the
containerized goods destined for the region. The port has eight container terminals with two
intermodal rail facilities. Union Pacific and BNSF railroad facilities are located adjacent to the
center of the marine terminal area to provide an efficient movement of cargo between the marine
terminals or transfer facilities (Cannon 2006). The Port of Oakland does not have a standalone
police force and contracts with Alameda County Sheriff’s Office for port security services
(Alameda County Sheriff’s Office).
Physical
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The Port of Oakland’s primary vulnerabilities are due to its physical layout, with an open
structure, multiple entrance/exit points, and open container yards. The port also has a CES
within a quarter mile of the port leading it to have a heightened vulnerability for CRAVED
goods. Truck traffic estimates at the port range widely but at the low end of the estimate with
2,000 trucks a day (Swedberg 2007), the port scores at a medium level of vulnerability while the
high estimate of 10,000 trucks provides a significantly higher score (Prakash 2013). The port was
scored in between mid and high for this vulnerability.
Administrative
The port does not score highly for administrative vulnerabilities. Primarily it is located in
a significant illicit import/export market, with an above average NICB score, though with few
reported cargo thefts in the area. The port is located in an HIDTA county (ONDCP 2015), but
according to the NDIC (2011) a “lack of actionable intelligence makes it difficult for CBP to
determine the level and extent of drug trafficking at Ports of Oakland and San Francisco. Though
of what is known there is not a significant quantity of illicit narcotics moving through the port. ”
Instead narcotics are primarily moved across the southern border and to the extensive narcotics
markets of the Bay Area. Furthermore, the port does not have a dedicated police force, and is
not staffed on a 24 hour basis like most other ports in the U.S. and has not built a centralized
center for surveillance over the port (Kane 2014) leading to jurisdictional vulnerability as its law
enforcement needs must be contracted out to local law enforcement agencies. However, there is
no evidence of vulnerabilities such as organizational or employee corruption, nor is there any
evidence of a historical presence of criminal networks in port operations.
Logistical
The Port of Oakland is one of the largest ports in the U.S. with throughput of 2.3 million
TEUs yearly.
Port of Tacoma – 23
The Port of Tacoma is an independent municipal organization governed by the Port of
Tacoma Commission as a limited operating port (Pate et al. 2008). The port handles more than
70 percent of cargo destined for or from the central and eastern regions of North America and
more than 70 percent of the marine cargo moving between the lower 48 states and Alaska and
ranks 7th in container traffic with no passenger traffic. Most facilities are leased to tenants that
provide their own private security but the port also operates some facilities. The port has an
armed non-sworn patrol force, Port Security Department and relies on the Tacoma Police
Department for law enforcement (Pate et al. 2008). The Port Security Department consists of
approximately 61 employees, including one Chief and one Director (Port of Tacoma). Port
Security Department employees receive training from the Tacoma Police Department academy.
Tenants that own or lease property provide their own access and control measures, and Port
Security personnel cannot access these areas without permission of the individual tenants (Pate et
al. 2008). As in all ports, according to the MTSA tenants are required to draft facility security
plans and provide those to the USCG however there are no formal arrangements to share plans
with Port Security personnel (MTSA 2002; Pate et al. 2008).
Physical
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Similar to other low-mid vulnerability ports, the Port of Tacoma primarily scores for
vulnerability in the physical layout with an open structure, presence of CRAVED goods, a large
vehicular presence at the port, and strong intermodal connections. The port has six terminals
with at least two entrances due to the location of the terminals across two port peninsulas with
containers housed in open yards on the terminals. The port does not have a CES on-site but
multiple warehousing firms at the port house high value CRAVED cargo (Port of Tacoma). The
port has two railway connections, BNSF and Union Pacific Railroad, with 20 percent of import
containers trans-loaded to 53-foot domestic boxes for rail shipment to points inland (Port of
Tacoma B).
Administrative
The primary vulnerability at the Port of Tacoma is that it is in an illicit import/export
market. Tacoma and Seattle are identified as HIDTA counties (ONDCP 2015) and are also in a
significant narcotics producing region, marijuana, in addition Tacoma is one of the top five
destination cities for heroin (National Drug Intelligence Center 2010). The port likewise
displays an above average hit rate for both NCIC and NICB hits. The port also displays
jurisdictional vulnerability. While the port has an armed, non-sworn patrol force, it must rely on
the Tacoma Police Department for law enforcement. In instances where a tenant or a port
employee notices suspicious activities, Port Security is called as the first response. However, in a
situation where a crime has been committed, tenants and port personnel call the Tacoma Police
Department for official police assistance. The port received a score in this vulnerability due to
the lack of a sworn police force on the port and reliance on the Tacoma PD for any official police
assistance. Furthermore, the Port Security Service is unionized within the same union as the
longshore labor force, potentially creating conflicts of interest (Gillie 2013).
Logistical
The port is a mid-level vulnerability port with nearly two million TEUs in 2013.
Port of San Diego – 23
The San Diego Unified Port District is a special government entity formed in 1962 by an
act of the California legislature in order to manage San Diego Harbor. The Port of San Diego is
one of 17 commercial ports designated a “controlled port,” with special access controls due to
security reasons (Bondareff and Contras 2012). It is an operating port, with a dedicated police
department, the San Diego Harbor Police Department, responsible for the San Diego Bay, the
San Diego International Airport, and all Tidelands around the bay, throughout all five member
cities of the Port District (Port of San Diego).
Physical
The port’s primary vulnerabilities are physical with an open structure, high volume of
daily truck traffic at the port, and a high level of peripheral companies in the region relative to
the size of the cargo throughput. However the port does not have CRAVED goods as there is no
evidence of a CES nor does the trade profile of San Diego include high value cargo with
principal inbound cargoes such as perishables and refrigerated commodities, fertilizer, cement,
breakbulk commodities, and forest products (including newsprint, cut paper and cut sheet stock)
and primary export cargoes include refrigerated cargo, breakbulk and bulk commodities. Dole
267

Fresh Fruit Company is a tenant of the terminal, importing about 2 billion bananas a year, but
this is not a CRAVED commodity (Port of San Diego).
Administrative
The primary administrative vulnerability is that the port is located in a heavy illicit
import/export market. San Diego is a heavy import narcotics district but primarily through the
land border reflected through its listing as an HIDTA county (ONDCP 2015), and through the
use of small vessels which make drug drops along the coast between San Diego and Los
Angeles76. The Port of San Diego itself is not noted for narcotics seizures as there are multiple
other means available to import narcotics in the region. However, the heavy presence of Latin
American and Eurasian transnational organized crime groups in the region makes the port a
vulnerable component in the transportation chain in the San Diego region. In addition, cargo
thefts are present in elevated numbers in the region, with 13 reported from March 2013-2015
(FreightWatch International).
Logistical
The Port of San Diego is a low throughput container port with under 100,000 TEUs
yearly.
Port of Boston – 22
A small port with the 24th largest container volume in the U.S., the Port of Boston is the
main maritime port managed by the Massachusetts Port Authority (Pate et al. 2008).
MASSPORT is not a state agency though law enforcement at the port is provided through Troop
F of the Massachusetts State Police and MASSPORT Police which are stationed at the port. The
port’s primary terminal, Conley Terminal, is operated by MASSPORT and handles all
containerized traffic at the port (MASSPORT B), while the port also has an automobile terminal
capable of handling 70,000 vehicles a year, privately owned petroleum and liquefied natural gas
terminals, which supply more than 90% of Massachusetts' heating and fossil fuel needs, and a
private operated cruise terminal (MASSPORT C). Troop F is a distinct component of the
Massachusetts State Police and includes numerous specialized assets such as a dedicated
Detective Unit, Bomb Squad, Community Services Unit, and Marine Unit. In addition, the troop
also maintains State Police K-9 Teams are maintained on site at Logan Airport (MASSPORT).
Physical
The ports primary vulnerabilities in this category are the large number of peripheral
companies, the level of daily truck traffic (Boston Globe 2013), and the level of intermodal
connectivity but the port does not have a CES on-site.
Administrative
The Port of Boston primarily rates highly in two areas. It has a heightened score as an
illicit import/export market but rates only for having a significant local narcotics market
(ONDCP 2015) and not a large cargo theft environment. While, Boston is a consumer drug
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See Appendix B for a list of all small vessel, or panga, interceptions and seizures. The Port of San Diego is the
nearest port for 68% of identified panga interceptions from 2009-present.
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market it is primarily supplied by distributors from Lowell, MA, Lawrence, MA and New York
City. The Port of Boston is identified as vulnerable due to the volume of commerce, but that is
low compared to other ports along the eastern seaboard. According to the HIDTA most narcotics
are known to be supplied through the southeastern seaboard inbound ports such as Miami, NYC,
and Savannah (NDIC 2011 B). In addition, for employee corruption, there is evidence of
employment fraud within the longshore community but no evidence related to the facilitation of
illicit maritime transportation (Zezima 2006).
Logistical
A low throughput port, Boston rates at the low end of logistical vulnerability, with near
200,000 TEUs yearly.
Port of Philadelphia – 21
The Port of Philadelphia is operated by the Philadelphia Regional Port Authority (PRPA).
The PRPA is a Pennsylvania state and owns six terminals on the Delaware River in the
Philadelphia area. These terminals are leased to private operators while PRPA provides
maintenance, marketing, and other services. The port is primarily a break bulk port, with just
38% of all cargo in 2006 containerized, leading it to have a low throughput. The primary
container port, Packer Avenue Marine Terminal handles the vast majority of containerized traffic
at the port with seven lift cranes and utilizing an automated gate system (PRPA 2007). The port
does not have a dedicated law enforcement agency but does have a Security Division which
handles non-sworn officer security functions and fulfills the primary security role.
Physical
The port’s primary container terminal, Packer Avenue Marine Terminal, has one primary
entry/exit point, through an automated gateway system, however the terminal is located directly
adjacent to residential areas and near large public access roadways such as I-95, increasing the
port’s vulnerability. The CES is not located near the primary terminals, and is roughly 17 miles
from the primary container terminal leading to a low CRAVED score, considering that the
majority of cargo transiting through the port is bulk cargo (U.S. CBP May 13 2013). However
the port has a significant freight forwarder presence, partially a result of the proximity to the
import/export area of NY/NJ. Truck traffic at the port creates a moderate level of vulnerability
relative to container traffic, and rail connectivity is significant with three rail lines leading to a
high level of intermodal vulnerability.
Administrative
The primary vulnerability in this category is that the port scores moderately for illicit
import/export market. The port is in an HIDTA county (ONDCP 2015) though maritime methods
are not identified as a primary method of drug imports for the region, while the port is located in
a significant region for cargo theft with 69 incidents between March 2013-2015 (FreightWatch).
In addition, the lack of a dedicated police force for the port increases the jurisdictional
vulnerability of the port, despite the presence of a Division of Security which itself is the result
of the requirements under the MTSA.
Logistical
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The port scores low in this vulnerability with 367,000 TEUs in 2013.
Port of Freeport (Texas) – 20
The Port of Freeport is an operating port and an autonomous governmental entity
authorized by an act of the Texas Legislature in 1925. The port is governed by a Port
Commission, with commissioners serving six-year staggered terms and who are elected by local
residents. The port ranks 27th in container traffic and is primarily a bulk cargo port. The port
has a separate security division and also works with the Freeport Police Department, Brazoria
County Sheriff’s Department, and Texas Department of Public Safety officers who enforce local,
state and some federal laws within the Port and have arrest authority (Port Freeport).
Physical
Primary vulnerabilities at the Port of Freeport are peripheral company access with the
Houston area freight forwarding community having ready access to Port of Freeport, and
considering the level of cargo, this heightens the level of vulnerability. The port also has a
heightened level of vehicle traffic and an intermodal landscape that increases vulnerability, with
50,000 railway car transits yearly and with a heightened level of daily vehicular truck traffic
(Port Freeport B), though there is only one connecting railway, Union Pacific (Texas Department
of Transportation 2005).
Administrative
The primary administrative vulnerability at Freeport is the location of a significant illicit
import/export market. As Freeport is just 30 miles from Houston, it has a similar illicit import
and export market conditions. In addition, the port has a heightened level of jurisdictional
vulnerability as security services are outsourced to a private company, Sunstate Security, without
a dedicated port police (Port Freeport B).
Logistical
Freeport has a low level of container throughput indicating a low level of vulnerability
due to throughput.
Port of Seattle – 20
The Port of Seattle is a municipal corporation of the City of Seattle and operates as a
limited operating port, leasing some facilities to private tenants and operating others (Port of
Seattle; World Port Source B). The port is one of the largest container and breakbulk ports in the
U.S. ranking 9th in container throughput. The port has a dedicated police department, Port of
Seattle Police Department which is the primary law enforcement agency within the jurisdiction
of the Port of Seattle. The Port of Seattle Police is a certified law enforcement agency with
sworn officers and is accredited with the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement
Agencies (CALEA), one of the only port police agencies with CALEA accreditation. The Port
Police has multiple units to address the wider set of responsibilities that it must manage
including the airport and resident communities within the Port of Seattle. These units include a
dive team, boat team, bomb disposal unit, crisis negotiation team, criminal investigations unit, K9 unit, and a special response/tactical team (Port of Seattle B). In addition to the Port Police, the
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Port of Seattle also has a security department with responsibility for port security and tenants
hire their own private security guards (Pate et al. 2008).
Physical
The primary vulnerabilities at the Port of Seattle are the open structure, a heavy daily
presence of vehicular traffic, and a high level of intermodal connectivity with two terminals with
on-dock rail access and 20% of all cargo moved by rail transit. CRAVED cargo is primarily not
kept at the port, but in the warehousing areas in the industrial section south of the port, while the
CES is located in Fife, Washington nearly 40 miles from the port (Mercer Logistics).
Administrative
The port does not display significant administrative vulnerabilities with no evidence for
administrative vulnerabilities except for the presence of an illicit import/export market with
Seattle located in an HIDTA county (ONDCP 2015) and with an above average rate of NICB
and NCIC hits.
Logistical
The port has a mid-level of vulnerability with cargo throughput of 1.2 million TEUs
yearly.
Port of Hueneme – 20
The Port of Hueneme is primarily an agricultural export port in central California and
services the central valley region as well as being the only deep-draft port between Los Angeles
and San Francisco along the California coast. The port is a landlord port owned and operated by
the Oxnard Harbor District, created in 1937, as an independent special district and political
subdivision of the State of California (Port of Hueneme). In addition to the port’s agricultural
import/export operations, the Port specializes in handling automobiles, bulk cargo, and provides
significant support and supplies for the offshore oil industry and is 28th in overall container
traffic (CalTrans Office of System and Freight Planning 2012). Security at the port is
multifaceted. The District has several specialized Memoranda of Understanding with local
public safety agencies, including the Ventura County Fire Protection District for fire services, the
Cities of Port Hueneme and Oxnard for police service at District. The Port Hueneme Police
Department performs regular patrols of District properties under a municipal services contract.
In addition, District “wharfingers” oversee the activities of the wharf and are utilized as internal
port security officers in addition a contract service company that provides access control at the
main gate (Ventura County Grand Jury 2008).
Physical
The port has two primary physical vulnerabilities with a large presence of peripheral
companies due to its proximity to the Los Angeles region and a heightened level of vehicular
traffic for the size of the container cargo at the port. Hueneme is primarily an agricultural port of
export for the California central valley and handles a low throughput of container cargo.
Administrative
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The primary vulnerability for the Port of Hueneme is its location in an illicit
import/export market in the greater Los Angeles region though the port is not located in an
HIDTA county (ONDCP 2015). Therefore, measures for cargo theft increase the cargo theft
scoring for the port. The port also rates a slightly elevated vulnerability with a lack of a
dedicated port police though the presence of Naval Base Ventura County and the Coastal Trident
Program established by the Port of Hueneme and the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for
Asymmetric Warfare as a comprehensive training and exercise program for the Port of Hueneme
alleviates jurisdictional vulnerability. This program has developed into a regional maritime
security and response program, enabling operational evaluation of leading-edge technology
systems, with participation by approximately 90 organizations and departments (Port of
Hueneme 2014).
Logistical
The port handles less than 100,000 TEUs yearly and rates low in logistical vulnerability.
Port of Portland – 18
The Port of Portland is a limited operating port with four main marine terminals along the
Columbia River and is governed by the nine-member Port of Portland Commission which sets
port policy (Port of Portland). The port is located along the Columbia-Snake River and extensive
barge operations services the grain and agricultural producers along the eastern banks of the
Snake River and Willamette Valley in central Oregon. The port has one significant container
terminal, Terminal 6, which is operated under a 25 year lease by ICTCI, a Philippines based
terminal operating company. The port is 25th largest for container traffic but is in danger of
losing significant traffic through a combination of labor disputes between the ILWU and ICTCI
and the withdrawal of Hanjin, the largest container service, constituting the bulk of container
traffic to Asia and Hapag-Lloyd, the only direct connection to Europe (The Oregonian 2015; The
Oregonian 2015 B). To provide law enforcement for these facilities, the Port of Portland has a
dedicated police department, Port of Portland Port Police which historically had jurisdiction only
over the airport but in 2009 the Oregon Legislature expanded authorities to cover all of the Port
of Portland facilities including the marine terminals (Oregon Legislative Assembly 2009).
Physical
The port’s primary vulnerabilities are in this category with a heightened vulnerability for
open structure, with four terminals, with multiple access points and the port near public access
roads but no major highways are near the port. While containers are kept in open access yards
most of the cargo at Portland is bulk and ro-ro, thereby decreasing the level of vulnerability for
open structure. The port has a high level of peripheral companies and daily vehicle traffic
increasing levels of vulnerability in those areas.
Administrative
The Port of Portland Police Department is primarily the department for the international
airport and not for the marine terminals, only recently granted jurisdiction over the marine
terminals. However, the primary component of vulnerability in this area is that the port has lost
significant container traffic with the loss of major shippers, Hanjin and Hapag-Lloyd, which may
lead to a lack of employment opportunities for previously employed longshore workers, truck
272

drivers, and warehousemen with significant knowledge of the port and operations. There is no
evidence of organization or employee corruption nor a historical criminal presence in port
operations.
Logistical
The port does not have a high level of cargo throughput, with primarily bulk grain
shipments, and has a low level of logistical vulnerability.
Port of Wilmington (Delaware) – 18
The Port of Wilmington is owned and operated by the Diamond State Port Corporation
(DSPC), a corporate entity of the State of Delaware (Port of Wilmington). The port is a
significant import port for bananas, the largest import port for perishable refrigerated need cargo
and the primary export port on the East Coast for livestock, and is 19th in overall container
traffic. The port operates seven deepwater general cargo berths, a tanker berth, and a berth for
RoRo vessels on the Christina River, as well as an automobile and roro berth on the Delaware
River (Delaware World Trade Center). The port has a standalone police department, the Port of
Wilmington Harbor Police (Port of Wilmington B).
Physical
Primary vulnerabilities at the port include a heightened level of freight forwarders. The
northeast corridor region, due to the level of cargo transited not only through maritime means but
also through air and land transportation has high levels of freight forwarders which is reflected
for high scores in that category for ports in this region. In addition, the port has a heightened
level of daily truck traffic vulnerability, though the data is based on truck traffic before rail
operations re-started at the port and intermodal traffic likely increased (Wilmapco 2009).
Administrative
The primary vulnerability identified at Wilmington (DE) is that it located in a significant
illicit import export market. The port is located in a region with significant cargo thefts, 26
reported between March 2013-2015, and an above average level of NICB identified stolen
vehicles. Wilmington is considered part of the consolidated Port of Philadelphia, which consists
of the waterfront areas of Philadelphia, Camden, and Wilmington (DE) and is a busy multi-port
complex. Wilmington’s level of cargo traffic is considered sufficient enough for traffickers to
inset illicit cargo through the port to smuggle illicit drugs into the region (NDIC 2011c) but
compared to other ports on the eastern seaboard it has a relatively low throughput.
Logistical
The port has 330,000 TEUs yearly which places it in the low range of logistical
vulnerability.
Port of Gulfport – 17
The Port of Gulfport is managed by the Mississippi State Port Authority which is an
independent agency of the state of Mississippi and does not receive funding from the state.
Security functions are maintained at the port through contract with an independent security guard
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protection service. The service provides continuous surveillance of all Port facilities, protects
against unlawful entry and pilferage, enforces fire detection control regulations and performs
other assigned security duties. The security functions of the service are coordinated with
municipal, county, state and federal law enforcement authorities (Mississippi State Port
Authority at Gulfport 2012). The Port of Gulfport is a landlord port and rents facilities and
terminal operations to private companies and in 2013 was the 23rd largest container port in the
U.S.
Physical
Gulfport is one of the smaller ports in the U.S. serving a regional market and having
suffered significant devastation during Hurricane Katrina has had difficulty re-establishing
market share. The port itself is not large but does have an open structure, with a significant
presence of freight forwarders, though no CRAVED cargo is housed at the port which primarily
is an import port for refrigerated cargo (Port of Gulfport). The port displays a heightened level
of truck traffic with 47 companies operating in the port, but due to a lack of definitive
information on daily truck movements the port does not score at the highest level in this
vulnerability.
Administrative
Hurricane Katrina exposed several interagency coordination issues at the port, nor is
there any evidence that the port participates in an Area Maritime Security Committee. Following
Hurricane Katrina, Port of Gulfport and Harrison County Emergency Management officials in
Mississippi said they had limited contact and coordination regarding emergency recovery.
Emergency management officials noted that there are difficulties in communicating with the port
due to the fact that they are required through the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency to
request or provide assistance to the port. While not a specific port security related concern, the
lack of interoperability and interagency communication is a significant concern that can lead to
vulnerability for broader port security issues (U.S. GAO 2007). The port rate for medium
vulnerability for an illicit import/export market, as part of an HIDTA county (NDIC 2011;
ONDCP 2015) does register above average NCIC and NICB hit rates for vehicle exports. The
primary administrative vulnerability at the port is that Gulfport contracts its security to a private
contractor which is not a licensed law enforcement entity (Port of Gulfport). Without a fully
licensed security agency managing security at the port, there is a lack of jurisdiction in terms of
arrest authority. Significantly for a port with its primary business as refrigerated cargo, recently
one of the primary tenants, Chiquita Brands, pulled out of the port as of late 2014 (Bonney
2014). The loss of a tenant means that there will be a fewer employment opportunities for
previously employed longshore workers, truck drivers, and warehousemen with significant
knowledge of the port and operations, and which can lead to a heightened level of vulnerability
to criminal networks that may decide to move cargo through the port.
Logistical
Gulfport is a low throughput port, with just over 200,000 TEUs yearly in 2013, though
this is now likely to be significantly decreased with the departure of Chiquita Brands.
Port of Mobile – 17
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The Port of Mobile is the primary port managed by the Alabama State Port Authority
(ASPA) and is an operating port. The Port of Mobile is a significant bulk port, the largest for
forest products and coal in the United States while 22nd in overall container traffic. The port has
41 berths that can provide full services to shippers from intermodal transfer and handling, to
storage and on dock security, through the ASPA Port Police (Alabama State Port Authority).
The ASPA also manages 10 terminals further inland along the rivers along the state waterway
system (Mobile Metropolitan Planning Organization).
Physical
The primary vulnerabilities identified at the port are its open set-up, similar to most ports
in the U.S. with multiple entry/exit points for Mobile terminal along the Mobile River providing
easy access, port facilities near the I-10 and I-65 interstate highways, and containers stored in
open yards on-site at the port. This leads the port to score high on the open structure
vulnerability components. The port displays a medium level of vulnerability with medium-level
of freight forwarders for the amount of container traffic at the port. The port was scored at a
medium level for intermodal traffic, because while data to identify truck trips was not available,
the high level of rail intermodal at the port likely pushes its vehicular presence lower since 25%
of cargo is transported by rail by five railroad operators (J.R. Wilburn and Associates Inc. 2013).
Administrative
No significant administrative vulnerabilities were identified for the port, with no evidence
in the public record of a historical presence of criminal networks operating in port economic
sectors, or evidence or organizational or employee corruption. The port scores low for an illicit
import/export market with low levels of cargo thefts, negligible export automobile traffic, or
evidence that Mobile has many seizures of illicit narcotics or other illegal cargo, though Mobile
is an HIDTA county in the Gulf Coast HIDTA group (NICB 2010b; ONDCP 2015).
Logistical
The port does have not a significant throughput load of 224,614 TEUs yearly but carries
significant levels of coal and forest products.
Port of Honolulu – 16
The Port of Honolulu is the 19th largest container port in the United States and is
managed and operated by the Hawaii Department of Transportation Harbors Division. The port
handles all international cargo into or out of Hawaii and the majority of traffic from the mainland
United States. The port has one primary facility for international cargo, at Fort Armstrong, with
a total of 38 piers handling many smaller vessels and barges for inter-island traffic (Hawaii
Department of Transportation B). As an operating port the Hawaii Department of Transportation
Harbor Police is the primary law enforcement agency for the port and all others on the islands
(Hawaii Department of Transportation).
Physical
Honolulu Harbor is the largest port in the Hawaiian islands and provides the main entry
point for imported cargo which is then transferred to other islands primarily through barges. The
Port of Honolulu has heightened open structure vulnerability, with multiple piers with entry and
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exits points throughout. However, the main container terminal at Sand Island that handles the
bulk of cargo throughput has one only one road linking it to the large island of Hawaii reducing
access. While containers are housed in open spaces many are transported by barge immediately
after arriving and therefore do not stay on site of extended periods of time. The port does have
an on-site CES located at Pier 42 increasing its CRAVED goods vulnerability (Islandmovers).
Administrative
The Port of Hawaii is in an HIDTA identified county (ONDCP 2015) and has been
identified as transshipment point for illicit narcotics bound for the western Pacific, primarily
Guam (NDIC 2011). While air cargo, through Honolulu International Airport is identified as a
methamphetamine shipment method, traffickers also use Hawaii as a transshipment point for
Mexican methamphetamine bound for the Pacific Basin, primarily Guam. However, the
maritime transportation of illicit narcotics in transit to and from the continental U.S. is an
intelligence gap. The HIDTA identifies both limited information and resources make both
detecting and interdicting illicit cargo challenging for law enforcement officials (NDIC 2011).
Furthermore, the Port of Honolulu has a challenging jurisdictional environment with a number of
inter-operability and interagency communication difficulties highlighted by a Maritime
Intelligence Sharing Taskforce (Salem et al. 2010). Participants in the taskforce identified
several areas where the policies or processes of different agencies were not well coordinated.
These gaps included a lack of consistency and poor inclusion in emergency operations processes,
and focused on the lack of coordination with the port and terminal industry that operate port
sites, an inconsistent approaches to the delivery of sensitive information, a lack of unified
security plans, inconsistent training programs and a complex regulatory landscape that does not
adapt well to individual ports. In addition in recent years, the Hawaii DOT Harbor Police, which
has jurisdiction over port security at ports in Hawaii, were stripped of their right to use firearms
in response to a lack of developed regulations and training, though this was reinstated following
introduction of SOPs for firearms use (Baehr 2011).
Logistical
As the primary cargo port for the Hawaiian Islands, the Port of Honolulu has heightened
vulnerability in terms of throughput with over one million TEUs yearly.
Port of Kahului – 16
The Port of Kahului is a small port on the island of Maui which is owned and operated by
the Hawaii Department of Transportation. It is unique in this analysis because it does not accept
any foreign container traffic, all of which transits to/from the port through Honolulu. The
Hawaii Department of Transportation (HDOT) has a separate police force which provides
security for all HDOT facilities including Kahului (Hawaii Department of Transportation). The
port received a heightened vulnerability score for the level of financial inlays through the PSGP
due to the level of container throughput at the port. Kahului had the lowest level of PSGP
investment of any port in the U.S. at $.27 per 2013 container where average is $56.41 per 2013
container.
Physical
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As the smallest port in the MVF sample, Kahului has few identified vulnerabilities. The
primary vulnerability is the open structure of the port, with the port composed of three piers with
multiple entry/exit points.
Administrative
The port does not have any identified heightened levels of administrative vulnerability.
Logistical
The port has a low level of throughput with just over 80,000 TEUs yearly, the vast
majority which is for local consumption on the island.
Port of Wilmington (North Carolina) – 13
The Port of Wilmington NC is operated by the North Carolina State Ports Authority
(NCSPA), governed by an 11 member Board of Directors, partially appointed by the Governor,
the General Assembly and the North Carolina Department of Transportation (North Carolina
State Port Authority). The NCSPA has jurisdiction over two ports, Wilmington and Morehead
City, with Wilmington rated as the 20th largest in container volume. The NCSPA has a
dedicated port police; the North Carolina State Port Police Department includes sworn police
officers and security officers at both the Port of Morehead City and the Port of Wilmington.
Physical
Primary vulnerability at Wilmington (NC) is for a heightened level of open structure
vulnerability. Terminal facilities have more than one entry/exit point, containers are housed in
open yards, but port facilities are not near large public access roads such as interstate highways.
Wilmington also has a high level of freight forwarders for the level of throughput at the port, in
addition to proportionally large numbers of truck access.
Administrative
Wilmington does not score for any administrative vulnerability except for a heightened
level of illicit import/export market vulnerability. The port has been identified in previous years
as an importation point (National Drug Intelligence Center 2003; DEA 2005), and seizures pre2005 indicate that narcotics have transited the port, however most recent data show that the port
does seem to be utilized at the same levels as in previous years (ONDCP 2015).
Logistical
A low throughput port, Wilmington scores low in this area, with 260,000 TEUs yearly.
Port of Anchorage – 11
The Port of Anchorage is an enterprise department under the Municipality of Anchorage
and a landlord port. Similar to other municipal enterprise ports, the port generates revenue and
receives no taxpayer funds, in addition to providing funds to the municipality. The port has 4
bulk carrier berths and two petroleum berths (Port of Anchorage). The port does not have a
standalone police department and instead contracts with Doyon Security Services which provides
20 armed officers that man CCTV cameras and perform the access control (Port of Anchorage
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B). In addition the City of Anchorage Police Department responds to any incidents on the port
(Alaska Dispatch New 2015). Due to the oil, gas and fishing industry and that it is Alaska’s
main port of entry for import/export cargo, Anchorage is a significant throughput port, ranked
15th in container traffic. The port received a heightened vulnerability score for the level of
financial inlays through the PSGP due to the level of container throughput at the port.
Anchorage had the second lowest level of PSGP investment of any port in the U.S. at $7.73 per
2013 container where average is $56.41 per 2013 container.
Physical
The port does not have significant physical vulnerabilities. The port is open structure, as
the port has three terminals, a staging area south of the port where containers are offloaded for
intermodal transport. The port has at least four entrances that can be identified in addition to
multiple places without fencing. It is likely that truck traffic is significant at the port, but there is
a lack of data to identify the number of daily visits.
Administrative
The primary administrative vulnerability identified for Anchorage is the lack of a
dedicated port police as security services are contracted out to a private company, Doyen
Services which is not a law enforcement organization and does not have arrest authority at the
port. Instead Anchorage PD has to be called to respond to any incidents and does not maintain a
full time presence at the port. There is no evidence of organizational or employee corruption at
the port nor a history of criminal network use of port facilities or companies.
Logistical
The Port of Anchorage is low-level throughput port with just over 700,000 TEUs.
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Appendix I: Port of New York and New Jersey Case Study Interview Subjects


Waterfront Commission employees (10)
o Police chief (2011-2014)
o Executive director
o General Counsel
o Director of Administration and Auditing
o Director of Intelligence
o Director of Law, Licensing and EIC
o Managing director of Licensing
o Assistant counsel (2)
o Law fellow



New Jersey State Police (1)



Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (1)



Customs broker (1)



U.S. Customs and Border Protection PNYNJ officer (1)



American Association of Port Authorities, Director of Government Relations (1)



Former court appointed monitor for a waterfront union at the PNYNJ (1)



Port of Baltimore Director of Security (1)



Maritime lawyer in the PNYNJ region (1)



Former Program Manager, Regional Port Programs, Port Commerce Department, Port
Authority of New York & New Jersey (1)
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Appendix J: Cargo throughput- mid-Atlantic and Northeast port

Table 14: Cargo throughput- mid-Atlantic and Northeast port (AAPA 2013)
2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

Hampton Roads

2,223,532

2,105,886

1,918,029

1,895,017

1,745,228

2,083,278

2,128,366

2,046,285

1,981,955

New York/ New Jersey

5,467,345

5,529,913

5,503,485

5,292,025

4,561,528

5,265,058

5,299,105

5,092,806

4,785,318

Philadelphia

367,499

273,190

291,091

272,824

222,900

255,128

253,492

247,211

204,912

Boston

195,303

187,747

192,705

168,285

187,094

208,626

220,139

200,113

188,869

Baltimore

705,230

678,262

631,804

610,922

525,296

612,877

610,466

627,947

602,475
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Appendix K: CRAVED Commodity list
Adapted from U.S. Census Bureau statistics of commodities (U.S. Trade Numbers) found in the
U.S. comparative port sample, aggregated in alphabetical order and marked per FreightWatch
International top ten stolen cargo in 2014 (FreightWatch International 2014)
Table 15: CRAVED commodity list Source

Commodity
Acyclic alcohols
Aluminum ores and concentrates
Ammonia
Ash & Slag
Bananas
Beer
Binders for found molds; chemical products
Biodiesel fuels
Bitumen
Cane, beet sugar
Cassava
Chemical woodpulp
Chromium ores
Coal, briquettes
Cocoa Beans
Coffee
Commercial vehicles
Corn
Cyclic hydrocarbons
Dates, figs, pineapples
Dolomite
Ferroalloys 7202
Fish fillets, chilled or frozen
Flat-rolled iron
Fork-lifts, other
Fresh apples
Fruit and vegetables
Fruit, nuts, preserved
Furniture, parts
Gasoline, other fuels

CRAVED- Food/Drink, Electronics, Home &
Garden, Building & Industrial, Clothing &
Shoes, Metals, Autos & Parts, Personal Care,
Miscellaneous, Alcohol, Pharmaceuticals,
Tobacco
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Glass containers
Glazed ceramics
Granulated Slag
Grapes, fresh
Gypsum
Halogenated derivatives of hydrocarbons
Hardware for fixtures
Imports of returned
Iron and steel
Lime
Live crustaceans
Machinery for rubber, plastic industry, parts
Melons and papayas
Men's or boys' suits, knit or crocheted
Men's or boys suits, not knit
Men's or boys' underwea
Misc. aluminumin
Misc. dead aninmals
Misc. flat rolled steel
Misc. fresh vegetables
Misc. mineral or chemical fertilizers
Misc. minerals
Misc. vegetables frozen
Miscellaneous medical chemical re-agents
Molasses
Motor vehicle parts
Motor vehicles for transporting people
Mussels, scallops, other mollusks
Natural Barium
Natural waters
Nitrites, nitrates
Nitrogenous fertilizers
Oil
Palm oil
Paper and paper products
Paper cartons
Paper, uncoated
Peat
Pebbles, gravel
Petroleum Gas
Petroleum products
Photo-sensitive semi-conductors, parts
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Pig iron
Plastic boxes
Portland, aluminum
Preparations for animal feeding
Railway Etc Tracks
Rice
Rubber
Rubber tires
Rum, gin, vodka, other liquors
Sands
Misc. mineral or chemical fertilizers
Scrap iron, steel
Screws, nuts
Seamless iron tubes and pipes
Seats, excluding dentist and barber chairs
Self-propelled heavy construction machinery
Semifinished products of Iron, nonalloy steel
Spongy ferrous iron
Steel ingots
Stone monument
Sweaters, pullovers
Sweetened waters
Titanium Ores
Tractors
T-shirts, tank t
Various forms of salt
Washing machinces
Wheat
Wine
Women's or girls slips
Wood, sawed
Yachts and other
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